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Peter Rodman

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Michael Green

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

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THE NATIONAL INTEREST NUMBER 60, SUMMER 2000

Articles

5 **The American Way of Victory** *by James Kurth*
The twentieth century witnessed, and its course was largely defined by, a trilogy of American wartime victories. But in the aftermath of the first two, the peace was lost. After the Cold War, will that happen again?

17 **Living With a New Europe** *by Zbigniew Brzezinski*
The challenge posed to the United States by the European Union is seriously exaggerated—and this is particularly true of the proposal for an all-European defense force. *Daniel Vernet, Christoph Bertram* and *Timothy Garton Ash* respond.

33 **The World's Resentment** *by Peter W. Rodman*
Identifying the source and assessing the consequences of the revival and diffusion of anti-Americanism in world politics.

42 **The Forgotten Player** *by Michael J. Green*
For seven years, the Clinton administration has ignored or belittled the political importance of Japan. As nationalism reawakens in that country, this may prove to be a costly mistake.

50 **Putin's Precursors** *by Laurent Murawiec*
In Russia, Modernization and Westernization are hardly one and the same thing. Persistent attempts to achieve the former while avoiding the latter have been a major source of Russian repression.

55 **Culture Matters** *by Lawrence E. Harrison*
As unacceptable as the notion is to many in a relativistic age, culture is a—if not the—determining factor in the economic progress of countries.

66 **Nyerere: A Flawed Hero** *by R.W. Johnson*
To acknowledge that Nyerere was better than most African leaders of his generation amounts to only modest praise. His record was a decidedly mixed one.

76 **Lessons Unlearned** *by Thomas Donnelly*
From Panama to Kosovo: the decline and incoherence of American warfighting.

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83 **Keeping the Coast Guard Afloat** *by Colin S. Gray*
The fifth armed service is sinking. A proposal to rescue it.

88 **Germany's Illiberal Fictions** *by Jacob Heilbrunn*
From Thomas Mann to Günter Grass, German novelists have for years provided the outside world with an insight into their country's political culture. It's not a pretty picture.

95 **The Challenge to Certainty** *by Zach Shore*
In his essay in the Winter issue, Alan Charles Kors got things half right. What he missed, however, is critical to an understanding of our age.

98 **Tainted Transactions: An Exchange**
Jeffrey Sachs, Anders Åslund, Marek Dabrowski, Peter Reddaway, Igor Aristov, Wayne Merry, Michael Hudson, David Ellerman, Steven Rosefielde, Janine Wedel

Books

111 **Attraction and Chastisement** *by Max Boot*
The counterinsurgency that worked—a century ago.

115 **The View From the Margins** *by Peter Hitchens*
Yet another contentious history from Norman Davies.

121 **An Ambiguous Legacy** *by Gabriel Schoenfeld*
Boris the Not-So-Great.

125 **Two Sides of the Same Coin** *by Joshua Muravchik*
Communism and fascism, cousins in disrepute.

128 **Nature's Pitchfork** *by Eric Jones*
The sky is falling, really.

Correspondence

133 Herbert May, Bob Ayers, Herb Greer, Adam van Sertima, Daniel Borinsky

Photo Essay

136 Idealism in the year 2000.

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The American Way of Victory

A Twentieth-Century Trilogy

James Kurth

THE TWENTIETH century, the first American century, was also the century of three world wars. The United States was not only victorious in the First World War, the Second World War and the Cold War, but it was more victorious than any of the other victor powers. As the preeminent victor power, the subsequent strategies of the United States did much to shape the three postwar worlds. They therefore also did much to prepare the ground for the second and third world wars in the sequence. Now, ten years after the American victory in that third, cold, world war, it is time to evaluate the U.S. victor strategies of the 1990s and to consider if they will make the twenty-first century a second American century, this time one of world peace and prosperity, or if they could lead, sometime in the next few decades, to a fourth world war.

The First and Second British Centuries

LIKE America at the beginning of the twenty-first century, Britain in the early nineteenth century had passed through a century of three wars that were worldwide in scope—the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–13), the Seven Years' War (1756–63) and the successive Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars (1792–1815). Britain had been victorious in each of these wars, making the eighteenth century something of a British one. The victor strategy that Britain pursued after the Napoleonic Wars laid the foundations for what has been called "the Hundred Years Peace" (1815–1914), making the second British century as peaceful as the first one had been warlike.[1]

The central elements of the British victor strategy were four; two involved international security and two involved the international economy.[2] The security elements were established immediately after the victory over Napoleon. They were, first, a British-managed balance of power system on the European continent, and, second, British naval supremacy in the rest

James Kurth is Claude Smith Professor of Political Science at Swarthmore College.

[1]Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), chapter 1.

[2]Realist theories of international relations focus on international security; liberal theories focus on the international economy. In practice, however, successful strategies have combined both, e.g., the British strategy of the nineteenth century and the American strategy during the Cold War. At its best, the Anglo-American tradition in international relations has been *both* realist and liberal. See my "Inside the Cave: The Banality of I.R. Studies", *The National Interest* (Fall 1998).

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of the world. The economic elements were established about a generation later. They involved, third, British industrial supremacy operating in an open international economy (Britain serving as "the workshop of the world"), and, fourth, British financial supremacy, also operating in an open international economy (the City of London serving as "the world's central bank").

By the beginning of the twentieth century, however, British naval and industrial supremacy were threatened by the spectacular growth of German military and economic power. When in August 1914 it appeared that Germany was about to destroy the Continental balance of power system with its invasion of Belgium and France, Britain went to war to stop it. The Hundred Years Peace and the second British century came to a crashing and catastrophic end with the First World War.

Victory therefore presents a profound challenge to a victor power, especially to a pre-eminent one: it must create a victor strategy to order the postwar world in a way that does not lead to a new major war. The British victor strategy after the Napoleonic Wars was successful in meeting this challenge for almost a century. But even this sophisticated strategy ultimately proved inadequate to the task of managing the problems posed by the rise of a new and very assertive power. As shall be discussed below, the American victor strategies after the First and Second World Wars were similar to the earlier British one in their efforts to combine several different dimensions of international security and economy; indeed, the American strategies relied upon some of the same elements, particularly naval, industrial and financial supremacy. They did not, however, succeed in preventing the Second World War and the Cold War. The fundamental question for our time is whether the American victor strategies after the Cold War will succeed in preventing some kind of a new world war in the next century.

As it happens, the Spring 2000 issue of *The National Interest* contained an array of articles that can help us address this question. In considering the lessons that can be drawn from the earlier American experiences of living with victory, I shall be making use of them. In particular, these lessons underline the importance of managing the rise of Chinese military and economic power and of doing so in ways similar to those that Zbigniew Brzezinski advocates in his "Living With China." They also underline the danger but potential relevance of the arguments that Robert Kagan and William Kristol advance in their essay, "The Present Danger."

Living With Victory After the First World War

IT TOOK FOUR years of war and the massive engagement of the United States before, in November 1918, the Western Allies succeeded in defeating Germany. But even in defeat, the nation whose rise to military and economic power Britain had failed to manage still retained most of its inherent strengths. The German problem, which had been at the center of international relations before the war, was redefined by the Allied victory, but it was still there, and Western victory still had to focus upon the German reality.

Germany remained the central nation on the European continent. Demographically, it had the largest and best educated population in Europe. (Russia, although it had a larger population, was convulsed by revolution and civil war.) Economically, it had the largest and most advanced industry in Europe. Strategically, it faced formidable powers to the west (France and Britain), but to the east lay only new and weak states (Poland and Czechoslovakia). In this

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sense, Germany's strategic position was actually better after its defeat in the First World War than it had been before the war began, when to the east it had faced Russia as a great power. It would only be a matter of time before Germany recovered its political unity, gathered up its inherent strengths, and once again converted these into military and economic power. This was the long-term reality that the victorious Allies had to consider as they composed their victor strategies.

There were four basic strategies that different allies employed at different times: territorial dismemberment, military containment, security cooperation and economic engagement. These were not new inventions; they derived from the strategies employed by victor powers after earlier wars. The first two derived from territorial annexations and frontier fortifications, strategies that the Continental powers had used against each other in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The last two derived from the "concert of Europe", or balance of power system, and the open international economy that Britain had managed in the nineteenth century. But these strategies were not obsolescent conceptions; the latter three prefigured the victor strategies that the United States would employ after the Second World War and after the Cold War.

Territorial dismemberment and military containment.

One apparent solution to the German problem was territorial dismemberment. This was the strategy preferred by France. The dismemberment of a defeated enemy can sometimes be carried out by victorious powers, and the Allies did so with that other Central Power in World War I, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. But while this division destroyed a former adversary, it unleashed a sort of international anarchy in southeastern Europe that still reverberates today. Dismemberment is also what happened to the Soviet Union after the Cold War. Here too, while this division greatly diminished a former adversary, it has unleashed internal and international anarchy in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Whatever might be the advantages of dismemberment as a victor strategy, they were not applicable to Germany in 1919. By that time, the German nation had become a solid reality with a solid identity; it could not be permanently undone by artificial territorial divisions, unless these were enforced by military occupation (which is how the division of Germany was to be enforced after the Second World War). There are today a few international analysts who argue that the United States should encourage the territorial division of troublesome powers, particularly Russia and China. There are, however, hardly any specialists on China or even Russia who believe that a permanent division of these nations is possible.

An alternative but closely related solution to the German problem was military containment. This was the objective of the Treaty of Versailles, which set up what was known as the Versailles system to carry it out. Military containment was another victor strategy chosen by France, and in the early 1920s the French were quite active at implementing it, as in their military occupation of the Ruhr in 1923.

The Democratic administration of President Woodrow Wilson advanced a kinder, gentler version of the Versailles system in its proposals for a League of Nations and a U.S. security guarantee to France and Britain. The military containment of Germany embodied in the security guarantee would be institutionalized and legitimatized in a collective security system embodied in the League. But, of course, the Republican-controlled U.S. Senate rejected these proposals, and the United States never again considered the

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strategy of military containment as a solution to the German problem.

Economic engagement and security cooperation.

Instead, a few years later, the United States addressed the German problem (now accentuated by the unstable French occupation of the Ruhr) with a strategy of economic engagement. This took the form of the Dawes Plan, an ingenious project for financial recycling, in which American banks loaned capital to Germany, Germany paid war reparations to France and Britain, and France and Britain repaid war debts to the American banks. The Dawes Plan thus encouraged an open international economy among the most advanced economies, and it sought to integrate Germany into this mutually beneficial system.[3]

The Dawes Plan succeeded very well from 1924 to 1929. It formed the basis for Germany's reintegration not only into the international economic system but into the international security system as well. It encouraged France and Britain to develop a new strategy of security cooperation toward Germany. In 1925 they signed the Lucarno security treaty with Germany, and in 1926 Germany entered the League of Nations. The new American strategy of economic engagement seemed to be working far better than the earlier French strategy of military containment.

But as Charles Kindleberger famously demonstrated in his 1973 book, *The World in Depression 1929-1939*, an open international economic system requires an "economic hegemon" to keep it running, in bad times as well as good. The economic hegemon performs three essential functions: (1) providing long-term loans and investments (as in the Dawes Plan); (2) providing short-term credits and foreign exchange in times of currency crises; and (3) opening its markets to receive the exports of economies that are passing through recession. Britain had performed these functions before the First World War, and they in turn had provided the economic foundations for the Hundred Years Peace. After the war, however, Britain no longer had the economic strength to play the hegemon role, even though it still had the will. Conversely, the United States now had the economic strength but had not yet developed the will. The Dawes Plan was only one step in the right direction, and it was a step in only one dimension. Still, for a few years in the prosperous 1920s, the international economy seemed to be operating well enough without an economic hegemon.

The prosperous and open international economic system of the 1920s allowed the victor powers to engage in a strategy of security cooperation (or even appeasement, then still an innocuous term). Given the success of the strategies of economic engagement and security cooperation, the strategy of military containment appeared unnecessary or even counterproductive, and it was largely abandoned even by France. But, with the exception of the Dawes Plan, neither Britain nor the United States stepped forward to assume leadership in managing either the German problem or the international economy, in good times or bad.

With the beginning of the Great Depression (which Kindleberger ascribed to the failure of the United States to act as an economic hegemon), the prosperous and open economic system of the 1920s collapsed and was replaced with the impoverished and closed economic system of the 1930s. Whereas the prosperity system had permitted a strategy of appeasement, the poverty system required a strategy of containment. But for political reasons (polarization between the Left and the Right), France in the 1930s no

[3]P.M.H. Bell, *The Origins of the Second World War in Europe*, second edition (New York: Longman, 1997), chapter 3.

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longer had the political will to provide leadership for such a strategy.

Leadership in managing the German problem fell by default to Britain, which had never been a strong believer in the strategy of military containment. It chose instead a modest version of the strategy of economic engagement, at a time when the conditions of the Depression made this no longer adequate and attractive for Germany. Further, economic engagement seemed to imply a strategy of security appeasement, which was now even less appropriate for Germany. As for the United States, with the collapse of the Dawes Plan it gave up on any effort to manage the German problem at all.

Thus, by the early 1930s, none of the three victor powers from World War I—France, Britain and the United States—was pursuing a coherent and consistent strategy to preserve its victory. With the coming to power of the National Socialist regime, Germany decided to manage the German problem in its own way. The Second World War was the result.

ON THE OTHER side of the world in East Asia, the United States pursued a quite different strategy. Here it faced the rising power of Japan, which had been an ally of Britain since 1902 and which was one of the victor powers in the First World War. Japan's growing military and economic strengths and its ambitions in China presented a serious challenge to the dominant powers in East Asia in the early 1920s, the United States and Britain.

The Republican administration of President Warren G. Harding, and particularly his secretary of state, Charles Evans Hughes, took the lead in designing an innovative strategy of security cooperation to deal with Japan.[4] It convened a conference in Washington in 1921–22, out of which came the following security elements: the Washington Naval Treaty, an agreement between the United States, Britain and Japan to limit the numbers of their battleships; the Four-Power Treaty, which provided for consultations on security issues among these three powers plus France; and the Nine-Power Treaty, which provided for common principles and cooperation in regard to China. These arrangements, which were later called "the Washington system", were an elaboration of the U.S. strategy of security cooperation. However, the United States did not develop a comparable strategy of economic engagement for Japan, to serve as the basis for this security strategy. Instead, it largely relied on conventional international trade between the two nations, which seemed sufficient in the prosperous and open international economy of the 1920s. But with the beginning of the Great Depression, this international trade largely collapsed, and the collapse of the Washington system of security cooperation soon followed.

Thus by the mid-1920s, the United States had conceived of some important elements for a victor strategy. In Europe, the Dawes Plan echoed the nineteenth-century British use of financial power in an open international economy. In East Asia, the Washington system echoed the nineteenth-century British use of naval power and balance of power management. But there was not much of a U.S. security strategy in Europe or of a U.S. economic strategy in East Asia. The U.S. victor strategies after the First World War had not added up to a grand design. They failed to prevent the Great Depression and the ensuing Second World War.

Why did the United States fail to adopt a coherent and consistent victor strategy after World War I? The traditional explanation blames American

[4]Akira Iriye, *The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific* (New York: Longman, 1987), chapter 1.

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immaturity and "idealism", and the resulting "isolationism." A related explanation blames the isolationism and protectionism of the Republican Party. However, the Dawes Plan and the Washington system were quite sophisticated projects (even by British standards) that can hardly be described as isolationist—and these were projects advanced by Republican administrations.

The main reason why the United States did not have a coherent and consistent victor strategy was that its victory in 1918 was *too* complete. As a result, in the 1920s the United States faced no obvious great power adversary or "peer competitor", which could have concentrated the American mind and provided the desirable coherence and consistency. Conversely, in the 1930s the Great Depression produced a real American isolationism. It also produced real great power adversaries (Germany and Japan), but these posed quite different strategic threats in quite different regions. This too made it difficult for the United States to compose a coherent and consistent strategy.

Living With Victory After the Second World War

THE UNITED States learned profound lessons from the failure of the Versailles and Washington systems to manage the German and Japanese problems and to prevent the Second World War. As it turned out, these lessons were largely expanded versions of the lessons that the Wilson administration, the Harding administration and the American bankers had already learned from the First World War. As World War II was drawing to a close, the United States took the lead in establishing a number of international institutions that would complete the first but abortive steps taken after the previous war.

Security cooperation and economic engagement.

On the security dimension, the United Nations was to succeed and perfect the League of Nations. On the economic dimension, three organizations were to help the United States perform the role of economic hegemon, one for each of the three functions identified by Kindleberger. The task of long-term lending would be promoted by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank); the task of short-term currency support would be promoted by the International Monetary Fund; and the task of opening trade would be promoted by an International Trade Organization (ITO). Together, the three organizations were known as the Bretton Woods system. As it happened, the Republican-controlled U.S. Senate rejected the ITO treaty in 1947, but a less institutionalized arrangement, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, took its place. (Almost fifty years later, the World Trade Organization was established, and this at last completed the original grand design.) The overall victor strategy of the United States was one of security cooperation based upon economic engagement.

This strategy—and its elaborate United Nations and Bretton Woods systems—might have been perfect for dealing with the German and Japanese problems that existed after the First World War. But the problems that now existed were altogether different. Whereas after the first war Germany was not defeated enough, after the second it was defeated too much. The victorious allies, including the United States, could easily, and almost automatically, impose the alternative and simpler victor strategy of territorial division and military occupation, and at first they did so.

Conversely, whereas after the first war Russia was in a sense doubly defeated (first by the German army and then by the

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chaos of the Russian Revolution and Civil War), after the second it was doubly victorious (first by defeating Germany and then by occupying or annexing—along with its soon-to-be involuntary allies, Poland and Czechoslovakia—the eastern half of it). The German problem suddenly ceased to be the central problem of international security and instead became a subordinate part of the new central problem, which was the Russian one.

The United States initially tried to apply its overall strategy of security cooperation and economic engagement to this new Russian problem. But it was crucial to this strategy that it be implemented through international institutions led by the United States, i.e., the United Nations and the Bretton Woods system. Both the strategy and its systems were incompatible with the interests of the Soviet Union, as those were defined by Stalin. Security cooperation and economic engagement required some degree of an open society and a free market, and these contradicted the closed society and command economy that characterized the Soviet Union. Instead, the worldwide reach of the American system was aborted by the Cold War and the establishment of the Soviet bloc.

The United States therefore was only able to apply its strategy and system to the Free World, especially the First World. In Europe, the United Nations was replaced by NATO, and the Bretton Woods system was reinforced by the Marshall Plan. NATO represented a sort of second coming of Wilson's abortive security guarantee to France and Britain, as was the Marshall Plan a second coming of the Dawes Plan. In East Asia, the United States concluded a series of bilateral security treaties and bilateral economic aid programs (including the Dodge Plan for Japan). The ensemble of security treaties echoed the earlier Washington system, and since it was based upon U.S. naval supremacy in the Pacific, it also echoed earlier British strategies based upon naval supremacy.

This American strategy and this system, whose prototypes had been aborted after the First World War and whose applications were confined to only half the world after the Second World War, were extraordinarily successful where they did operate. They certainly helped to solve a good part of the old German and Japanese problems. However, they could not solve the new Russian problem (some historians think that they even accentuated it). The result was the Cold War.

Military containment.

The Russian problem was addressed by a version of the alternative victor strategy, military containment—in this case, containment not of the recently defeated enemy but of the victorious ally. By 1948 there had already been the sudden reversal of the alliance between the Western Allies (Britain and the United States) and the Soviet Union against Germany into an emerging alliance between the Western Allies and Germany against the Soviet Union. The rapidity of the transformation was quite breathtaking, but it was readily accepted by the American public. (In his famous novel, *1984*, written in 1948 as this transformation was being completed, George Orwell portrayed the sudden reversal of the alliance between Oceania and Eastasia against Eurasia into an alliance between Oceania and Eurasia against Eastasia.)

When the communists came to power on the Chinese mainland in 1949, they presented a new security problem. For a brief time, the Truman administration was inclined to hope that some version of the strategy of security cooperation (perhaps based upon traditional Chinese suspicions of Russia) and economic engagement would work to solve this new Chinese problem, but this hope was aborted by Mao's alliance with Stalin in

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January 1950, the Chinese entry into the Korean War in November 1950, and the closed society and command economy that characterized communist China.

The prosperous and open international economic system of the 1920s had permitted a strategy of security cooperation or appeasement toward Germany and Japan. But this was because these two nations had capitalist economies and were willing to engage with a prosperous and open international economy. When the international economy ceased to be so, the basis for a strategy of security appeasement disappeared; the only effective alternative would have been a strategy of military containment.

The Soviet Union and communist China in the 1940s–50s, on the other hand, were command economies. Because of this, they were not willing to engage with an open international economy, even one that was prosperous. Consequently, there was no basis for a strategy of security cooperation (or appeasement). The alternative strategy of military containment therefore became necessary. But although containment of the Soviet Union and communist China was necessary, it did present problems of its own. Military containment once led to defeat for the United States (the Vietnam War) and once led to near disaster for the world (the Cuban Missile Crisis). And military containment by itself was not sufficient to defeat the Soviet Union, to reform communist China, and to bring about a U.S. victory in the Cold War. The successful and sustained operation of the free market and open international economy in the First or Free World, in contrast with the gradual but steady exhaustion of the command and closed economic systems in the Second or Communist World, exerted a magnetic force upon the Soviet Union and China, and drove them by the 1980s, each in its own way, to reform their economies and to engage in the American-led international economic system. But of course this did not happen quickly or easily. Forty years of Cold War and military containment were the price.

Why did the United States succeed in adopting a generally coherent and consistent victor strategy after the Second World War? The main reason was that its victory was in some sense a Pyrrhic one. The German enemy was replaced almost immediately by the Russian one, and the Japanese enemy was soon replaced by the Chinese one. Even more, since both enemies were communist and initially were in alliance, they could easily be seen as one enormous enemy. This wonderfully concentrated the American mind into a generally coherent and consistent strategy in the late 1940s and 1950s.

Living With Victory After the Cold War

THE circumstances of victory and defeat after the Cold War had more in common with those pertaining after the First World War than those after the Second.

The redefined Russian problem.

Russia was more defeated after the Cold War than Germany after the First World War (but less defeated than Germany after the Second). As the Soviet Union was reinvented as Russia, it lost a quarter of its territory and half of its population. The Russian economy in the 1990s was beset both by deep depression and by high inflation, and the Russian military was beset by weakness and incompetence, with only an arsenal of nuclear weapons remaining as the legacy from the era of Soviet power. The strategic position of Russia was removed from the center to the periphery of the European continent, and it remained the central nation only in the emptiness of Central Asia. The Russian problem was redefined from

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being one of organized power into one of organized crime. Only in 2000—with a new president, Vladimir Putin, modest economic recovery and ambiguous military success in the Chechnya war—are there signs that Russia may have begun a revival to the degree that Germany did in the mid-1920s.

The U.S. victor strategy toward this "Weimar Russia" has been a variation of that adopted toward Weimar Germany, a new version of the strategy of security cooperation and economic engagement. Russia's generally positive role in the United Nations echoes Germany's role in the League. However, the enlargement of NATO into Eastern Europe (really a form of military containment of Russia) echoes Wilson's abortive security guarantee to Western Europe (really a form of military containment of Germany). The extensive U.S. and international economic aid to Russia echoes the Dawes Plan (although it has not been nearly as extensive and effective as the Marshall Plan). But just as the U.S. victor strategy toward Germany in the 1920s depended upon integrating that nation into an international economy that remained open and prosperous, so too does the contemporary U.S. victor strategy toward Russia. It would fail if either the international economy collapsed into one that was closed and depressed (like the 1930s), or if the Russian economy reverted into one that was closed and command (like the 1940s–70s).

The new Chinese problem.

In East Asia, the United States faces the rising power of China, a situation not unlike that it faced with Japan after the First World War. China's growing economic and military strengths, and its goals regarding Taiwan and the South China Sea, have presented a serious challenge. Indeed, the Chinese problem after the Cold War has been an even greater challenge for the United States than the Japanese problem was after the First World War (although it is not nearly as threatening as the Russian problem was after the Second).

The U.S. strategy toward China that evolved in the 1990s has in some sense been an inversion of the U.S. strategy toward Japan in the 1920s (and an expansion of the U.S. strategy toward Weimar Germany). Whereas the strategy toward Japan provided for an elaborate system of security cooperation (the Washington system) but only for relatively simple economic engagement (conventional international trade), the strategy toward China provides for an elaborate system of economic engagement ("the Washington consensus", including the admission of China into the World Trade Organization), but for relatively simple security cooperation (conventional military visits). In a more important sense, however, the U.S. strategy involves an innovative combination of economic engagement and military containment (particularly in respect to Taiwan and the South China Sea). But since China thinks of Taiwan as being properly part of China, what the United States perceives as its strategy of military containment, China perceives as a strategy of territorial dismemberment.

Probably the most difficult single challenge facing the contemporary U.S. victor strategy is how to sustain this innovative and complex combination of economic engagement and military containment in regard to China. The article by Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Living With China", is a sustained and eminently sensible analysis of this problem. In essence, he hopes that the Taiwan independence question can be dissolved into the World Trade Organization, that the tensions from military containment can themselves be contained by the rewards of economic engagement. His proposals are thus very different from those of Robert Kagan and William Kristol in

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"The Present Danger", who hardly consider the international economy at all. Consequently, they advocate a pure strategy of military containment toward China, including U.S. efforts to bring about a "regime change."

We have seen that the U.S. strategies toward Germany and Japan in the 1920s depended upon integrating those nations into an open and prosperous international economy, and that the U.S. contemporary strategy toward Russia depends upon the same. To an even greater extent, the U.S. strategy toward China has as its foundation the integration of that giant nation—one with more and more of a nationalist mentality—into such a global economy. If the global economy were to exclude China from its benefits, or if it were to become a closed and depressed one, the entire complex U.S. strategy toward China would collapse. The United States would be driven, at best, to the classic alternative, a simple strategy of military containment, or, at worst, as was the case in the 1930s in regard to both Germany and Japan, to no strategy at all. At that point, the proposals of Brzezinski would become obsolete, and the proposals of Kagan and Kristol could appear to be necessary. The management of the new China problem therefore depends upon the management of the new global economy, and the development of any real Sino-American security cooperation depends upon the performance of the United States as the global economic hegemon.

Challenges to the Victor

The culminating point of victory.

EVEN when a victor power conceives a victor strategy that is sound and appropriate to the military and economic realities of the time, there will be challenges that arise from how it is implemented. The first of these challenges is to determine what is, in Clausewitz's phrase, "the culminating point of victory", and to not go beyond it. Victor powers are prone to succumb to "the victory disease"; they continue to pursue the strategies that brought them victory in the utterly new and inappropriate circumstances that the victory has created. Concentration in war becomes compulsion in victory. The most famous example of the twentieth century was Hitler following his successful blitzkriegs of Poland and France with his disastrous invasion of the Soviet Union. The most familiar American example was MacArthur following his successful landing at Inchon and recovery of South Korea with his disastrous drive to the Yalu River and the Chinese border, resulting in China's entry into the war.

A contemporary American example of going beyond the culminating point of victory could be the enlargement of NATO. Although the admission of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary may not have passed that point, a "second round of enlargement" including the Baltic states and reaching the most sensitive borders of Russia probably would do so. This kind of victory disorder may also be developing with the U.S. promotion of human rights over national sovereignty, and especially with the use of military force for the purpose of humanitarian intervention. The 1995 U.S.-led humanitarian intervention in Bosnia was accepted by all of the other major powers. The 1999 U.S.-led humanitarian intervention in Kosovo was greatly resented, and in some measure rejected, by Russia and China. A third such intervention anytime soon, especially in a country traditionally in the sphere of influence of Russia (e.g., the Caucasus and Central Asia) or of China (e.g., the South China Sea), very likely would go beyond the culminating point of victory; it would represent a humanitarian disease.

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The realistic range of opportunities.

The second challenge for the victor power is in some sense the opposite of the first. It is to determine what is the realistic range of opportunities resulting from victory. The victor power is suddenly in a position where all things seem possible, where there are too many options. It may erratically pursue this objective, then that, and then another. Versatility in war becomes diffusion, even dissipation, in victory. This is an error to which pluralist democracies, with their different interest groups, are especially prone.

It has often been argued that Britain succumbed to this victory disorder in the nineteenth century. The British continued to expand their colonial empire, one of the opportunities that came with their victory in the Napoleonic Wars, until they entered into the condition of "imperial overstretch." One result was that Britain had to undertake numerous and continuous military operations on "the turbulent frontier." Another result, more serious in its long-run consequences, was that the ample British investment capital was diffused across a wide range of colonies and foreign countries, rather than concentrated upon the development of new technologies and industries within Britain itself. Such new technologies and industries would have better suited Britain for its competition with Germany.

A contemporary American example of the error of diffusion or dissipation seems to be developing with the U.S. promotion of every aspect of the American way of life in every part of the world. The promotion of economic globalization may be inherent in the U.S. performance as economic hegemon, but it does weaken the economic conditions and social bonds of many Americans. Even more, the promotion of social and cultural globalization—of the American way of expressive individualism, popular culture and the dysfunctional family—has generated resentment and resistance in a wide arc of countries in the Middle East, South Asia and East Asia. This, it seems, is the American way of producing a turbulent frontier.

The balancing effect.

The third challenge is the most familiar and the most fundamental, although Americans are inclined to think that they are exempt from it. It is derived from the well-known balancing effect. Victory brings the pre-eminent victor power hegemony, which in turn can initiate a realignment of the lesser victor powers against it (perhaps joined by the defeated one). The balancing effect was always especially pronounced among the continental powers of Europe. However, since Britain was an offshore power with no ambitions for territorial acquisitions on the continent, its victories did not initiate this balancing process. Indeed, its role as an "offshore balancer" helped it on occasion to exercise a sort of offshore hegemony.

The United States has served as an offshore or rather overseas balancer for Europe and also for East Asia. Even more than Britain, its remote position has permitted it to exercise an overseas hegemony over the nations of Western Europe (while balancing against the Soviet Union) and over those of East Asia (while balancing against China). Indeed, the United States continues to exercise this overseas hegemony, now over all of Europe, even with the collapse of the Soviet Union and with no other power to balance at all. By historical comparison with the European past, this hegemonic security system is an extraordinary achievement on the part of the United States. Were America located on the continent where France is, or even thirty miles offshore where Britain is, it probably would not have occurred; it can exist because the United States is located an ocean away and in another hemisphere.

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The U.S. hegemonic security system in East Asia continues to include Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and the problematic Taiwan; it provides the basis for any strategy of military containment of China.

The overseas location of the United States thus enables it to avoid the balancing effect and instead to perform the role of security hegemon in Europe, parts of East Asia and, in more complicated conditions, parts of the Middle East (as in the Gulf War and the continuing air strikes against Iraq). Of course, the United States also acts as the security hegemon in Latin America, where there is no prospect of a balancing effect against "the colossus of the North" (a case of an opposite phenomenon, which international relations specialists call the "bandwagoning effect").

Hegemony versus hyper-victory.

The U.S. role as the security hegemon in several regions of the globe complements the U.S. role as the economic hegemon in the global economy. America's security hegemony is acceptable because of its unique overseas location and the sustained peace that it has provided. Its economic hegemony is acceptable because of the unique economic functions that it performs and the sustained prosperity that it has produced. The United States has operated the security and economic dimensions of hegemony together to consolidate and preserve its great victory after the Cold War. It does so in ways reminiscent of Britain coordinating the security and economic dimensions of its supremacy to consolidate and preserve its great victory after the Napoleonic Wars.

This splendid achievement of the United States could be undermined, however, by its own actions. The victory disorders of compulsion and dissipation could eventually overcome even the powerful U.S. advantages of overseas position and economic performance, and drive some major powers—most obviously China and Russia—into the balancing effect and even into a sort of containment policy directed at the United States. This was the prospect put forward by Samuel Huntington in his famous argument about the "clash of civilizations." Huntington was concerned that American excesses could bring about a Sino-Islamic alliance or even "the West versus the Rest." These prospects would become even more likely if the prosperous and open international economy should turn into a poor and closed one—if the "New Economy" of the 1990s, based upon the computer and the Internet, should suddenly collapse, as the "New Era" economy of the 1920s, based upon the automobile and the radio, had done.

Whatever form a balancing effect or containment coalition might take, however, at its core would be China. It would be the new Central Power on the Eurasian land mass, just as it was once the Middle Kingdom. The arrival of this coalition on the international scene would mean that the U.S. victory after the first cold war would have been followed by a second cold war (or worse), and this in turn would mean another war on a global scale. This alone makes living with China the single most important challenge facing a United States that is still living with victory, and which is still expecting to do so for decades to come. □

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Living With a New Europe

Zbigniew Brzezinski

THE transatlantic alliance is America's most important global relationship. It is the springboard for U.S. global involvement, enabling America to play the decisive role of arbiter in Eurasia—the world's central arena of power—and it creates a coalition that is globally dominant in all the key dimensions of power and influence. America and Europe together serve as the axis of global stability, the locomotive of the world's economy, and the nexus of global intellectual capital as well as technological innovation. Just as important, they are both home to the world's most successful democracies. How the U.S.-European relationship is managed, therefore, must be Washington's highest priority.

In the longer run, the appearance of a truly politically united Europe would entail a basic shift in the distribution of global power, with consequences as far-reaching as those generated by the collapse of the Soviet empire and by the subsequent emergence of America's global preponderance. The impact of such a Europe on America's own position in the world and on the Eurasian power balance would be enormous (see the table on the following page for an indication of how a united Europe would dwarf the United States), inevitably generating severe two-way transatlantic tensions. Presently, neither side is well equipped to handle such potentially significant change. Americans generally do not fully comprehend the European desire for an upgraded status in the relationship and they lack a clear appreciation of the diversity of European views concerning the United States. Europeans often fail to grasp both the spontaneity and the sincerity of America's commitment to Europe, infusing into their perception of America's desire to sustain the Euro-Atlantic alliance a European penchant for Machiavellian duplicity.

It should be noted, however, that the operative words in the preceding paragraph regarding the significance of a truly united Europe are "would be." A European Union with genuine political weight and unity is not foreordained. The emergence of such a Europe depends on the depth of its political integration, on the scope of Europe's external expansion, and on the degree to which Europe develops its own military as well as political identity. The decisive steps in these regards have yet to be taken.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, former national security adviser to the president, is author of *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives* (Basic Books, 1997). This is the second of three articles on U.S. foreign policy by the author. The third will appear in the Fall issue, and will address the topic of Russia in the context of U.S. policy, the EU and NATO.

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	United States	EU 15	EU 27*	EU 27 + Turkey
Population	272,639,608	374,324,512	479,779,201	545,378,407
GDP (purchasing power parity)	$8.511 trillion	$8.053 trillion	$8.747 trillion	$9.172 trillion
GDP per capita	$31,500	$20,927	$15,061	$14,759
Military Expenditures	$267.2 billion	$166.3 billion	$221.6 billion	$228.4 billion
Military Expenditures as % of GDP	3.4%	1.84%	1.97%	2.06%
Total Exports	$0.905 trillion	$2.032 trillion	$2.189 trillion	$2.233 trillion
Exports as % of world total	16.5%	37.0%	39.9%	40.7%
Total Imports	$0.757 trillion	$2.028 trillion	$2.146 trillion	$2.174 trillion
Imports as % of world total	13.5%	36.0%	38.1%	38.9%

*EU 27 consists of current members and all the potential candidates for membership in Central and Eastern Europe.

Sources: *The World Factbook, 1999* (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1999). Export and import estimates are calculated from 1998 trade figures in *Direction of Trade Statistics Quarterly* (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, December 1999), pp. 2-5.

Currently, Europe—despite its economic strength, significant economic and financial integration, and the enduring authenticity of the transatlantic friendship—is a *de facto* military protectorate of the United States. This situation necessarily generates tensions and resentments, especially since the direct threat to Europe that made such dependence somewhat palatable has obviously waned. Nonetheless, it is not only a fact that the alliance between America and Europe is unequal, but it is also true that the existing asymmetry in power between the two is likely to widen even further in America's favor.

This asymmetry is due both to the unprecedented strength of America's economic expansion and to the technological innovation that America pioneers in such complex and diverse fields as biotechnology and information technology. What is more, the American-led technological revolution in military affairs enhances not only the scope of the military reach of the United States, but also transforms the very nature and uses of military power itself. Regardless of any collective action on the part of the European states, it is highly unlikely that Europe will be able to close the military gap with America at any point in the near future.

As a result, the United States is likely to remain the only truly global power for at least another generation. And that in turn means that America in all likelihood will also remain the dominant partner in the transatlantic alliance for the first quarter of the twenty-first century. It follows, therefore, that transatlantic debate will not be about fundamental alterations in the nature of the relationship, but rather about the implications of anticipated trends and the corresponding yet somewhat more marginal adjustments. That said, it hardly needs to be added that even incremental adaptations can breed conflicts which should be avoided if the U.S.-European relationship is to remain constructive and truly cooperative.

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I. Historical Differences

A BASIC historical mystification both inspires and complicates the ongoing dialogue between America and Europe. Both sides instinctively think of America when they dream of a united Europe. The Europeans crave America's continental scale and global standing, and, in their more effervescent moments, they even envisage a future Europe as a global superpower co-equal to America. The Americans, when welcoming—occasionally somewhat skeptically—Europe's future unity, instinctively draw on their own historical experience. That vision renders some U.S. foreign policymakers uneasy, for the inescapable presumption is that Europe—when it "unites"—will become America's peer, and potentially its rival.

The American experience is often invoked by European statesmen in Europe's march to unity (one such figure recently declared to me that the European Union today is somewhere between 1776 and 1789). Yet most European political leaders realize that the European Union lacks both the ideological passion and the civic loyalty that inspired not only the framers of America's Constitution but—and this is the crucial test of political commitment—those prepared to make the ultimate sacrifice for the independence of the American colonies. As of now, and for the foreseeable future, it is simply the case that no "European" is willing to die for "Europe."

It follows that Europe, as it integrates, will be something altogether novel in the history of political entities, both in form and in substance. It will doubtless be a polity, in addition to being globally a most significant single economy. As a polity, however, it will lack the emotional and idealistic commitment that the United States evoked when it took shape. That commitment was expressed in a transcendental concept of political liberty, proclaimed to enjoy universal validity, that provided both the philosophical foundation and a politically attractive beacon for a new nation-state. The commitment of those who founded that state, and of those who later flocked to it and became assimilated by it, was almost religious. In short, the American revolution created a new kind of nationalism, one that was open to all, a nationalism with a universal face.

The Preamble to the U.S. Constitution conveys the singular character of that American commitment to national unity and liberty:

> We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish . . .

Nothing quite like it characterizes the drumbeat of the European nations' march toward a common Europe. It is striking that the Treaty of Rome, the historic 1957 pledge of six European nations "to lay the foundations of an ever closer union", places emphasis in its very opening on ensuring "economic and social progress", on "constant improvements of the living and working conditions", on "the removal of existing obstacles" to "balanced trade and competition", on "the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade", and so on. It is an admirably pragmatic, but also pedestrian, document.

To emphasize this essential difference between America and Europe is not to denigrate the historical significance of Europe's undertaking. Nor is it to question the good faith of those Europeans engaged in creating a new architecture. It

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is to note that the defining motivation of the European enterprise has, over time, become one of convenience and practicality. The initial impulse for European unity was more idealistic. Europe's "founding fathers" of the late 1940s and early 1950s were inspired by a transnational political conviction and very much motivated by the determination to end, once and for all, the nationalistic conflicts that twice in this century came close to destroying European civilization. They were also fearful that America, disenchanted by European feuds, might simply abandon the European nations to the other great historical option—also "unifying" in its own ugly way—the one east of the Cold War's new dividing line "from Stettin to Trieste."

Today's Europeans are serious about Europe in a more pragmatic way, though some—as noted earlier—do dream of an entity that will match America. French statesmen, at times unable to conceal their hyper-envy of America's global standing, see in Europe the recovery of France's past grandeur. The Germans have sought in Europe their own redemption. The British, more skeptical, have finally concluded that there will be a Europe of sorts and that they must be in it if they are to infuse some genuine significance into their own special relationship with America. Other peoples on the Continent—including the recently liberated peoples of Central Europe—also wish to be European, because they share the view that to be part of Europe is to be more secure, more prosperous and free. None of these motivations are base, all are historically justified, and they deserve America's respect.

Nonetheless, pragmatism differs in substance as well as in its effects from patriotism. A polity construed on convenience is bound to be different from a polity derived from conviction. The former can still generate loyalty. It can create a shared community. But it is also likely to be less ambitious, politically less assertive and, above all, less inclined toward idealism and personal sacrifice. Despite some similarities in scale, the "Europe" that is actually emerging is thus likely to be politically quite different from America: a hybrid of a huge transnational corporation, to which it is prudent and convenient and even gratifying to belong, and of a confederated state that over time may also gain the genuine loyalty of its hitherto distinctive communities. In short, the European polity of convenience will be less than a United States of Europe, though more than just a European Union Incorporated.

Indeed, it is no aspersion on anyone or any state to suggest that on the global scene the emerging Europe is likely to be more similar to a Switzerland writ large than to the United States. The Swiss constitution—which ended inter-communal strife—stresses that the ethnically differentiated Swiss Cantons resolved "to renew [their] alliance", that they were "determined to live [their] diversity in unity respecting one another", and went on to identify the practical purposes of the Confederation. Abroad, the main emphasis of Switzerland's international engagement has been in the important areas of international finance and trade, while avoiding engagement in this century's global political-philosophical conflicts.

Integration, Not Unification

IN ANY CASE, it seems reasonable to conclude that "Europe", in the foreseeable future, will not be—indeed, cannot be—"America." Once the implications of that reality are digested on both sides of the Atlantic, the U.S.-European dialogue should become more relaxed, even as the Europeans address the dilemmas connected with their simultaneous quest for integration, expansion and

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some militarization; and even as the Americans adjust to the inevitable emergence of a novel European polity.

Unification of several peoples normally occurs as a result of external necessity, shared ideological commitment, domination by the most powerful, or some combination thereof. In the initial phase of the European quest for unity all three factors were at play, though in varying degrees: the Soviet Union was a real threat; European idealism was nurtured by the still fresh memories of World War II; and France, exploiting West Germany's sense of moral vulnerability, was able to harness Germany's rising economic potential in support of its own political ambitions. By the end of the century, these impulses have perceptibly waned. As a result, European "integration"—largely a process of regulatory standardization—has become the alternative definition of unification. Yet while integration is a perfectly sensible way of achieving an operationally effective merger, a merger still falls quite short of an emotionally meaningful marriage.

The plain fact is that bureaucratically spearheaded integration simply cannot generate the political will needed for genuine unity. It can neither stir the imagination (despite the occasional rhetoric about Europe becoming America's peer) nor develop the mortal passion that can sustain a nation-state in a time of adversity. The 80,000 page-long *acquis communautaire* (organized into 31 policy sectors)—which a new member of the European Union must ratify—is not likely to provide the average European with the needed nourishment for politically energizing loyalty. However, it should be reiterated that by now, given the absence of the other three more traditional ways of seeking unity, integration is not only necessary but is the *only* way that Europe can move forward toward "unity."

That gap between "unification" and "integration", in turn, explains why integration is bound to be slow; and why, were it somehow accelerated too sharply, it could even divide Europe once again. Indeed, any attempt to accelerate political unification would probably intensify internal tensions between the leading states within the Union, since each of them still insists on preserving its sovereignty in the critical area of foreign policymaking. At this stage, anti-Americanism as the impetus for unity—even when disguised by talk of "multipolarity"—cannot be a unifying force as anti-Sovietism once was, because most Europeans do not subscribe to it. Moreover, with Germany reunited, no one in Europe, outside of Paris, still regards France as the putative leader of the new Europe—but also no one in Europe desires Germany to become Europe's dominant leader.

Integration, however, is not only a slow process, but each successful step increases the very complexity of the undertaking. Integration inherently means an incremental and highly balanced progression toward deepening interdependence among constituent units, but their growing interdependence is not infused with the unifying political passion required for the assertion of genuine global independence. That may happen eventually, when Europeans come to view themselves politically as Europeans while remaining, for example, German or French as a matter of linguistic and cultural peculiarity.

Horizontal Expansion

IN THE meantime, because of Europe's slow progression, external expansion is likely to become a partial compensation for the crawling pace of internal integration. Europe will grow, but more horizontally than vertically since, as a practical matter, the two cannot

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significantly advance at the same time. This painful reality is a sensitive point among Europe's true believers. When Jacques Delors dared to declare flatly in early 2000 that "the pace [of enlargement] is unquestionably being forced . . . we thus risk diluting the blueprint" for European integration, with the result that "we will inevitably move away from a political Europe as defined by Europe's founding fathers", he was almost immediately and publicly taken to task by a compatriot EU Commissioner, Michel Barnier.

The Commissioners in Brussels hope that bureaucratic streamlining and institutional renewal will invigorate the process of integration. Buoyed by the modest success of the euro—despite some apocalyptic predictions from its largely American and British detractors—Brussels has moved forward, in anticipation of significant expansion, with the long-standing intergovernmental conference on the renewal of the European institutions. Key institutional decisions are to be made by the end of the year. But even the most forceful proponents of expansion concede that, at best, politically significant integration will have to be confined for a while to the smaller inner core of the EU, thus perhaps creating a so-called "multi-speed and variable geometry" Europe.[1] Yet even if that were to happen, it is doubtful that this formula would resolve the basic tension between integration and expansion in so far as the development of a common foreign policy is concerned. Such a Europe would mean division into first and second-class members, with the latter objecting to any major foreign policy decisions taken on their behalf by a directorate of allegedly more truly European states.

In any case, enlargement, too, is bound to become an increasingly absorbing and complicated task. With some two hundred EU teams about to begin the tedious process of negotiating the modalities of accession with the dozen or so new aspirant nations, expansion will probably slow down, both because of its inherent complexity and because of a lack of will on the part of EU member states. In fact, the admission of any Central European state by 2004 is becoming increasingly prob-

A Decalogue Regarding European Developments and Prospects

1. For most Europeans, "Europe" is not an object of personal affection. It is more a convenience than a conviction.
2. On the global scene, the EU will not be like America but more like a Switzerland writ large.
3. Most Europeans do not partake of anti-Americanism as the impulse for unity.
4. Integration is essentially a bureaucratic process and not the same as unification.
5. The EU's expansion inevitably collides with deepening integration.
6. The EU needs to expand for demographic and economic reasons.
7. A federated inner core of foreign-policymaking states within a larger EU of 21 or more states is not politically workable.
8. Slow expansion plus bureaucratic integration is likely to produce a Europe united economically but only confederated politically.
9. The EU is unlikely to acquire an autonomous military capability.
10. The EU will thus be a novel type of polity, with its global influence primarily economic and financial.

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lematic. In the longer run, however, expansion cannot be avoided. An amputated Europe cannot be a true Europe. A geopolitical void between Europe and Russia would be dangerous. Moreover, an aging Western Europe would begin to stagnate economically and socially.[2] No wonder, then, that some leading European planners have begun to advocate a Europe of as many as thirty-five to forty members by the year 2020—a Europe that would be geographically and culturally whole, but almost certainly politically diluted.[3]

A Question of Muscle

THUS, neither integration nor expansion is likely to create the truly European Europe that some Europeans crave and some Americans fear. Indeed, an increasing number of Europeans do sense that the combination of the euro and integration with slow expansion can only create economic sovereignty. Political awareness that more is needed prompted the three leading European states—France, Great Britain and Germany—to join in 1999 in an effort to create a credible European military capability, and to do so even before an integrated Europe with a defining foreign policy of its own emerges. The projected European military force is meant to put some muscle behind a common foreign and security policy (CFSP), which is to be shaped by the newly created post of Europe's High Representative for External Relations and Common Security.

The proposed joint European rapid reaction force, which is to be operational by 2003, will be the first tangible manifestation of a political Europe. In contrast to the already existing, but largely symbolic, "Eurocorps"—composed primarily of French, German, Spanish and other draftees and possessing neither mobility nor real military capability—the planned force would be assembled when needed from pre-dedicated combat units, would number up to 60,000 men deployable within 60 days, and would be sustainable in a theater of deployment "in or around Europe" for at least a year. In effect, according to various European estimates, such a force would be equivalent to a full corps, supported by some 150 to 300 aircraft, 15 large combat vessels, a strategic air transport capability, and the requisite C^3I (command, control, communications and intelligence). European military experts are to conduct an accelerated audit of the inventory of the available European

[1]"Variable geometry implies that the willing and able will be permitted to deepen the level of their integration in specific policy areas, while the unwilling will not be obliged to follow suit. A multi-speed approach implies that, while the willing and able proceed with integration in a given policy area, the willing but unable will have a clear road-map of how they can join at a later date." Robin Niblett, "The European Disunion", *The Washington Quarterly* (Winter 1997), pp. 104-5.

[2]The OECD estimates that the EU will need 35 million immigrants in the next 25 years to keep the population at 1995 levels, and an additional 150 million by 2025 if it wishes to keep the current ratio of retirees to workers. Moreover, it is estimated that by 2030, state pensions will absorb 5.5 percent of the GDP in Britain, 13.5 in France, 16.5 in Germany and 20.3 in Italy. (The equivalent estimate for the United States is 6.6.)

[3]According to a report prepared by Jacques Attali at the request of the French foreign minister, France—"combining continental generosity and strategic coherence"—should deliberately "promote what it can no longer avoid", namely, a Europe that embraces 35 or even 40 members, including among others Ukraine and Georgia, thereby opting for "pluralism" over federalism. Contrarily, Werner Weidenfeld has warned recently in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* that "this clear abandoning of any attempt to deepen the European identity will turn out to be Europe's Achilles' Heel."

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assets so that the force can engage in peacekeeping or even in some (otherwise unspecified) limited combat operations. Its appearance would mark the emergence of a genuine European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), capable of military action outside of NATO.

However, the European defense initiative—driven by the genuinely felt sense of Europe's military inadequacy revealed by the Kosovo war, fueled by French ambitions, but tempered by British and German inclinations to reassure the Americans—has yet to pass three basic tests: will the force be rapidly deployable, will it be militarily capable, and will it be logistically sustainable? Europe has the means to create such a force; the question is whether it has the will.

At this stage, skepticism is very much in order. European defense leaders have stated that the force can be assembled without additional expenditures through a very deliberate reallocation of existing defense budget items, a proposition that defies common sense. It is evident to serious European commentators that the planned force will require improvements in central logistics control, joint military depots, and presumably some joint exercises. That would entail additional costs, not to mention the more basic need for adequate reconnaissance and intelligence as well as for a more competitive and more consolidated European defense industry. Yet in recent years the overall percentage of the European budgets allocated to defense as well as to defense-related R&D has actually been declining, with European defense expenditures having fallen in real terms by about 22 percent since 1992.

The critical fact is that political parsimony undermines the military seriousness of the venture. As Daniel Vernet wrote in *Le Monde* in September 1999, for the European force to come into being, the Europeans "must know exactly what they want, define defense restructuring programs (politically sensitive and financially costly), and, finally, allocate the budgetary resources to match their ambitions." In addition, to sustain a force of 60,000 men in the field for more than a year, a rotational pool of about 180,000 combat-ready European soldiers must be available. It is not.

A further complication, casting additional doubt on the credibility of the proposed enterprise, is that some European states are members of the EU but not of NATO (the "neutrals"), and others of NATO but not of the EU (America's "Trojan horses", according to some Europeanists). Their prospective relationship to ESDI is thus unclear and, in any case, it inevitably complicates the picture. Finally, but perhaps most important of all, the meshing of the proposed force with existing NATO arrangements could become disruptive operationally and divisive politically.

Ultimately, the most probable outcome for ESDI is that the proposed force will produce neither a rival to NATO nor the long-missing second European "pillar" for a more equal alliance. Although the Europeans will probably somewhat enhance their own military planning and joint command structures, especially after the expected absorption of the Western European Union by the EU itself, more likely is the piecemeal emergence over the next five or so years of a somewhat improved European capability to provide for non-NATO peacekeeping in some not overly violent European trouble spot (most likely in the Balkans). In effect, the so-called European pillar will be made less out of steel and concrete and more out of *papier-mâché*. As a result, Europe will fall short of becoming a comprehensive global power. Painful as it may be for those who would like to see a politically vital Europe, most Europeans still remain unwilling not only to die but even to pay for Europe's security.

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II. For Strategic Direction

U.S. POLICYMAKERS should keep in mind a simple injunction when shaping American policy toward Europe: do not make the ideal the enemy of the good. The ideal from Washington's point of view would be a politically united Europe that is a dedicated member of NATO—one spending as much on defense as the United States but committing the funds almost entirely to the upgrading of NATO's capabilities; willing to have NATO act "out of area" in order to reduce America's global burdens; and remaining compliant to American geopolitical preferences regarding adjacent regions, especially Russia and the Middle East, and accommodating on such matters as international trade and finance. The good is a Europe that is more of a rival economically, that steadily enlarges the scope of European interdependence while lagging in real political-military independence, that recognizes its self-interest in keeping America deployed on the European periphery of Eurasia, even while it chafes at its relative dependence and half-heartedly seeks gradual emancipation.

U.S. policymakers should recognize that "the good" actually serves vital American interests. They should consider that initiatives such as ESDI reflect the European quest for self-respect, and that carping injunctions—a series of "do nots" emanating both from the State and Defense Departments—merely intensify European resentments and have the potential to drive the Germans and the British into the arms of the French. Moreover, American opposition to the effort can only serve to convince some Europeans—wrongly—that NATO is more important to U.S. security than it is to Europe's. Last but not least, given the realities of the European scene, what ESDI poses for NATO are problems of process not ones of principle, and problems of process are not likely to be constructively managed by elevating them into issues of principle.

Hence, dramatic warnings of "decoupling" are counterproductive. They have a theological ring to them, and as such they threaten to transform differences that can be accommodated into ones involving doctrinal debates. They are reminiscent of earlier NATO collisions that accomplished nothing good—whether over the abortive Multilateral Nuclear Force initiative of the early 1960s, which accelerated the French nuclear program; or, more recently, the brief spasm in 1999 of American-pushed efforts to revamp NATO into some sort of a global ("out of area") alliance, which quickly came down to earth with the outbreak of the Kosovo war. Such disputes detract and distract from a fundamental reality: NATO, a truly remarkable success, may be far from perfect but it does not require a dramatic overhaul.

One should pause here and ask: Even assuming that the new European force were to come into being by 2003, where and how could it act on its own? What credible scenario can one envisage in which it could act decisively, without advance guarantees of NATO support and without some actual dependence on NATO assets? Let us assume a conflict in Estonia, with the Kremlin stirring up the Russian minority and then threatening to intervene; Europe would not lift a finger without direct NATO involvement. Suppose Montenegro secedes and Serbia invades; without U.S. participation, the planned European force would probably be defeated. While social unrest in some European province—say, Transylvania, or even Corsica!—might prove more susceptible to a deployment of European peacekeepers (much as has been the case in Bosnia),

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such an intervention is hardly an example of Europe becoming "an independent actor on the international stage", to quote French Defense Minister Alain Richard.

In a genuinely serious mission, the planned European force still would have to rely heavily on NATO assets in the key areas of reconnaissance, intelligence and airlift. These assets are primarily American, though dedicated to NATO. Thus, NATO would be *de facto* involved, even if initially it had exercised its option of first refusal. In brief, if the crisis is serious, the European reaction will not be independent; if the reaction is independent, the crisis will not be serious.

To be sure, adjustments within NATO will be unavoidable as Europe slowly evolves into a more defined polity. ESDI will make NATO's decision-making processes somewhat more cumbersome, and European contributions to NATO's own military enhancement may even marginally suffer as the EU seeks some sort of force of its own. ESDI, especially after the Europeans organize within the EU some sort of a European defense organism, will also have the effect of stimulating a shared European strategic perspective, which America will have to take into account. But a shared European security posture is more likely to emerge through the gradual consolidation of the European defense industry[4] and intensified European military planning than through any precipitous leap—especially by 2003—into an autonomous European combat capability.

Indeed, of greater consequence to NATO's future than the European underperformance revealed during the Kosovo war is Europe's nonperformance *after* the Kosovo war. The staggering fact is that "Europe" not only cannot protect itself but cannot even police itself. The inability of the European states to engage entirely on their own in effective peacekeeping in a small and weak region—and their reluctance to provide the needed financing for its economic recovery—poses a more serious long-term challenge to NATO's cohesion than does ESDI. It is likely to breed growing American uneasiness regarding the proper role for U.S. forces committed to Europe's defense.

In the nearer term, an even more divisive issue—one of greater strategic import—may be generated by U.S. plans to deploy a missile defense system. The ongoing debate in the United States over missile defense has been driven primarily by domestic political considerations, and a unilateral American decision, made in the heat of a U.S. presidential race, would doubtless be badly received in Europe. Indeed, American unilateralism on this matter could have far graver consequences than even the most intense U.S. concerns regarding ESDI's alleged "decoupling" effect on American and European security. If transatlantic security ties are to be sustained as America's central strategic priority, it is clearly better at this stage to engage in comprehensive discussions with America's allies regarding the feasibility, the costs, the defense trade-offs, and the political as well as strategic effects of a missile defense deployment. In any case, it is too early to make a prudent judgment as to how urgently needed and how practicable such a defensive shield may be. That is a decision for the next U.S. president to make.

IN THE MEANTIME, a basic strategic priority of the United States should be the continued expansion of NATO. NATO enlargement offers the best possible guarantee of continued transatlantic security ties. It serves

[4] A significant step in that direction was taken during 1999 through the merger of Aerospatiale Matra SA and DaimlerChrysler Aerospace AG to create the European Aeronautic, Defense and Space Co., with resources and capabilities that are competitive by American standards.

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to create a more secure Europe, with fewer areas of geopolitical ambiguity, while increasing the European stake in a vital and credible alliance. Indeed, the case can be made that the 1999 NATO decision to return to the issue of enlargement no earlier than 2002 should be revised, and that a serious effort to decide on new members should be made in 2001, once a new U.S. president is in office. Several countries appear to be ready for inclusion, meeting not only the standards set recently for Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, but even previously for Spain. An earlier resumption of the process of enlargement would provide a clear signal that not only does the transatlantic security link remain vital, but that America and Europe are both serious about shaping a secure Europe that is truly European in scope.

American support for the resumption of NATO enlargement is consistent with the American stake in expansion of the EU. The larger Europe becomes, the less likely it is that either external or internal threats will pose a serious challenge to international peace. Moreover, in the longer run the more overlap there is in membership between NATO and the EU, the greater will be the cohesion of the transatlantic community and the more compelling the complementarity of the Atlanticist and Europeanist visions. It is a felicitous fact that some of the candidates currently qualified for either NATO or EU membership happen to be the same countries. The United States can argue persuasively that Slovenia, Slovakia and Lithuania already meet, or are close to meeting, the criteria for NATO membership. According to a comparative study prepared by PricewaterhouseCoopers, several Central European states (including Slovenia and Estonia) are more qualified—in terms of macroeconomic stability, GNP, economic interaction with the EU, and economic infrastructure—for EU membership than was Greece. Poland and the Czech Republic—both already NATO members—were recently listed in *The Economist* as being more qualified than Italy! Which makes it all the more egregious that "the present accession requirements are more numerous and stringent than those that were faced by

A Decalogue of Basic U.S. Policy Premises and Guidelines

1. Europe remains America's natural and pre-eminent ally.
2. An Atlanticist Europe is essential to a stable Eurasian equilibrium.
3. An autonomous European defense capability, in any case unlikely in the near future, should not be opposed by the United States.
4. Allied political unity is more important than the enhancement of NATO's capabilities.
5. The United States should defer any deployment decision regarding a ballistic missile defense system until consensus is reached with NATO allies.
6. The United States should seek an enlarged NATO in Europe but not an "out of area" NATO.
7. The United States has a bigger stake in Europe's enlargement than in Europe's integration.
8. NATO and the EU should work together on joint plans for further expansion.
9. Eventually, Turkey, Cyprus and Israel might be included in both entities.
10. There should be no *a priori* limitations or exclusions on NATO and EU memberships.

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the South European countries that joined the EU earlier."[5]

That some countries merit entry into the EU and NATO should facilitate and encourage stronger U.S. support for the enlargement of both. High-level NATO-EU consultations regarding a staged, progressive and continuing expansion therefore would be very much in order. But it is premature at this stage even to speculate as to what might be the eventual outer boundaries of the two, hopefully overlapping, entities. Much will depend on the evolution of Russia, for whom the doors to an Atlanticist Europe should be kept open. An expanded EU overlapping with NATO can encourage Russia's positive evolution by dampening old imperial temptations. Russia may then recognize its own interest in accommodating and becoming associated with NATO. If it does not, then a larger NATO will provide the needed security for a larger Europe. But in any case, the *a priori* exclusion of any qualified European state either from NATO or the EU would be unwise.

Moreover, from a geopolitical as well as economic point of view, it is not too early to note that once both NATO and the EU have expanded to include the Baltic and some southeastern European states, the subsequent inclusion not only of Turkey but of Cyprus (following a Turkish-Greek accommodation) and of Israel (following a comprehensive peace with all its neighbors) may also become desirable. In addition, as Europe expands, the transatlantic community at some point will have to respond to signals from countries such as Ukraine, Georgia and even Azerbaijan, that their long-term objective is to qualify for participation in the great historical undertaking occurring within the EU and under NATO's security umbrella.

In promoting this great project, the United States should remain supportive of the EU's quest for deeper integration, even though that support will be mainly rhetorical. The United States has wisely avoided identifying itself with the conservative British opposition to Europe's political as well as monetary unity, and it should likewise avoid the occasional temptation to display *Schadenfreude* when Europe stumbles. Precisely because European integration will be slow and because the European polity will not be like America, America need not fear the emergence of a rival. The transatlantic relationship is more like a marriage that blends together mutually respected differences—including some division of labor—as well as commonalties, and both in fact serve to consolidate the partnership. That has been the case over the last half century, and it will remain so for some time to come.

In fact, the evolving character of the international system should reinforce the transatlantic bond. Europe and the United States account jointly for less than 15 percent of the world's population and are highly visible as islands of prosperity and privilege in a seething and restless global environment. In this age of instant communications, an awareness of inequality can be rapidly translated into political hostility targeted at those who are envied. Hence, both self-interest and a sense of potential vulnerability should continue to provide the underpinning for a durable U.S.-European alliance.

The European polity, situated on the western edge of Eurasia and in the immediate proximity of Africa, is more exposed to the risks inherent in rising global tumult than the politically more cohesive, militarily more powerful and geographically more isolated America. The Europeans will be more immediately at

[5]Eva Ehrlich and Gabor Revesz, *The State of the Economy in Central and Eastern Europe Compared with the EU's Requirements* (Budapest: The Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 1999), p. 4.

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risk if a chauvinistic imperialism should again motivate Russian foreign policy, or if Africa and/or south-central Asia suffer worsening social failures. The proliferation of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction also will endanger Europe more, given Europe's limited military capabilities and the proximity of potentially threatening states. For as far as one can see, Europe will continue to need America to be truly secure.

At the same time, a close relationship with Europe philosophically legitimates and gives focus to America's global role. It creates a community of democratic states without which the United States would be lonely in the world. Preserving, enhancing and especially enlarging that community—in order to "secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity"—must therefore remain America's historically vital task. □

Comments on Brzezinski

Daniel Vernet:

ZBIGNIEW Brzezinski knows exactly where a European defense force could be deployed: in Corsica! Thank you, Doctor. We already have the French gendarmerie, a kind of national guard that is in great demand in Bosnia and Kosovo, for that.

More seriously, Brzezinski represents the benevolent side of the American attitude toward the European integration process, including the attempt to build European projection forces allegedly capable of acting independently of NATO. He does not criticize this decision. He does not recommend that Washington should undermine it. He does not transform it into a problem of principle, which could divide the two sides of the Atlantic. Being more than skeptical about the ability of the Europeans to accomplish what they have embarked upon, he gives the American administration a piece of sound advice: do not fear the emergence of a rival. Brzezinski has a good case, underpinned by arguments that are hardly dismissible. Let me stress a few of them:

1) Integration has replaced unification as the ultimate goal of the European process. It will be a slow process, as a too speedy one could divide Europe rather than unite it.

2) Europe will grow horizontally rather than vertically, and widening is not compatible with deepening.

3) ESDI—the European Security and Defense Identity—does not represent a threat to NATO because, even in the most optimistic hypothesis, it will be effective only in unserious crises.

4) NATO and the EU should extend at the same pace, excluding no country *a priori* and including close association with Russia. Russia should recognize that this combined NATO-EU enlargement does not contradict its own interests. If it does not do so, NATO and EU enlargements will be needed to provide security to an expanded Europe.

Brzezinski seems to accept the Attali vision of a Europe from the Atlantic to Vladivostok, which is inconsistent with the dream of the founding fathers of the Common Market and the European Community. That dream envisaged the new Europe not only as a free-trade zone but as an international actor, a political partner for America—maybe not a global power for this generation or the next one, but a regional power, not only overcom-

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ing the historical conflicts between its member states but exporting security and possibly prosperity to its "near abroad."

Brzezinski is right: there is a contradiction between this vision—traditionally supported by every French government but not necessarily shared by all its partners in the EU—and the present shape of Europe. He is also right to point out that this situation will probably not change in the next few years. In some matters (the institutions, for example) Europe is more likely to accommodate the existing framework than to make the profound changes needed by a *grand bond en avant*. In other matters (such as defense), it lacks either the will or the means, or both, to have a common policy; in particular, it lacks the political will to allocate more resources to defense budgets, without which it will be impossible for Europe to have a common foreign and security policy.

All these points are indisputable. However, the future of the European Union does not look quite as bleak as described by Brzezinski. Up to now, Europe has not reached a point of no return, which could make the original vision impossible. Furthermore, every measure taken in the last decade—single market, euro, free circulation of people inside Europe (the so-called "Schengenland"), nomination of a High Representative for External Relations and Common Security, a modest but realistic step toward a European defense—leaves open the possibility of future improvements, even if they would not be spectacular ones. All options are still on the table.

Take the projection forces. Brzezinski rightly notes that the European reaction will not be independent if the crisis is serious. For the time being, that is certainly so. But an independent reaction in a less than vital conflict would be a major step forward compared with the inability and unwillingness of the Europeans to act in some low-intensity crises of recent years. Let us take the first step before the second.

Europe will not be a military power, but it will not set limits to its ambition and be a soft power, the kind of larger Switzerland Brzezinski refers to.

Since the end of World War II the American attitude regarding European integration has always been ambiguous: unify, but not too much. The end of the Cold War has not altered this ambivalence: poor Europe that is incapable of going beyond a limited integration; happy America that has such an ally. □

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Christoph Bertram:

FOR all its many good points, Brzezinski's prescription for the future U.S.-European relationship is, in the final analysis, a complacent and hence a flawed one. It can be summed up in one sentence: Europe, far from turning into a rival for the United States, will remain a dependent variable, a useful tool for U.S. strategy to spread stability to as many countries outside Russia as possible by incorporating them; it should be humored but not regarded as an equal partner by the United States.

On one issue Brzezinski is right: there is no need for Americans to panic as the EU tries to speed up defense integration. The angry fluster in some Washington corridors caused by plans for modest if urgent improvements in European capabilities for "out of area" military intervention has no justification: whatever comes of the plan, in the event European forces

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will have to draw on U.S. assets and hence to gain prior U.S. agreement.

But to make military power the litmus test of European integration is to repeat Stalin's mistake of judging the Catholic Church by the number of its divisions. Even Brzezinski, that most European of American realpolitikers, does not understand what this emerging Europe is really about. For him, it is "a polity construed on convenience", not "conviction", a pragmatic device for shared prosperity and stability. But pragmatism fails to explain the extent to which proud states, steeped in their respective histories, have sacrificed national autonomy for European interdependence. What drove them to submit to the authority of common laws and a common supreme court, to create a common currency, to unite the western part of the Continent, to invite the new democracies of the rest of Europe into their midst, and now to try and develop the means for autonomous military action was never merely convenience. It was, and is, a certain idea of what Europe should be.

The power of this idea should not be underrated. Americans used to recognize this, patiently but persistently encouraging efforts at European integration during all the decades of the Cold War. Now, perhaps out of irritation over Europe's newfound confidence, coupled with a one-track fascination with their own military and technological prowess and the dizziness of grandeur that has descended upon the world's only and probably last superpower, Americans seem to have lost both the patience and the vision. Sadly, Brzezinski here provides a strategic rationale for this loss.

It is shortsighted nevertheless, and for the very reasons the author himself states so eloquently at the beginning of his article: "America and Europe together serve as the axis of global stability." There is no other similar partner for an America that cares about international order, prosperity and democratic progress. And Europe, whatever its shortcomings, is a much stronger partner today than during the Cold War. It will be stronger still in the future.

Therefore it should be America's prime interest to lay the foundations today for a partnership with the Europe of tomorrow. U.S. supremacy may last for a generation but it will not last forever. What better use to make of this temporary advantage than to establish now the institutional framework for a partnership in which a Europe that will be stronger than it is today and an America that will be weaker can work together for order, prosperity and democracy in tomorrow's world? That, Dr. Brzezinski, would be imaginative realpolitik! □

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Timothy Garton Ash:

AS I would always expect from Zbigniew Brzezinski, this essay is lucid, incisive, far-reaching and stimulating. I have the problem of agreeing with most of its analysis and policy recommendations, especially those on NATO and EU enlargement. Let me nonetheless, as an English European, tease out five points, partly in disagreement, partly in necessary elaboration.

First, I am always in favor of saying things that are true, even if they are politically unhelpful. The statement that Europe is a "*de facto* military protectorate

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of the United States" seems to me neither true nor helpful. If I say "Xanadu is a French protectorate", this is generally understood to mean that the French run Xanadu. The Americans do not run Europe. Even in the weaker sense of "being dependent for military protection" this statement is scarcely true since, chaotic though Europe's defense arrangements are, there are no major current threats to our security against which the major European powers could not defend themselves and their EU partners.

Second, it is, however, true that even the strongest EU countries are still pathetically reliant on the United States in the case of any actual military action beyond the frontiers of the EU, even in a small patch of our own backyard such as Kosovo. I think one could usefully spell out that one major reason for this is that the leaders of Western Europe set the wrong priorities at the end of the Cold War, putting the creation of a common currency before that of a common army. With the present initiatives for improved foreign policy and defense coordination, the EU is doing in 2000 what it should have done in 1990. (I make the argument in more detail in my new book, *History of the Present.*)

Third, Brzezinski is absolutely right about the urgent need for the United States to be seen to be supporting, rather than carping at, these belated initiatives, especially in the defense field. The top-level political message from the new administration in Washington should be entirely and emphatically positive: "We *want* Europe to have a stronger defense identity and effective rapid reaction force." The supplementary stick might usefully be: "and we now expect you to look after Kosovo yourselves." Justified reservations about NATO compatibility can all be explored at lower, more technical levels.

Fourth, yes, Europe will never be a country. But (partly by means of introspection) I am not so pessimistic as Brzezinski is about the possibilities of positive emotional identification with Europe. Indeed, I think we have mutual friends in Central Europe who could well imagine "dying for Europe." *Malgré tout*, Europe has a soul. There is a struggle going on for this soul. Crudely stated, this is a new version of the old argument between the Atlanticist, liberal, global free-trading orientation, and the Gaullist, étatist, protectionist one. Historically, the balance of advantage has been moving from the latter to the former.

Fifth, by what it does and says, the United States will significantly affect this struggle, for better or for worse. Neither expecting a United States of Europe, nor accepting a Europe as Greater Switzerland, it should work toward two goals best defined by one George Bush (Sr.): "partners in leadership" and "Europe whole and free." □

Timothy Garton Ash is author of *History of the Present: Essays, Sketches and Dispatches from Europe in the 1990s* (Random House, forthcoming). He wrote this comment while a visiting scholar at the Hoover Institution, Stanford, CA.

Brzezinski replies:

ACTUALLY, in the main I agree with the basic points made by my friendly European critics. I do wish that America had Europe for a genuine partner, but wishful thinking is not a good guide to real policymaking. Creating a larger and gradually more integrated European space, closely allied to the United States, is the only game in town; the alternative to it is stagnation in the European venture, and a renewal of geopolitical uncertainties in the area between the Euro-Atlantic zone and Russia. □

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The World's Resentment

Anti-Americanism as a Global Phenomenon

Peter W. Rodman

CHARLES Krauthammer was one of the first to speak of the "unipolar moment"—the extraordinary global predominance that the United States suddenly acquired when Soviet power collapsed. He wrote in 1990, when the USSR still existed. But Krauthammer chose the word "moment" wisely. He did not doubt that in this instance, as so often before in history, predominance would give rise to challenge, and that therefore its duration could not be predicted.

He did not have long to wait. Well before that decade was out, challenges began to appear. The unipolar moment that Americans so enjoy is not, it seems, so universally celebrated elsewhere. Most of the world's other major powers—even our friends—have made it a central theme of their foreign policies to build counterweights to American power. In fact, their efforts in this direction constitute one of the main trends in international politics today.

Americans seem strangely oblivious to this. One reason, perhaps, is the traditional Wilsonian bent of American thinking about foreign policy: an America that sees itself as leading and acting in the name of universal moral principles has a tendency to assume that its leadership is welcomed and endorsed by everyone else. Such an America is genuinely puzzled by the idea that its assertiveness in the name of universal principles may sometimes be construed by others as a form of unilateralism. Yet unilateralism is precisely one of the charges being levied by many against the Clinton administration—and, again, this includes some of our friends. Our assertiveness—in any cause—is today perceived by others as an exercise of our predominant power.

The fact is that the rest of the world is reacting to American power in a thoroughly classical, un-Wilsonian, balance of power fashion, according to which it is not motives and intentions that are decisive but comparative power. The Russians and Chinese have, for the past five years, made it a centerpiece of their foreign policies—and of their increasingly close collaboration—to restore what they call "multipolarity" to the international system. Our Western European friends, in the Maastricht Treaty of 1993, committed themselves to a stronger European Union not only in the economic field but also in foreign and security policy; the Kosovo war of 1999, instead of vindicating NATO and American leadership, as it was seen to do in the eyes of the administration, had the effect of accelerating efforts to build a new all-European defense organization.

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Other powers in the world are reacting similarly to American predominance.

Another manifestation of this phenomenon is widespread sentiment that the United Nations Security Council ought to be the principal arbiter of international security, as was envisioned in the UN Charter. Many feel especially strongly that military interventions are not generally legitimate unless carried out under a UN mandate. (We heard a lot about this during the Kosovo crisis.) One of the main motives for this attempted elevation of the Security Council is to restrain American power.

How widespread and determined is this global reaction, and how seriously should the United States take it? Is it just rhetorical emoting, among countries that know full well they still need American leadership, or does it portend the kind of counter-coalition that has often in history cut a hegemon down to size? How much of it is structural—the natural response of others to a single power's predominance—and how much of it is the result of specific American conduct in the recent period? What policy lessons should the United States draw from the evidence, assuming it enjoys its pre-eminent position and would like to prolong it?

The Sino-Russian Mantra

IT IS NOT hard to accumulate evidence for the proposition that much of the rest of the world sees American predominance as a problem, rather than a blessing. The mantra for this point of view is "multipolarity"—the explicit rejection of the idea that the world ought to be, or remain for long, unipolar.

The Russians and Chinese were the first to develop this theme. This is ironic, perhaps, in that the Clinton administration for a long time congratulated itself for its "strategic partnerships" with both countries. A "strategic alliance with Russian reform" was how President Clinton characterized his policy toward Boris Yeltsin's Russia in an April 1, 1993 speech. He could visualize, or so it seemed, a natural affinity between a progressive American administration and a reformist Russian leadership. Similarly, a "constructive strategic partnership" was often said to be the aim of American policy toward China.

Yet, if there has been any consistent theme in Russian foreign policy in the post-Cold War period, it is Russia's categorical rejection of American leadership. In September 1996, then-Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov told the UN General Assembly that one of the basic conditions for achieving a durable peace was

> the emancipation from the mentality of 'those who lead' and 'those who are led.' Such a mentality draws on illusions that some countries emerged as winners from the Cold War, while others lost it. But this is not the case. Peoples on both sides of the Iron Curtain jointly got rid of the policy of confrontation. Meanwhile the mentality . . . directly paves the way for a tendency to establish a unipolar world. Such a world order is unacceptable to the overwhelming majority of the international community.

Boris Yeltsin likewise hailed the trend toward multipolarity that he professed to see gaining ground in the world. "This trend in universal development has been formulated by Russia", he boasted in a speech on May 12, 1998. "Most countries have agreed with it." And since, as Yeltsin insisted, attempts were still being made to foist the interests of one state on the world community, "the time has come to understand that in the present-day world, particularly in the 21st century, no state, however strong, can impose its will on others."

Whatever affinity the Clinton administration may have assumed it had with

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Russian "reform", Russians themselves have been thinking in more classical terms about how to define their national interests. Resisting American dominance seems clearly to be a part of that definition.

The Chinese have expressed the same passion for "multipolarity." Liu Huaqiu, a vice foreign minister serving as the chief national security adviser to the president and premier, declared in 1997 that global trends were moving in this direction, with China at the forefront:

> A multipolar world has become the growing trend, and China has developed into a main force. . . . The international status of socialist China has strengthened; its reputation has grown, and its influence has expanded. China will develop into an important role in the future multipolar world.

Not surprisingly, Russia and China have enshrined this as a central theme of their collaboration. When Chinese Premier Li Peng visited Yeltsin in Moscow at the end of December 1996, their joint communiqué declared, "The sides are unanimous that . . . a partnership of equal rights and trust between Russia and China aimed at strategic cooperation in the 21st century . . . promotes the formation of a multipolar world." And when Yeltsin visited Beijing in April 1996, the rhetoric on both the Russian and Chinese sides was extraordinary in its bluntness. The joint communiqué of that visit, signed by Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin, all but branded the United States a threat to peace: "The world is far from being tranquil. Hegemonism, power politics and repeated imposition of pressures on other countries have continued to occur. Bloc politics has taken up new manifestations." Three and a half years later, during Yeltsin's last visit to Beijing, another joint communiqué offered more of the same, only updated after Kosovo:

> Negative momentum in international relations continues to grow, and the following is becoming more obvious: The forcing of the international community to accept a unipolar world pattern and a single model of culture, value concepts and ideology, and a weakening of the role of the United Nations and its Security Council; the seeking of excuses to give irresponsible explanations or amendment to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter; the reinforcing and expanding of military blocs; the replacing of international law with power politics or even resorting to force; and the jeopardizing of the sovereignty of independent states using the concepts of 'human rights are superior to sovereignty' and 'humanitarian intervention.' The two sides agree to work together with the rest of the world to oppose the momentum presently preventing the establishment of a just multipolar structure for international relations.

Our Allies Agree . . .

MORE surprising, and perhaps more significant, than the reactions of Russia and China to American predominance is the degree to which these sentiments are also a staple of contemporary European discourse. The relationship of dependence that marked the last fifty years was the source of accumulating resentments—on both sides of the Atlantic—and the end of the Cold War danger has inevitably led our allies to seize the opportunity to expand their autonomy. The new European "identity", of course, is also the product of a long-standing and thoroughly positive project—that of European integration—which the United States has supported from the beginning. It has produced historic reconciliations on the Continent, and enormous economic progress. Yet there is no mistaking that at present Europe seeks to define its identity at least in part by dif-

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Anti-Americanism Muslim style . . .

ferentiation from the United States. A common theme of European rhetoric, even of the friendliest of our allies, is that it is time for Europe to make itself an equal of the United States, to be a counterweight to it, to achieve greater autonomy from it, to lessen dependence on it, and so on.

Naturally, the French give this its most pointed expression. Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine has labeled the United States not only a superpower but a "hyperpower", for the unique range of its dominance in the political, military, economic and cultural realms. The need for Europe to counterbalance this power is, for France, a self-evident axiom. To a conference of French ambassadors in August 1997, Védrine declared:

> Today there is one sole great power—the United States of America. . . . When I speak of its power, I state a fact . . . without acrimony. A fact is a fact. . . . But this power carries in itself, to the extent that there is no counterweight, especially today, a unilateralist temptation . . . and the risk of hegemony.

France's policy, he went on to say, was

> to contribute . . . to the emergence of several poles in the world capable of being a factor of equilibrium. . . . Europe is [such] an actor, a means of influence absolutely necessary for such a multipolar world to come about.

In an interview with *Libération* in November 1998, Védrine complained again that "a major factor in the world today" was "the overriding predominance of the United States in all areas and the current lack of any counterweight."

Building "counterweights", the "risk of hegemony"—if anyone thought that the end of the Cold War meant the end of "old-fashioned" balance of power thinking, this is as classical as one can get.

But the French are not the only Europeans to think in these terms. In the economic realm, the strengthened economic and monetary union (EMU) brought about by the Maastricht Treaty had the explicit goal of making the EU a stronger economic bloc relative to other powers. Joschka Fischer, now the German

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foreign minister, summed up the significance of EMU in an address to the European Parliament in January 1999:

> The introduction of a common currency is not primarily an economic, but rather a sovereign and thus eminently political act. With the communitarization of its money, Europe has also opted for an autonomous path in the future and, in close collaboration with our transatlantic partners, for an autonomous role in tomorrow's world.

Likewise, Dutch Prime Minister Wim Kok declared in a March 1998 speech, "EMU can develop into a cornerstone for Europe's further political integration—forming the foundation for Europe's increased power in the world."

All the more so was Europe's development of a common foreign and security policy, also mandated by Maastricht, seen as a means of making Europe into a "counterweight to the United States"—as Wim Kok put it on another occasion. The Kosovo crisis only intensified this resolve. In late 1998, in the early days of the Kosovo diplomacy, Tony Blair—perhaps America's closest friend among European leaders—cited Kosovo as a reason for the European Union to develop a defense institution of its own. This represented a major reversal of British policy, which had always insisted on NATO as the exclusive organization for Western security. In a speech in Edinburgh on November 13, 1998, Blair complained that Europe had been "hesitant and disunited" over Kosovo; it was now time for it to develop a capacity for autonomous action so that it would not always be so dependent on the United States.

While the Kosovo air campaign was a remarkable demonstration of transatlantic solidarity and an American-led Alliance operation, the breathtaking scale of American technological dominance had a paradoxical if not perverse effect. For many European governments, particularly those of a Center-Left coloration,

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. . . and Serbian style.

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participation in an American-led war was political agony; governments were bitterly assaulted by anti-American leftists (and Gaullist rightists in France), though the anti-Milosevic cause was enough to sustain public support for the war. The conclusion drawn by many Europeans across the political spectrum was that Europe needed to accelerate its own technological development and its creation of a European defense institution, precisely so that it not be put in such a position again.

An official German account of the Bremen meeting of the Western European Union in May 1999 reported,

> Minister Joschka Fischer and Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping urge a rapid buildup of common EU forces to master crises and conflicts in Europe even without participation of the United States. The Kosovo conflict expresses how urgent and indispensable this buildup will be for the future of Europe, declared Fischer.

At the Helsinki summit of the EU in December 1999, the Europeans announced their intention to field an all-European force of 50,000 to 60,000 men by 2003. While the position of all the European allies is that NATO remains the foundation of European security, German Greens have hailed the EU's all-European defense project precisely as the beginning of Europe's "emancipation" from the United States.

Japan's attitude toward American preeminence is somewhat more complicated. While the end of the Soviet threat led many in Japan to question why the Americans were still hanging around, the North Korean menace and the emergence of China have supplied a persuasive answer to the question. Japan's assertiveness on many issues has also been dampened by its disappointing economic performance in recent years. Yet experts agree that Japanese nationalism is re-emerging.

Japanese officials now routinely stress "autonomy" from the United States as a central theme. Other Japanese are calling on their country to rewrite its American-drafted constitution; to forge a new identity as a bridge between East and West (rather than as just an appendage of the West); to seek greater influence and empowerment *vis-à-vis* the United States by becoming more active in the United Nations; and to challenge U.S. dominance of international economic policy. And in its own way, the debacle of the Seattle meeting of the World Trade Organization last December may have had some of the same impact in Japan as the Kosovo crisis had in Europe. "The failure poured cold water on the overconfidence of the United States", trumpeted *Asahi Shimbun* in an editorial. "The conference was an occasion that the other developed countries and developing countries said no to the United States, which is selfish and over-proud of itself as the sole superpower of the world."

. . . *And the Third World Joins In*

MANY COUNTRIES in the Third World as well view the emergence of the United States as the sole superpower as a mixed blessing. During the Cold War, they had played the two superpowers against each other. The Soviet collapse left the international system too "unbalanced" for some countries' tastes.

Egyptian Foreign Minister Amre Moussa, in a revealing 1996 interview in *Middle East Quarterly*, lamented the "lack of international balance" now that the Soviet Union was gone. This represented a remarkable shift from the policy of Anwar Sadat, who had expelled the Soviet presence from Egypt and cast Egypt's lot with the United States, calculating (even while the Soviet Union still

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existed) that America held "most of the cards" in the Middle East.

A more extreme statement comes from the egregious Mahathir Mohamad, prime minister of Malaysia. His speech to the UN General Assembly last September 29 was a diatribe complaining that the international system was completely unbalanced without the Soviets. It is hard to say whether Mahathir speaks only for himself or whether he simply says openly what many other Third World leaders believe privately. In any case, his indictment is worth quoting at length:

> With [the destruction of the Eastern bloc] the liberal democratic free market capitalists see no more need to be gentle in spreading their systems or in profiting from them. No one would be allowed any other political or economic system except what is prescribed by the sole dominant bloc. The true ugliness of Western capitalism revealed itself, backed by the military might of capitalism's greatest proponent.
>
> For the small countries the demise of the Eastern bloc is a major disaster. Now they are exposed to pressures which they cannot resist....
>
> [T]he principle that prevailed in the third quarter of the 20th Century was that no one should interfere in the internal affairs of a nation. That in fact was the essence of independence. As long as the world was divided into Eastern and Western blocs this principle was respected.
>
> But then a President decided that his country had a right and a duty to oversee that human rights are not abused anywhere in the world irrespective of borders and the independence of nations. No one conferred this right on this crusading President. But small things like that was [*sic*] not going to stop him....
>
> For the poor and the weak, for the aspiring tigers and dragons of Asia, the 21st Century does not look very promising. Everything will continue to be cooked in the West. . . . And what is from the West is universal. Other values and cultures are superfluous and unnecessary. If they remain there will be a clash of civilizations. To avoid this there should be only one civilization in the world. Thus the Globalized world will be totally uniform. Variety is equal to being intransigent and must therefore be eliminated.

Keeping Our Cool

MOST OF THIS reaction to American pre-eminence is inevitable, and much of it is, in fact, healthy. For our allies in particular, the end of the Cold War is an opportunity to restore some balance to a relationship of dependency. Such relationships are by their nature corrosive, breeding resentments on both sides. A U.S. Congress that has been complaining for years about inequitable "burden-sharing" should be pleased if allies now seek greater self-reliance. The issue with the Europeans, then, becomes a narrower one. As even the French agree, the Atlantic Alliance remains important, and valued, on both sides of the Atlantic. Therefore the task of U.S. policy is to develop the European Union's new defense policy and structure in a way that complements the Alliance and remains within its broad framework, rather than disrupting its unity.[1] Assuming the anti-American rhetoric can be kept under control, the result could be positive, especially if the Europeans actually develop capabilities for handling a variety of crises and peacekeeping chores. With Japan, similarly, sufficient dangers exist to justify continuation of the security alliance, but a more equal strategic partnership would be healthy.

As for the general foreign complaint that the world is "unbalanced", there is not much the United States can do about that, short of collapsing or abdicating its inter-

[1]For a fuller discussion, see my *Drifting Apart: Trends in U.S.-European Relations* (Washington, DC: The Nixon Center, June 1999).

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national role. The demise of the Soviet Union did, alas, vindicate market economics and the idea of freedom; if this is painful for governments that would prefer to govern by contrary principles, then they have a problem that we cannot solve for them. The laws of economics apply to everyone, and we live in an age when every authoritarian regime faces a problem of legitimacy. We could not shield others from these forces even if we wanted to.

Yet, all this having been said, the United States has a problem too. Americans need to understand that other countries are not all eager and happy to fall into line under our leadership. Europe is the continent where the balance of power was invented; for most nations the fact of a single predominant power triggers a reflex to build counterweights. Probably we should not take it so personally; it is a survival instinct of smaller countries throughout history. It is a law of geopolitics—something that should be a surprise only to those who do not know geopolitics.

U.S. policymakers would also do well to remember that America's predominance may not last forever. This is not because our physical power will be matched anytime soon; William Wohlforth has made an overwhelming case that America's position of unipolar preponderance is probably going to be quite durable.[2] The problem is rather that policy ineptitude could render that predominant power less impressive. Whether our physical predominance translates into actual influence over events will depend on intangibles such as our political will and staying power, the credibility of our commitments, our perceived willingness or unwillingness to take risks and bear costs, our reputation for reliability and competence. All these depend on our performance over time. They could all be badly weakened by a major policy fiasco—such as a failed military intervention.

The Pentagon has a phrase, "asymmetric strategies", which refers to the strategies by which smaller powers seek to exploit the vulnerabilities of a stronger power. Lord knows we have such vulnerabilities—and others are eagerly searching for them. (Chinese strategists, for example, have analyzed the 1991 Gulf War and satisfied themselves that if Saddam Hussein had not committed a few key errors, the outcome would have been quite different.[3]) The intensity of rogue states' pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, moreover, undoubtedly derives from their conviction that such a capability would prove a great "equalizer", significantly compounding America's reluctance to use its power in some hypothetical future confrontation.

FINALLY, there is the broader issue of grand strategy: how a superpower can maximize its chances of preserving its advantageous position and minimize, for example, the risks of provoking countervailing coalitions. Some of this is merely a question of style. Triumphalism, gloating, bullying, lecturing about our "indispensability"—all these are counterproductive, and also avoidable. Sometimes the matter seems trivial; for example, President Clinton's forcing the embarrassed Helmut Kohl and Jacques Chirac to wear cowboy boots at the Denver G-7 summit in 1997 caused a wave of resentful press commentary in Europe. But peremptory American impositions of policy—the insistence on only three new admittees to NATO in the first round at the Madrid summit, after some allies had publicly committed themselves to five; the abrupt U.S. veto of Germany's

[2]Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World", *International Security* (Summer 1999).

[3]See Michael Pillsbury, *China Debates the Future Security Environment* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2000), pp. 76-83.

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first nominee for IMF director this year—have the same effect. Whatever the substantive merits of the U.S. position in such instances, the style rankles. Congress' recent habit of imposing third-country sanctions on allies over Cuba, Libya and Iran forms a part of this background. Again, even if we are correct on the merits (which we often are), we need to realize that in the eyes of our allies there is a rapidly lengthening list of examples of "unilateralism", if not high-handedness.

Josef Joffe has offered a model of grand strategy for the United States to follow. He sees America as the hub of a wheel, with other major powers as the spokes. America's central, pivotal, advantageous position rests not only on our strength, but on the fact that all other powers either need us for something, or want something from us, are afraid of crossing us, or are afraid of leaving us in bed with one of their rivals.[4] Europe and Japan still need us for security, as a hedge against Russia and China; Russia and China worry about Japan, and both also wish to be part of the Western economic system; and so on. The United States continues, as Sadat said, to hold most of the cards.

Deterrence of major challenges to the world balance of power must certainly remain a key component of U.S. policy. But Joffe's concept is an argument for maintaining positive links with all the other major players, so that each continues to have a stake in its relations with America. This keeps us in the position of master of the geopolitical game. It is a logical formula for a pre-eminent power that wants to pre-empt counter-coalitions and retain influence over events. The United States has an excellent chance to prolong its advantage by a conscious strategy of this kind.

Conscious strategy does not come easily to American leaders, accustomed as they are to making policy by a series of *ad hoc*, unrelated, "pragmatic" decisions. Nor is subtlety our strong suit. But we would be well advised to give this some thought. □

[4]Joffe, "'Bismarck' or 'Britain'? Toward an American Grand Strategy after Bipolarity", *International Security* (Spring 1995).

All-Purpose Target

Possibly it was a mistake in the concluding days of the Uruguay Round of trade talks to rename the old General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 'World Trade Organization' sounds so much more sinister. But the attack on it is coming as part of an attack on 'globalisation' (the modern version of the international communist Jewish banking conspiracy) which in essence is sheer millennial panic. The main charge laid against the WTO is that it puts free trade above all other things, at the expense of labour standards, national autonomy (what in the thirties was called autarky), the environment, genetically modified organisms, the rights of women, of indigenous peoples, homosexual rights and marriage, vegetarianism, voting rights for animals, social solidarity, religion, art, culture, and indeed everything but the kitchen sink. It is the perfect all-purpose villain.

—*Quadrant*, January-February 2000

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The Forgotten Player

Michael J. Green

UNTIL HIS STROKE this past April, Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi's ruling coalition had repeatedly challenged the pacifist consensus that has prevailed in Japan since 1945, knocking over half century-old taboos and replacing them with the symbols of a "normal" state. A telling example occurred in March 1999, when Japanese destroyers fired on North Korean spy boats, driving them from Japan's territorial waters. The fusillades were the first fired in anger by the Japanese navy since the Second World War, and though they were only warning shots, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) promptly crafted legislation that would enable Japanese ships to fire for effect the next time. Support for the Obuchi cabinet increased by 5 percent in the wake of the confrontation.

Subsequently, the Japanese Diet passed legislation authorizing logistical support for U.S. forces in the event of a military conflict in Asia—support the United States had sought without success since the 1970s. In August the Diet passed laws awarding official recognition to the *hinomaru* flag and to *kimigayo*, the national anthem, which opens with a refrain revering the emperor. Then in February of this year, two commissions in the Diet opened a debate on amending Japan's postwar constitution. This came on the heels of polls showing that 60 percent of the Diet's members supported revision and 40 percent were dissatisfied with its "Peace Clause." All this has been accompanied by a chorus of commentators and editorials championing a more assertive Japanese stance toward China, North Korea and the United States.

The sudden transformation of Japan's strategic culture has not been unanimously well received. "Japan Returns to Nationalism", trumpeted the Asian edition of *Time* magazine last year. In a more sober assessment, a June 1999 memorandum prepared by the U.S. National Intelligence Council cautioned that Japan is "pursuing greater autonomy or independence." The official Chinese press has warned of a return to the Japanese militarism of the 1930s. In a survey last year of Asian business executives, a majority expressed the opinion that Japan was becoming more nationalistic. Commentators throughout the region are today echoing Lee Kuan Yew's famous quip that encouraging Japan to play a larger security role is akin to feeding a reformed alcoholic chocolate liqueurs.

But Japan is not returning to militarism or embarking on a campaign of revanchism. Taboos have fallen, but the framework of postwar pacifism remains in

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place. Japan's allergy to nuclear weapons remains strong, and Tokyo continues to hold an idealized view of international institutions such as the United Nations. Japan's aging demographics also conspire against resurgent militarism—Japanese rightists will not build a new Kwantung Army out of the aging "salarymen" who constitute the country's bulging demographic middle. In many respects, indeed, the Japanese are developing a more transparent, liberal and civil society; the same Diet that blessed the anthem and flag also passed sweeping legislation for the establishment of nonprofit and charitable organizations. More important, Japan is *not* bolting from the U.S.-Japan alliance, which lately has become even more crucial to Japanese security given uncertainties about China and North Korea. Quite the contrary: for the first time in postwar history, all of Japan's political parties (except the Communists) openly champion the alliance.

Still, Japan *is* changing. After years of cautious international behavior and paralyzing domestic debates about security policy, a broad consensus is emerging that Japan should assert its national interests more forcefully and be a more "normal" nation. In part, this new wisdom reflects the pent-up ambitions of Japanese leaders of a younger generation that appears more comfortable on the world stage and less encumbered by war guilt than its elders. In part, it reflects a growing realism about threats to peace in Northeast Asia posed by North Korean and Chinese missiles.

There is a nationalistic dimension to the changes in Japan as well, one rooted in resentment toward a domineering American foreign policy and anxiety about the nation's economic future. Taken together, this mixture of ambition, realism and angst has so far yielded more passion than strategic coherence, but the momentum behind a more independent Japanese security policy has become irreversible.

For the United States, the emergence of a more normal Japan represents an opportunity rather than a threat, but it is an opportunity that is being squandered. Ironically, after years of cajoling Tokyo to assume a larger security burden, Washington has lost its bearings. While seven years ago the Clinton administration was alarmed at the prospect of a formidable economic competitor across the Pacific, today Japan rarely receives attention above the middle layers of the bureaucracy. Tokyo is still seen as a source of funds, but hardly a strategic partner.

Distracted by the "rise" of China, Washington seems to have lost sight of the fact that there are today *two* aspiring powers in Asia. Rather than taking a patronizing and aloof approach, American policy toward Japan should seek to assure Tokyo that the United States is both committed to the alliance and is listening to the concerns of its ally. This means actively supporting Japanese diplomatic initiatives that serve broad U.S. strategic interests in East Asia. It means dropping the hollow rhetoric of "strategic partnership" with China. And it means encouraging a more "normal" security policy for Japan, albeit one premised on the current division of roles in which Japan assigns offensive and strategic missions to the United States.

The Burst Bubble

JAPAN's struggle to craft a more ambitious security doctrine is not new. In the early 1980s Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone seized on public alarm at the Soviet military build-up in the Far East to boost defense expenditures and to make the word *domei* (alliance) an acceptable term in official references to relations with the United States. After the Gulf War, the Japanese

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government secured Diet support for limited military participation in UN peacekeeping operations and launched a concerted but unsuccessful bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. These developments were significant, but in large measure evolved in response to international pressure for increased burden-sharing. Japanese officials described their purpose to a reluctant domestic audience in terms of *giri* (obligation) or *koken* (contribution) to the international society. Today all that has passed away, as Tokyo increasingly champions a more assertive foreign policy for reasons of sheer self-interest.

Observers of Japan from Herman Kahn to Henry Kissinger have long predicted that the Japanese would eventually devise a strategic role commensurate with their growing economic power. Few, however, anticipated that Japan's most significant steps in the security arena would follow the collapse of its economic model. After nine years of averaging close to zero growth, Japanese economic planners are finally beginning to admit that the old formula of intrusive government intervention, controlled competition and lifetime employment can no longer be sustained. The Japanese government claims that bad debts in 1998 totaled about $0.5 trillion, but the lack of transparency in the financial sector has led many outside analysts, including former Resolution Trust Corporation Chairman William Seidman, to conclude that the amount must be closer to $1 trillion. Lurking just behind the debt crisis is a massive underfunding of public and private pension funds, distorted and deflating asset markets, overcapacity in the manufacturing sector, a rapidly aging society, and unemployment rates that many economists forecast will approach 8 percent in the next decade.

Predictably, the demise of the old economic order has fueled resentment and anxiety. Attacks on "globalism", "American standards" and "market fundamentalism" have become a staple in the Japanese media and have been popularized in books like Shintaro Ishihara's *The Yen As Japan's National Will*, his *The Japan That Can Say NO*, and Mototada Kikkawa's *Loss of the Money War*. This economic uncertainty is fueling nationalism, which, in turn, is fueling a growing assertiveness in security and foreign policy. At the same time, declining economic resources are also forcing moderates and internationalists to rethink their approach to the world. As *Challenge 21* (a 1998 Foreign Ministry planning document) argues, Japan must raise its diplomatic profile to compensate for its lost economic power.

Still a Dangerous Neighborhood

UNCERTAINTY also pervades Japan's stance toward its neighbors. Asia is not necessarily a more dangerous place than it was during the Cold War, when Soviet Backfire bombers and nuclear submarines patrolled the Sea of Japan, but the threats are today far more visible and direct, and the Japanese public, for largely domestic reasons, has become more attuned to security concerns.

Japanese attitudes toward China, for example, have hardened considerably in recent years. Tokyo never fully shared Washington's postwar hostility toward Beijing and, indeed, rushed to establish formal diplomatic relations with China after the U.S. rapprochement in 1972. In the early 1990s, Japan enjoyed something of a special relationship with Beijing, serving as a bridge between China and the West in the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen incident. As Yoichi Funabashi, the respected columnist for *Asahi Shimbun*, argued in the pages of *Foreign Affairs* in 1992, the Japanese were growing confident in the "Asianization of Asia."

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By the middle of the 1990s, however, Japanese thinking tended toward an anxious realism about China's strategic intentions. In 1995 Chinese nuclear tests outraged both the hawkish Right and the anti-nuclear Left in the Japanese Diet, leading to an unprecedented suspension of grant aid to Beijing. China rattled the Japanese public again in March 1996 by bracketing Taiwan with ballistic missiles, some of which landed near Japanese shipping lanes south of Okinawa. China's increasingly strident attacks on theater missile defense and the U.S.-Japan defense guidelines have also provoked concern in Tokyo. In 1985 only 18 percent of the Japanese public polled by the *Asahi* newspaper responded that they did not feel friendly toward China. By 1996 that figure had risen to 51 percent.

Nevertheless, Japan's relationship with China is still defined mostly by economics. Tokyo reached its own bilateral agreement with Beijing this summer on China's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), and continues to provide around $1 billion per year to China in loans. Tokyo is also working with Beijing to solve China's environmental problems under the Japanese government's "Green Aid" plan. Still, the tone of relations is entirely different from the past. Annual Japanese direct investment in China rose from $438 million in 1989 to $4.5 billion in 1995, but fell to $1.1 billion in 1998, and many in the Japanese business community have voiced exasperation with the Chinese market.

Then, too, Japan no longer reflexively defers to China on matters of historical accounting. During his state visit to Tokyo in November 1998, Chinese President Jiang Zemin insisted on an official apology for Japan's invasion of China. Obuchi refused to offer one unless the Chinese agreed to ask for no further apologies in the future. The impasse was never resolved and the summit proved a diplomatic disaster for both sides. Tellingly, the Japanese media expressed near unanimous support for Obuchi's tough stance.

Japan has also lately been formulating security policy and diplomacy in Asia with an eye toward Chinese bellicosity. After reaffirming the U.S.-Japan alliance in 1996, Tokyo defrosted its icy relationship with Russia, proposed a new strategic dialogue with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and established the first regular high-level security consultations with South Korea.

North Korea, too, has shaken Japan's sense of security. As the Cold War ended, Japanese politicians figured they could maneuver deftly between the two Koreas without abandoning Japan's *de facto* alignment with the South. In 1990 Shin Kanemaru, political kingpin of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party, met with Kim Il Sung and vowed in a tearful statement to normalize relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) as soon as possible. Japan had much to offer the North. Japan's ethnic Korean community once transferred close to $600 million annually to Pyongyang and Tokyo hinted at a multibillion-dollar package to settle "post-colonial claims." Alas, the promise of improved relations with Pyongyang has disappeared in a hale of missile launches and caustic rhetoric from the North. In 1992 the Japanese media revealed that North Korean commandos had kidnapped close to a dozen innocent Japanese citizens from coastal Japan (for the purpose of training spies). Japanese anxiety about the DPRK was further inflamed in 1993 by the first of North Korea's Nodong missile tests, and in 1994 by confrontation over North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

But the worst shock came in August 1998, when Pyongyang test-fired a Taepodong long-range missile directly over northern Japan. The Taepodong has

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become Japan's Sputnik. After decades of recusing itself from security issues on the peninsula, Tokyo's approach to Pyongyang today is in fact more confrontational than either Seoul's or Washington's. In the wake of the Taepodong launch, Japan temporarily suspended financial support for the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, agreed to missile defense cooperation with the United States, and accelerated the passage of tougher defense guidelines. It also approved the development of independent reconnaissance satellites, in part as the result of frustration with the tepid U.S. response to the missile firing and an erroneous belief in Japanese political circles that Washington had failed to share intelligence about the launch. In the Diet, Japanese politicians even debated the constitutionality of unilateral "pre-emptive strikes" and the need for an independent "counterstrike" capability.

Generational Divisions

WHILE ALL this was happening, Japanese domestic politics have been in a state of flux. A process of political realignment began in 1993, when the Liberal Democratic Party surrendered its four decade-long control of the government to an eight-party coalition, which managed to institute new electoral laws before collapsing under its own weight.

The immediate impact of these upheavals was the destruction of the old Japanese Left. The Socialist Party, which existed in large measure to block changes in Japanese security policy, is now a skeleton of its former self and will probably disappear altogether in Japan's next election. It has been replaced as the largest opposition party by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), a polyglot of former Socialists, former LDP politicians and new politicians from urban and suburban districts. The DPJ bears no resemblance to the old Socialist Party. Its platform supports the U.S. military presence in Asia and calls for laws to strengthen the self-defense forces. But this is only the consensus view within the party. In fact, the DPJ's president, Yukio Hatoyama, ran for office on a platform arguing that U.S. forces should be reduced and the constitution revised to grant Japan more responsibility for its own defense.

With the exception of the Communists, it is difficult to draw clear distinctions among the major political parties on security issues. This is particularly true of younger politicians. Polls show that 90 percent of elected officials in their forties and younger favor constitutional revision (the number is about half that for those over fifty). Whereas many analysts expected a new Left-Right cleavage to develop with the demise of the old "1955 system" (named after the year the LDP was formed), the most striking division appears to be generational. For the most part, younger politicians favor the U.S.-Japan alliance. An overwhelming majority voted for what previously would have been a controversial piece of legislation forcing a reluctant Okinawan governor to accept the renewal of U.S. basing leases in March 1997, and for the U.S.-Japan defense guidelines legislation last spring. But few are satisfied with the status quo. Most of the younger voices champion a more active role for Tokyo within the U.S.-Japan alliance. They expect eventual reductions in the number of U.S. bases, fuller consultations on the deployment of U.S. forces in Japan, and more diplomatic space for Japanese initiatives.

There has long been a group of nationalists on the Japanese political scene that defines its country's purpose in terms of separation from the United States—regardless of U.S. policy. And it is always possible that the assertiveness of

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the younger generation could mutate into a more traditional form of anti-Americanism. The election of Shintaro Ishihara as governor of Tokyo suggests that nationalism has a sizeable constituency in contemporary Japanese politics. Ishihara's election, though, was not merely about nationalism—it was fundamentally about shaking up the old system. Only 13 percent of voters backing Ishihara said they agreed with his views, while 53 percent said they supported him because they thought "he could get things done." The emerging generation of political elites in Tokyo resents the lack of initiative in Japanese foreign policy and chafes at American policies that treat them as passive partners. But if the U.S. posture toward Japan were to reflect a willingness to accept a more equal strategic partnership, this political force should respond positively.

The Consequences of "Japan Passing"

WHAT IS urgently needed now is a U.S. policy that approaches East Asia in strategic terms and with a clear sense of where Japan fits in. Thus far, the signals from Washington have been decidedly mixed. The Clinton administration opened its first term with two years of intense pressure on Japan to negotiate "results-oriented" trade agreements. In 1996 the administration reversed course and attached more importance to bilateral strategic ties under the so-called "Nye Initiative", which culminated in a joint security declaration in April 1996 and agreements to revise the defense guidelines and consolidate U.S. bases on Okinawa. But the promise of the Clinton-Hashimoto declaration soon evaporated in a series of small but highly symbolic U.S. gestures.

The first of these occurred in late 1996 when the State Department denied that the United States had an obligation to defend Japan in the unlikely event that Tokyo's territorial dispute with Beijing over the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands turned violent. Diplomatically, the administration was correct to remain neutral, but technically the United States *is* obligated under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty to defend the Senkakus. Critics of the U.S.-Japan alliance in Tokyo recognized this and pressed for unilateral action until senior Pentagon officials finally resolved the issue by declaring that the islands were indeed covered by the treaty.

Shortly after the Senkaku dispute, the administration announced a new "strategic partnership" with China. In pursuit of that aim, President Clinton passed up a stopover in Japan to spend nine days in China in 1998, at one point using a joint press conference with Chinese President Jiang Zemin to criticize Japanese economic policy. Prime Minister Hashimoto later told Madeleine Albright that this did not bother him, but the press in Japan coined a new phrase for the administration's Asia policy—"Japan passing."

The worst case of "Japan passing" occurred in the wake of the August 1998 Taepodong launch. As Japan reeled from the shock of the missile test, Washington offered Pyongyang 200,000 tons of food aid and funds for the construction of four light-water nuclear reactors. Tokyo, which was to pay about $1 billion of the tab, was informed that it must choose between accepting Washington's agreement with Pyongyang or war on the peninsula. And during this same period, the administration rebuffed or ignored a series of Japanese diplomatic proposals to address the South Asian nuclear tests, a multilateral security dialogue in Northeast Asia, and the Asian financial crisis.

To be fair, the administration does not deserve all the blame for poor strategic policy coordination. Increasingly in Japan, local governments, citizen

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groups, the press and domestic agencies are influencing policy formulation. Tokyo also drops the ball frequently—for example, by not sending peacekeepers to places like East Timor, in spite of bolder rhetoric about regional security. And Japan has occasionally gotten out ahead of U.S. policy in the region. This proved to be the case when the Obuchi government announced a suspension of aid for North Korea immediately after the Taepodong missile launch, and when the Ministry of Finance announced its plans for the creation of an Asian Monetary Fund without first consulting the Treasury Department or the International Monetary Fund.

Nevertheless, even some of Tokyo's most disruptive attempts to be heard have merit from the perspective of U.S. interests. The Asian Monetary Fund concept may have been a fanciful conceit, for example, but at the time Washington was barely paying attention to the growing financial crisis in Southeast Asia. Japan was also justified in its concern about North Korea's missile development program, which the Clinton administration had downplayed in negotiations with Pyongyang until Congress pressed for action. And the Japanese have accomplished with their China policy what has thus far eluded the administration: a successful negotiation on WTO coupled with firmness on security issues. From Tokyo there has been no silly rhetoric about strategic partnership.

JAPAN deserves to be taken more seriously as an American partner in Asia. The administration should have formulated a strategy with Japan toward the Asian financial crisis as it spread, instead of bickering over rhetorical differences in economic philosophy. After the Taepodong launch, senior U.S. officials should have planned a response together with Tokyo and Seoul before rushing to an agreement with North Korea (a trilateral coordination group has since been formed). Likewise, the administration would do well to sit down with Japanese officials to devise a joint strategy for permanent Japanese membership of the UN Security Council. And the administration should strengthen and expand its cooperation with Japan on global issues such as health and the environment, which are currently subsumed within the U.S.-Japan "Common Agenda"—a potentially important exercise that has been neglected in recent years.

Most important, the United States needs to pay far greater attention to its defense relationship with Japan. To begin with, the U.S. intelligence community should expand cooperation with the new Japan Defense Intelligence Headquarters, with the aim of strengthening mutual analytical capabilities. The administration should further aid Japan in the implementation of domestic crisis management rules, so that the bilateral defense guidelines are complemented by clear lines of authority inside Japan. U.S. forces in Asia should also begin integrating Japanese logistical and rear area support into their own contingency preparations and training. And we must welcome, not fear, Japan's debate about an expanded role in UN military operations.

The U.S. and Japanese governments agreed in the 1980s to a division of military roles and missions in and around Japan, whereby the United States would assume responsibility for all strategic, offensive and counteroffensive missions and Japan would retain responsibility for defensive tasks. That basic formula, expanded in the 1990s to incorporate Japanese participation in UN operations, need not change. Were Japan to acquire capabilities, or assume responsibility, for offensive operations, the alliance would be altered so fundamentally that Japan-China

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relations and Japan-South Korea relations would become unsustainable, thus undermining both U.S. and Japanese security aims. As Japan debates constitutional revision and the related question of whether to recognize the right of "collective self-defense", this division of roles and missions must remain clear. Within that formula, however, there is much more that Japan can do to enhance its own security and launch diplomatic initiatives as a global power, albeit one in support of and supported by the United States.

The rest of Asia may prove more difficult to convince. Japan will need to move promptly to reassure its neighbors that constitutional revision and other modifications to its defense policy will bolster, rather than diminish, the security of the region. The demise of old taboos will not make this any easier. Revisionism about the Second World War has become a leitmotif of popular media and politics in Japan. The 1997 film *Pride* glorifies Japan's wartime leader, Hideki Tojo. Millions went to see the film and the producers are currently at work on sequels about the kamikaze pilots and Japan's noble effort to "liberate" Indonesia. Not surprisingly, Japan's neighbors view these developments with considerable unease.

In Japan, the problems of the past have become entangled with visions of the future. Most Japanese do not deny the darker side of their national history. They do, however, intend to transcend it. Japan may have found a formula for doing so in its relations with South Korea. When Obuchi offered South Korean President Kim Dae Jung "heartfelt remorse" and a "deep apology" for Japan's transgressions against Korea, Kim accepted the gesture and promised to work toward building a stronger partnership with Japan in Asia. By contrast, China's Jiang Zemin refused to accept a similar apology and, more significant, to embrace a larger regional role for Japan. That impasse, as much as anything, accounts for recent tensions in Japan-China relations. China's transparent preference for a weak and passive Japan has not been lost on Tokyo.

The Japanese elite is today thinking more seriously about Japan's own security interests than at any other point in the postwar period. The United States should welcome this awakening and assure Japan that it will not weaken bilateral ties. From here on, America will have to consult with Japan earlier, more frequently and at higher levels. We will have to consider joint management of U.S. bases in Japan, endorse Japanese candidates to lead international organizations, and support Japanese diplomatic initiatives in Southeast Asia and at the United Nations.

In exchange, we should raise the bar of expectations. We should insist on active Japanese participation in peacekeeping operations, on a clearer Japanese stand against rogue regimes like Iraq, and on improved consultation prior to Japanese diplomatic initiatives. In all of this, we should appreciate that the opportunity to build a stronger relationship is at hand and that the consequences of alliance mismanagement are serious.

Before the dark days of the 1930s, the Japanese diplomat, scholar and student of Woodrow Wilson, Inazo Nitobe, wrote that the true internationalist in Japan must first look down at his own feet to see where he stands before raising his head to see where the world is going. As Japan raises its head, the first thing it should always see is the United States. □

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Putin's Precursors

Laurent Murawiec

HISTORIANS explain that for several centuries Russia's elites have been divided between "Westernizers" and "Slavophiles." The former advocate the adoption of Western ways, the latter seek to keep Russia isolated from Europe's decadent and alien traditions. Peter the Great is often depicted as the father figure of the Westernizers, while Ivan the Terrible is credited with inaugurating the long succession of tyrants that fought to safeguard Russia's "soul" against alien encroachment.

But such analysis is inadequate. It fails to account for what has been called "Peter the Great's dilemma": Is it possible to bring an end to Russian barbarism by using barbaric means? Should Peter—"the awful Emperor", as Pushkin dubbed him—be considered a Westernizer simply because he created "a window on Europe", or a Slavophile, on account of his frightful brutality?

If Russia has always failed to modernize, if it remains encamped on the outskirts of Europe, it may be that most of its supposed Westernizers were not, and are not, so Western-oriented after all. There are, indeed, *modernizers* in Russia. A strong tradition in Russian statecraft and in the intelligentsia has espoused modernization—developing science, technology, industry and education—but has done so strictly on Russia's terms. According to this tradition, the West's religious and cultural values must not be allowed to contaminate the unchanging essence of Mother Russia, whose hallmarks are Russian Orthodoxy and a powerful, centralized state. In the modern era, the humiliating defeat suffered by Russia in the Crimean War compelled Russian elites to adopt Western hardware in order to build up Russia's infrastructure and her military might, as reflected in Dostoyevsky's elaboration about the need to do so in his *Diary of a Writer*. But while Western railways, capital and machinery were needed, Western mores and institutions were unwelcome.

It is an article of faith among such modernizers that the Russian state, the standard-bearer of the "Russian Idea", must never allow either Russia's civil society or its economy to develop an autonomous existence. Citizens must be constrained, prevented from organizing themselves spontaneously outside church and state-sanctioned lines. Selfish economic interests will not concern themselves with Russia's destiny, and dominion by the state is essential.

This outlook is partly congruent with the thinking of extreme Slavophiles. Modernizing Russia is not their concern. They are prepared to slow down and even

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halt altogether Russia's industrial and urban development, lest that development breed Western pestilence. The similarity with Islamic fears of the West is striking: the pure essence of Russia is so fragile that, for all its divine strength, it could easily be contaminated. These ideologues are prepared to go to absurd lengths, and to implement highly counterproductive measures, in order to maintain "purity." Nicholas I in the first half of the nineteenth century, Alexander III in the last quarter of that century, and, in their own ways, Lenin and Stalin embody this current. The Bolshevik leaders slaughtered all the educated classes, preferring the abysmal sloth, incompetence and unproductivity of *muzhik* graduates of Soviet schools to "bourgeois" engineers: the coarse Bolshevik cadres were bad technicians, but at least they were *nashi* (ours).

THE modernization and Slavophile camps are in many respects distinct and identifiable, but they are not rigidly separated. Countless threads connect them. Dostoyevsky, advocate of modernization though he was, was also a very close collaborator of Konstantin Pobedonostsev, for decades the Procurator of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church and probably the most reactionary figure in modern Russian history. Before he had them slaughtered, Lenin found Menshevik experts useful for performing skilled administrative tasks for which illiterate Bolsheviks were unsuited. Stalin oscillated between the modernizers and the ideologues. He urbanized and industrialized the Motherland, but many of his policies were as irrational and self-defeating as Hitler's insistence on diverting train cars from the front to transport Jews to the death camps.

While authentic "Westernizers" do exist as a third current, all too often modernizers have been deemed to be Westernizers merely on account of their willingness to accept, import and employ Western techniques and artifacts. But a willingness to use Western technology implies no desire to assimilate the substance of what is properly "Western"—the Judeo-Christian legacy, Greek philosophy, the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, critical philosophy. Constitutional government has never lasted long in Russia, and the rule of law has never been established. Modernizers can do without these.

The true Westernizers have seldom numbered more than a handful in each generation. They are a delicate flower that has been able to grow permanent roots in the Russian soil. When a massive project of translating Western classics—Homer, Shakespeare, Dante, Racine—into Russian was undertaken at the Imperial Lycée in Tsarskoe Selo, near Saint Petersburg, at the dawn of the nineteenth century (Alexander Pushkin was among the first pupils), Westernization acquired a real content. Similarly, when Anton Rubinstein established the Music Conservatory and Concert Society in Saint Petersburg (Tchaikovsky was in the first batch of graduates), he introduced Bach, Mozart and Beethoven.

But whatever chances existed for a deeper penetration of Western culture were exterminated in the Bolshevik slaughterhouses. Indeed, this minute slice of the intelligentsia was never treated as anything more than an exotic gaggle of potentially dangerous thinkers, to be relegated to the sidelines of Russian society. Sometimes, as a source of reforms, they were visited by the czar's favor. More often than not, they were oppressed. Solzhenitsyn's portrayal of the Gulag *katorga* (research prison) for scientists, in *The First Circle*, is a very good metaphor for the condition of the Westernizers throughout Russian history. Russia was ever keen to jail, exile or kill them, but

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sometimes bestowed upon them the favor of letting them work in its service.

THE MARQUIS de Custine, in his celebrated *Empire of the Czar*, made the cogent point that only one man was free in Russia, the czar. All others were slaves. The sole exception to that rule, perhaps, was the czar's intelligence service. In 1826 Czar Nicholas I's chief of the "Higher Police", Count Benckendorff, created a "Third Section of His Majesty's Imperial Chancellery." The *ukaz* of July 3, 1826 named this "the most influential office in all Russia", with Benckendorff outranking all other officials in the government. While it was "a universal and more vigilant system of surveillance", as its chief described it, it was entrusted to an elite of well-connected and educated aristocrats. "It became the central nerve of [the czar's] entire government system."

At its inception, the Third Section undertook an exhaustive study of Russia's condition. The official history of the Ministry of Police reported that its work led to

> the discovery of those aspects of Russian life that, because they did not correspond to contemporary requirements, were now regarded in a negative light by the best and shrewdest minds, and which in the future, albeit distantly, might lead to mass discontent and consequently to the disturbance of public tranquillity.

The Section's first report, in 1827, concluded: "All Russia impatiently awaits changes. . . . The machine requires to be rewound afresh. The keys to this necessity are to be found in Justice and Industry." The 1839 report stated that the Section was "convinced of the necessity, even of the inevitability, of the liberation of the serfs. . . . The spirit of the people is directed towards one aim only—liberation. . . . Serfdom is a powder-keg laid beneath the state and it is the more dangerous that the Army is composed of these same peasants." This extraordinary analysis the Higher Police had offered without the stimulus that was later to be provided by the jarring shock of defeat in the Crimean War.

Together with its standard function of repression, the intelligence service thus possessed a "socio-analytical" function. It enjoyed an inordinate degree of freedom, available to no other group in the empire. That freedom was not only analytical, but could sometimes extend to policy formulation. A similar "sociological unit" existed in Felix Dzherzinsky's Cheka and in the NKVD of the 1930s, the predecessor organizations of the KGB and today's Federal Security Service. These units included anthropologists and other social scientists.

The acumen and freedom of thought enjoyed by a small, elite part of the secret police did not save either czarism or the Soviet system. Observing the last century of Soviet and Russian history, a pattern is striking: the secret police, while playing its murderous role, has also been a source of innovative thinking, or "modernism" in the specified sense of anti-Western modernization *à la russe*. But equally striking has been the recurring failure of its undertakings.

In the aftermath of World War II, Lavrenty Beria, the chief of the NKVD, counterposed a "reformist" program to the policy of retrenchment and savage purges identified with the brutish Andrei Zhdanov. After Stalin's death, Beria, both a butcher and the head of the Soviet military's nuclear weapons crash-program, was a contender for the top job. He put forward a decidedly liberal program, proposing to loosen some of the strictures of central planning and to allow a measure of "decentralization." In foreign policy, he proposed an *aggiornamento*—no direct confrontation with the West, the neutralization of Germany—in a way a

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forerunner of the détente of the 1970s. But so feared and hated was the butcher side of Beria that he was soon murdered at the behest of a coalition of the Politburo and the military. One of the chief co-conspirators, Nikita Khrushchev, later revived whole aspects of Beria's program, and by the late 1950s his economic plank had resurfaced in the form of the "liberalization" debate around economists Liberman and Trapeznikov, who proposed to loosen central economic controls and introduce incentives to enhance productivity. That period, perhaps the high tide of Soviet "modernity", was an age of technological optimism: Russians could believe, however mistakenly, that they were finally about to enter the modern world. *Sputnik*, *Vostok* and Yuri Gagarin seemed to herald a new era.

Khrushchev's ouster in 1964 did not seem to change that. In the early years of the *troika* that replaced him, Leonid Brezhnev did not steal a march on the super-manager Aleksei Kosygin, who supervised the State Committee for Science and Technology. Kosygin rallied the modern men who wielded slide rules instead of the Chekists' pistols, and sported white lab coats instead of black leather jackets. His backers were the battalions of younger factory managers, planners and technologists who looked beyond iron and steel. Optimize the system, release it from the tyranny of gross output measurements, boost productivity—these were the catch phrases. But the system was so unwilling to reform itself that Kosygin was neutralized and crushed by the increasingly rotund Brezhnev.

The longer the "era of stagnation" persisted, the greater the pressure became—as much from outside the Soviet Union as from within. By the late 1970s and the early 1980s, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, one of the more astute Soviet military leaders, and the teams working for him at military think tanks such as the Voroshilov Academy, recognized that a "military-technical revolution" was transforming the American capacity to wage war, allowing NATO to face off and probably beat down anything the Soviet army could field in Europe.[1] AirLand Battle, the high-tech American warfighting doctrine introduced in the early 1980s to defeat the Red Army in Europe, and later Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative were the edges that cut deeply into Soviet self-confidence, leading to the creation of a defense-led lobby for crash-modernization of the Soviet military-industrial complex. KGB chief and later party Secretary-General Yuri Andropov had the KGB protect and probably fund a string of research institutes, in order to "incubate" the work of talented social scientists and economists. There were the thinkers from the Siberian Academy of Sciences, such as Tatiana Zaslavskaya of the Institute of Sociology in Novosibirsk, Abel Aganbegian and his Institute for the Study of Industrial Organizations, and in Moscow Leonid Abalkin and the Institute of Economics. Andropov, as has since become clear, orchestrated an effort to develop a reform program. His ill health alone prevented him from implementing it. The changes he envisioned were gigantic, but they required the energy, authority and time that Andropov lacked.

Gorbachev came to power too late, and whatever he did was always too little and too delayed. He could only haphazardly implement a program that was fundamentally flawed in its conception. The system crashed. Modernization failed, just as the reforms of Czar Alexander II ended in 1883 with his assassination, and just as in 1917, February had been destroyed by October.

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[1]Mary C. Fitzgerald, "Marshal Ogarkov and the New Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs" (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis, January 1987).

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THE COMMON denominator of all these failed attempts at modernization is that they were implemented from the top down. The centrality of the state—essential to the "Russian Idea"—seems to doom all efforts at modernizing Russia. Russia will "catch up" with the West in fifteen years, Vladimir Putin says, but it will do so in its own way. Russia, like so many others these days, claims to have a Third Way—in its case, the Russian Idea. Unfortunately, on examination it becomes apparent that it is an idea that exemplifies the old urge to achieve modernization while avoiding a commitment to Western values and institutions. Putin himself, with his KGB background, is only too reminiscent of the "Higher Police" approach to change.

Last year, Putin declared that Russia would never become a "second edition of, say, the United States or Great Britain. . . . For Russians, a strong state is not an anomaly, which should be got rid of. Quite the contrary, they see it as a guarantor of order and the initiator and the main driving force of any change." But the state is not Russia's mainstay, it is Russia's curse. If Putin has his way, Moscow will appoint provincial governors directly and voters will be cut out of the process. True, some oligarchs and free-wheeling operatives will probably be reined in and their unlimited license to loot will be curtailed. But that will only mean that the state will reassert its monopoly over racketeering.

Elena Bonner, Sakharov's widow, has characterized the beginning of the Putin era as "a new stage in the establishment of a modernized Stalinism." Whether things will get as bad as that may be debated, but it is more than likely that the freedoms enjoyed by Russians in the last decade—the right to be informed, to establish free associations, to have a genuine choice in elections—will be seriously curtailed. Russia will not wake up from its imperial dream of greatness; rather, it will pump resources into reviving that illusion, and will tailor its foreign policy accordingly. This will impair its domestic economic policy, prevent necessary reforms and prolong a disastrous demographic and health care crisis. As a result, Russia will continue as a half-modern, half-archaic hybrid. So long as Russia refuses to Westernize, it will not modernize. □

Destructive Dreams

Geography, of course, tempts the South Florida Cubans. Their coveted land lies across the Straits of Florida. On a clear day they swear that they can smell its breezes and see it in the haze. The successive migrations from the Old World were spared such illusions and such temptations. The one-way passage, the passage without illusions, the knowledge that the world of the fathers had been erased, that the worlds of Minsk and Riga and Odessa and Krakow were gone for good—that was the gift of those older migrations. For the Florida Cubans, however, the dreams of return and the dream of restoration remain, and they have been nothing but a curse and an alibi. And so those exiles have lived for more than four decades now, as the writer David Rieff once phrased it, 'in a mingled state of perpetual disappointment and perpetual expectation.' . . .

But one day the dictator in Havana and his foes in Miami will pass from the scene. And Cuba will be seen for what it is, without the complications of defective memory, without the fantasies of exiles: a small, derelict Caribbean island in need of repair, too small to live up to the dreams grafted onto it by the exiles in Miami. A terrible nemesis, a disappointment, lies in wait for the exiles and their latifundia of the imagination.

—Fouad Ajami, *The New Republic*, May 1, 2000

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Culture Matters

Lawrence E. Harrison

THE DECADES-OLD war on poverty and authoritarianism in the poor countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America has produced more disappointment and frustration than it has victories. The deprivation and despair that prevailed in the mid-twentieth century persist in most of these countries, even a decade after capitalism's ideological triumph over socialism. Where democratically elected chiefs of state have displaced traditional authoritarian regimes, a pattern most notable in Latin America, the experiments are fragile, and "democracy" often means little more than periodic elections.

What explains the persistence of poverty and authoritarianism? Why have they proven so intractable? Why have no countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America other than the East Asian dragons made their way into the elite group of affluent countries? The conventional diagnoses that have been offered during the past half century—exploitation, imperialism, education and know-how shortfalls, lack of opportunity, lack of capital, inadequate markets, weak institutions—are demonstrably inadequate. The crucial element that has been largely ignored is the cultural: that is to say, values and attitudes that stand in the way of progress. Some cultures, above all those of the West and East Asia, have proven themselves more prone to progress than others. Their achievements are reiterated when their peoples migrate to other countries, as in the cases of the British in the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand; and the Chinese, Japanese and Koreans, who have flourished wherever they have migrated.

The conclusion that culture matters goes down hard. It clashes with cultural relativism, widely subscribed to in the academic world, which argues that cultures can be assessed only on their own terms and that value judgments by outsiders are taboo. The implication is that all cultures are equally worthy, and those who argue to the contrary are often labeled ethnocentric, intolerant or even racist. A similar problem is encountered with those economists who believe that culture is irrelevant—that people will respond to economic signals in the same way regardless of their culture.

But a growing number of academics, journalists and politicians are writing and talking about culture as a crucial factor in societal development, and a new paradigm of human progress is emerg-

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ing. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan captured the shift recently when he said, in the context of economic conditions in Russia, that he had theretofore assumed that capitalism was "human nature." But in the wake of the collapse of the Russian economy, he concluded that "it was not human nature at all, but culture"—a succinct restatement of Max Weber's thesis in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.*

A Dismal Record

IN THE 1950s, the world turned its attention from rebuilding the countries devastated by World War II to ending the poverty, ignorance and injustice in which most of the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America lived. Optimism abounded in the wake of the stunning success of the Marshall Plan in Western Europe and Japan's ascent from the ashes of defeat. Development was viewed as inevitable, particularly as the colonial yoke disappeared. Walt Rostow's hugely influential book, *The Stages of Economic Growth*, published in 1960, suggested that human progress was driven by a dialectic that could be accelerated. The Alliance for Progress, John F. Kennedy's answer to the Cuban revolution, captured the prevailing optimism. It would duplicate the Marshall Plan's success, and Latin America would be well on its way to prosperity and democracy within ten years.

But as the century ended, that optimism had been displaced by frustration and pessimism, the consensus on market economics and democracy notwithstanding. Spain, Portugal, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and the former British colony Hong Kong have followed Rostow's trajectory into the First World, and a few others—for example, Chile, China, Malaysia and Thailand—have experienced sustained, rapid growth. Spain and Portugal finally opened themselves to the Enlightenment, the Industrial Revolution and the Western values that had driven the modernization of their neighbors in Europe. And like Japan before them, the East Asian dragons rode the Protestant Ethic-like features of Confucianism and export promotion policies to success.

But the vast majority of countries still lags far behind. Of the six billion people who inhabit the world today, fewer than one billion are to be found in the advanced democracies. More than four billion live in what the World Bank classifies as "low-income" or "lower middle-income" countries. The quality of life in those countries is dismaying:

- Half or more of the adult population of 23 countries, mostly in Africa, is illiterate. Non-African countries include Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan and Haiti.
- Half or more of the women in 35 countries are illiterate, including not only those countries just listed but Algeria, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Laos, Morocco, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia.
- Life expectancy is below 60 years in 45 countries, most in Africa, but also Afghanistan, Cambodia, Haiti, Laos and Papua New Guinea. Life expectancy is below 50 years in 18 countries, all in Africa. And in Sierra Leone it is just 37 years.
- The mortality rate for children under 5 is greater than 10 percent in at least 35 countries, most, again, in Africa. Other countries include Bangladesh, Bolivia, Haiti, Laos, Nepal, Pakistan and Yemen.
- The population growth rate in the poorest countries is 2.1 percent annually, three times the rate in the high-income countries. The growth rate in some Islamic countries is astonishingly high: 5 percent in Oman, 4.9 percent in the United Arab Emirates, 4.8 percent in Jordan, 3.4 percent in Saudi Arabia and Turkmenistan.

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Furthermore, the most inequitable income distribution patterns among countries supplying such data to the World Bank—not all do—are found in the poorer countries, particularly in Latin America and Africa. The most affluent 10 percent of Brazil's population accounts for almost 48 percent of its income. Kenya, South Africa and Zimbabwe are a fraction of a point behind.

Democratic institutions are commonly weak or nonexistent in Africa, the Islamic countries of the Middle East, and in the rest of Asia. Democracy has appeared to prosper in Latin America over the past fifteen years. Argentina, Brazil and Chile seem headed toward democratic stability after decades of military rule. But the fragility of the democratic experiments is underscored by recent events in several countries: in Colombia, where left-wing guerrillas, often cooperating with drug traffickers, control large parts of the country and threaten to topple the government; in Ecuador, where ineptitude and corruption in the Andean capital of Quito have contributed to a deep recession and to separatist sentiment in coastal Guayaquil; and in Venezuela, where Hugo Chávez, an officer who attempted two coups in the early 1990s, is now president and conducting himself in ways that leave one wondering whether he, and not Fidel Castro, may turn out to be the last Latin American *caudillo*. And there remains a weighty question: Why after more than 150 years of independence has Latin America, an extension of the West, failed to consolidate democratic institutions?

In sum, the world at the beginning of the twenty-first century is far poorer, far more unjust, far more authoritarian than most people half a century ago expected it would be, and the anticipated fruits of the post-Cold War democratic-capitalist consensus have, with a few exceptions, yet to be harvested.

Explaining the Failure: Colonialism and Dependency

AS IT BECAME apparent that the problems of underdevelopment were more intractable than the development experts had predicted, two explanations with Marxist-Leninist roots came to dominate the politics of the poor countries and the universities of the rich countries: colonialism and dependency.

Lenin had identified imperialism as a late and inevitable stage of capitalism that reflected what he viewed as the inability of increasingly monopolistic capitalist countries to find domestic markets for their products and capital. For those former colonies, possessions or mandate countries that had recently gained independence, imperialism was a reality that left a profound imprint on the national psyche and presented a ready explanation for underdevelopment—particularly in Africa, where national boundaries had often been arbitrarily drawn without reference to homogeneity of culture or tribal coherence.

For those countries in what would come to be called the Third World that had been independent for a century or more, as in Latin America, "imperialism" took the shape of "dependency"—the theory that the poor countries of "the periphery" were bilked by the rich capitalist countries of "the center." These countries allegedly depressed world market prices of basic commodities and inflated the prices of manufactured goods, enabling their multinational corporations to extort excessive profits.

The injustice of dependency was popularized by the Uruguayan writer Eduardo Galeano, whose phenomenally successful book, *The Open Veins of Latin America*, was first published in 1971 (it has since been republished sixty-seven times). The following lines capture its essence:

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> Latin America is the region of open veins. From the discovery up to the present, our wealth has been taken from us first by European capital and then by American capital and has accumulated in those distant centers of power. . . . The international division of labor consists of some countries that specialize in getting rich and some in getting poor.

The Marxist-Leninist roots of dependency theory are apparent from another popular book published in the same year with the title *Dependency and Development in Latin America*. The authors were Fernando Henrique Cardoso, today the president of Brazil, and Enzo Faletto, an Argentine. The book, in stark contrast with President Cardoso's centrist, democratic-capitalist policies since 1993, concludes:

> It is not realistic to imagine that capitalist development will solve basic problems for the majority of the population. In the end, what has to be discussed as an alternative is not the consolidation of the state and the fulfillment of 'autonomous capitalism' but how to supersede them. The important question, then, is how to construct paths toward socialism.

Neither "colonialism" nor "dependency" have much credibility today. For many, including some Africans, the statute of limitations on colonialism as an explanation for underdevelopment lapsed long ago. Moreover, four former colonies, two British (Hong Kong and Singapore) and two Japanese (South Korea and Taiwan), have vaulted into the First World. One rarely hears dependency mentioned today, not even in American universities, where not many years ago it was a conventional wisdom that brooked no dissent. Contributing to dependency theory's demise were, among other factors, the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe; the transformation of communism in China into conventional, increasingly free-market authoritarianism; the collapse of the Cuban economy after Russia halted massive Soviet subventions; the success of the East Asian dragons in the world market; the decisive defeat of the Sandinistas in the 1990 Nicaraguan elections; and theretofore stridently anti-*Yanqui* Mexico's initiative to join Canada and the United States in NAFTA.

And so an explanatory vacuum emerged in the last decade of the century.

Explaining the Failure: Culture

LARGELY unnoticed in U.S. academic circles, a new, inward-looking paradigm that focuses on cultural values and attitudes is gradually filling the explanatory vacuum left by dependency theory's collapse. Recently, Latin America has taken the lead in articulating the paradigm and contriving initiatives to translate it into actions designed not only to accelerate economic growth but also to fortify democratic institutions and promote social justice. The culture paradigm also has adherents in Africa and Asia.

Of course, many analysts who have studied the East Asian economic miracles over the past three decades have concluded that "Confucian" values—such as emphasis on the future, work, education, merit and frugality—have played a crucial role in East Asia's successes. But just as the flourishing of the East Asians in the world market—so inconsistent with dependency theory—was largely ignored by Latin American intellectuals and politicians until recent years, so was the cultural explanation for those miracles. Latin America has now for the most part accepted the economic policy lessons of East Asia, and it is confronting the question: If dependency and imperialism are *not* responsible for our economic underdevelopment, our authoritarian political traditions, and our extreme social injustice, what *is*?

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That question was posed by the Venezuelan writer Carlos Rangel in a book published in the mid-1970s, *The Latin Americans: Their Love-Hate Relationship with the United States*. Rangel was not the first Latin American to conclude that traditional Ibero-American values and attitudes, and the institutions that reflected and reinforced them, were the principal cause of Latin America's "failure", a word he contrasted with the "success" of the United States and Canada. Similar conclusions were recorded by, among others, Simón Bolívar's aide, Francisco Miranda, in the last years of the eighteenth century; by the eminent Argentines Juan Bautista Alberdi and Domingo Faustino Sarmiento and the Chilean Francisco Bilbao in the second half of the nineteenth century; and by the Nicaraguan intellectual Salvador Mendieta early in the twentieth century. Anticipating similar comments by Alexis de Tocqueville twenty years later, Bolívar himself had this to say in 1815:

> As long as our compatriots fail to acquire the talents and political virtues that distinguish our brothers to the north, political systems based on popular participation, far from helping us, will bring our ruin. Unfortunately, those qualities in the necessary degree are beyond us. We are dominated by the vices of Spain—violence, overweening ambition, vindictiveness, and greed.

Rangel's book earned him the enmity of most Latin American intellectuals and was mostly ignored by Latin American specialists in North America and Europe. But the book has proven to be seminal. In 1979 Nobelist Octavio Paz explained the contrast between the two Americas this way: "One, English-speaking, is the daughter of the tradition that has founded the modern world: the Reformation, with its social and political consequences, democracy and capitalism. The other, Spanish and Portuguese speaking, is the daughter of the universal Catholic monarchy and the Counter-Reformation."

One finds strong echoes of Rangel in Claudio Véliz's 1994 book, *The New World of the Gothic Fox*, which contrasts the Anglo-Protestant and Ibero-Catholic legacies in the New World. Véliz defines the new cultural current with the words of the celebrated Peruvian writer Mario Vargas Llosa, who asserts that the economic, educational and judicial reforms necessary to Latin America's modernization cannot be effected

> unless they are preceded or accompanied by a reform of our customs and ideas, of the whole complex system of habits, knowledge, images and forms that we understand by 'culture.' The culture within which we live and act today in Latin America is neither liberal nor is it altogether democratic. We have democratic governments, but our institutions, our reflexes and our mentality are very far from being democratic. They remain populist and oligarchic, or absolutist, collectivist or dogmatic, flawed by social and racial prejudices, immensely intolerant with respect to political adversaries, and devoted to the worst monopoly of all, that of the truth.

The recent runaway bestseller in Latin America, *Guide to the Perfect Latin American Idiot*, is dedicated to Rangel by its co-authors, Colombian Plinio Apuleyo Mendoza; Vargas Llosa's son, Álvaro; and Cuban exile Carlos Alberto Montaner, all three of whom identify themselves as "idiots" of the far Left in their younger years. The book criticizes those Latin American intellectuals of this century who have promoted the view that the region is a victim of imperialism. Among them are Galeano, Fidel Castro, Che Guevara, pre-presidential Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Gustavo Gutiérrez, founder of Liberation Theology. Mendoza, Montaner and Vargas Llosa strongly imply that the real causes of Latin America's

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underdevelopment are in the minds of the Latin Americans:

> In reality, except for cultural factors, nothing prevented Mexico from doing what Japan did when it almost totally displaced the United States' production of television sets.

In their 1998 sequel, *Manufacturers of Misery*, the authors trace the influence of the traditional culture on the behavior of six elite groups: the politicians, the military, business people, the clergy, the intellectuals and the revolutionaries, all of whom have acted in ways that impede progress toward democratic-capitalist modernity. A year later, a prominent Argentine intellectual and media celebrity, Mariano Grondona, published *The Cultural Conditions of Economic Development*, which analyzes and contrasts development-prone (e.g., U.S. and Canadian) and development-resistant (e.g., Latin American) cultures. Among the differences noted was a stronger emphasis on creativity, innovation, trust, education and merit in the former.

To be sure, Latin American values and attitudes are changing, as the transition to democratic politics and market economics of the past fifteen years suggests. Several forces are modifying the region's culture, among them the new intellectual current, the globalization of communications and economics, and the surge in evangelical/Pentecostal Protestantism. Protestants now account for more than 30 percent of the population in Guatemala and 15–20 percent in Brazil, Chile and Nicaragua.

The impact of these new-paradigm books and Montaner's weekly columns (he is the most widely read columnist in the Spanish language) has been profound in Latin America. But in the United States, Canada and Western Europe, they have gone largely unnoticed. A generation of Latin Americanists nurtured on dependency theory, or the less extreme view that the solution to Latin America's problems depends on the United States being more magnanimous in its dealings with the region, finds the cultural explanation indigestible.

However, one American of Mexican descent, Texas businessman Lionel Sosa, has contributed to the new paradigm. In his 1998 book, *The Americano Dream*, Sosa catalogues a series of Hispanic values and attitudes that present obstacles to achieving the upward mobility of mainstream America:

- The resignation of the poor—"To be poor is to deserve heaven. To be rich is to deserve hell. It is good to suffer in this life because in the next life you will find eternal reward."
- The low priority given to education—"The girls don't really need it—they'll get married anyway. And the boys? It's better that they go to work, to help the family." (The Hispanic high school dropout rate in the United States is about 30 percent, vastly higher than that of white and black Americans.)
- Fatalism—"Individual initiative, achievement, self-reliance, ambition, aggressiveness—all these are useless in the face of an attitude that says, 'We must not challenge the will of God.' . . . The virtues so essential to business success in the United States are looked upon as sins by the Latino church." At least in California, the Hispanic rate of self-employment is well below the state's average.
- Mistrust of those outside the family, which contributes to the generally small size of Hispanic businesses.

At least one African has come to similar conclusions about the slow rate of progress on his continent. Daniel Etounga-Manguelle is a Cameroonian who holds a doctorate in economics and planning from the Sorbonne and who heads a prominent consulting company that operates throughout Africa. In 1990

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he published a book in France entitled *Does Africa Need a Cultural Adjustment Program?*, in which he attributes Africa's poverty, authoritarianism and social injustice principally to traditional cultural values and attitudes. The book evokes the new-paradigm literature in Latin America.

Etounga-Manguelle's analysis of African culture highlights the highly centralized, vertical traditions of authority; a focus on the past and present, not the future; a rejection of "the tyranny of time"; a distaste for work ("The African works to live but doesn't live to work"); the suppression of individual initiative, achievement and saving (the corollary is jealousy of success); a belief in sorcery that nurtures irrationality and fatalism.

For those, particularly in the international development community, who see "institution-building" as the way to solve the problems of the Third World, Etounga-Manguelle offers an insight: "Culture is the mother; institutions are the children."

Etounga-Manguelle concludes that Africa must "change or perish." A cultural "adjustment" is not enough. What is needed is a cultural revolution that transforms traditional authoritarian child-rearing practices, which "produce sheep"; transforms education through emphasis on the individual, independent judgment and creativity; produces free individuals working together for the progress of the community; produces an elite concerned with the well-being of the society; and promotes a healthy economy based on the work ethic, the profit motive and individual initiative.

How Culture Influences Progress

THE IDEA OF "progress" is suspect for those who are committed to cultural relativism. Some anthropologists view it as an idea the West is trying to impose on other cultures. At the extreme, cultural relativists may argue that Westerners have no right to criticize institutions and practices like female genital mutilation; *suttee*, the Hindu practice for widows to join their dead husbands on funeral pyres; or even slavery. Some Western anthropologists opposed the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

But after a half century of the communications revolution, it is clear that progress in the Western—and East Asian—sense has become a virtually universal aspiration. I am not speaking of progress as defined by the affluent consumer society, although an end to poverty is clearly one of the universal goals, and that inevitably means higher levels of consumption. Over the almost two decades that I have been studying and writing about the relationship between cultural values and human progress, I have identified ten values, attitudes or mindsets that distinguish progressive cultures—cultures that facilitate achievement of the goals of the UN Declaration—from static cultures, which impede their achievement:

1. *Time orientation*: The progressive culture emphasizes the future, the static culture the present or past. Future orientation implies a progressive world-view: influence over one's destiny, rewards in this life for virtue, and positive-sum economics in which wealth expands—in contrast to the zero-sum psychology commonly found in poor countries.

2. *Work and achievement* are central to the good life in the progressive culture, but are of lesser importance in the static culture. In the former, work structures daily life, and diligence, creativity and achievement are rewarded not only financially but also with satisfaction, self-respect and prestige.

3. *Frugality* is the mother of investment—and financial security—in progres-

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sive cultures; a threat to the egalitarian status quo in static, zero-sum cultures in which one person's gains are at the expense of others.

4. *Education* is the key to advancement in progressive cultures but is of marginal importance except for the elites in static cultures.

5. *Merit* is central to advancement in the progressive culture; connections and family are what count in the static culture.

6. *Community*: The radius of identification and trust extends beyond the family to the broader society in the progressive culture, whereas the family circumscribes community in the static culture. Societies with a narrow radius of identification and trust are more prone to corruption, nepotism and tax evasion and are less likely to engage in philanthropy.

7. *The societal ethical code* tends to be more rigorous in the progressive culture. Every advanced democracy except Belgium, Taiwan, Italy and South Korea appears among the 25 least corrupt countries on Transparency International's "Corruption Perceptions Index." Chile and Botswana are the only Third World countries that appear among the top 25.

8. *Justice and fair play* are universal, impersonal expectations in the progressive culture. In the static culture, justice, like personal advancement, is often a function of whom you know or how much you can pay.

9. *Authority* tends toward dispersion and horizontality in progressive cultures, which encourage dissent; toward concentration and verticality in static cultures, which encourage orthodoxy.

10. *Secularism*: The influence of religious institutions on civic life is small in the progressive culture; their influence in static cultures is often substantial. Heterodoxy and dissent are encouraged in the former, orthodoxy and conformity are encouraged in the latter.

Obviously, these ten factors are generalized and idealized, and the reality of cultural variation is not black and white but a spectrum, in which colors fuse into one another. Few countries would be graded "10" on all the factors, just as few countries would be graded "1." Nonetheless, virtually all of the advanced democracies—and high-achieving ethnic/religious groups such as Mormons, East Asian immigrants, Jews, Sikhs and Basques—would receive substantially higher scores than virtually all of the Third World countries.

This conclusion invites the inference that what is really in play is development, not culture. The same argument could be made about Transparency International's corruption index. There *is* a complex interplay of cause and effect between culture and progress. But the power of culture is demonstrable—for example, in those countries where the economic achievement of ethnic minorities far exceeds that of the majorities, as in the case of the Chinese in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and even the United States.

The ten factors I have suggested are not definitive. But they do at least suggest which elements in the vastness of "culture" may influence the way societies evolve. Moreover, the new-paradigm writers in Latin America and Africa attribute the slow modernization of their countries in large measure to just such traditional values and attitudes. Their views evoke the seminal culturalists Alexis de Tocqueville, Max Weber and Edward Banfield. Tocqueville's *Democracy in America* is particularly relevant for those who would adduce geographic or institutional explanations for democratic development:

> Europeans exaggerate the influence of geography on the lasting powers of democratic institutions. Too much importance is attached

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to laws and too little to mores. . . . If in the course of this book I have not succeeded in making the reader feel the importance I attach to the practical experience of the Americans, to their habits, opinions, and, in a word, their mores, in maintaining their laws, I have failed in the main object of my work.

Changing the Traditional Culture

IN PART because of the influence of the new-paradigm writers, but in some cases because of life experiences that have brought them to the same conclusions, a growing number of Latin Americans and others have initiated activities that promote progressive values and attitudes.

Octavio Mavila was for three decades the Honda distributor in Peru. A burly self-made man well into his seventies, Mavila has visited Japan numerous times over the years. He came to the conclusion that the only significant difference between Japan and Peru was that Japanese children learned progressive values while Peruvian children did not. In 1990 he established the Institute of Human Development in Lima to promote "the Ten Commandments of Development": order, cleanliness, punctuality, responsibility, achievement, honesty, respect for the rights of others, respect for the law, work ethic and frugality. (In *The Americano Dream*, Lionel Sosa presents a similar program for success based on "the twelve traits of successful Latinos.") More than two million Peruvian students have participated in courses sponsored by the institute.

The Ten Commandments of Development are being preached outside Peru, too. Humberto Belli, Nicaragua's minister of education in two administrations, viewed them as central to his program of educational reform. Ramón de la Peña, rector of the Monterrey campus of Mexico's prestigious Monterrey Institute of Technology and Higher Studies, has also promoted use of the Ten Commandments.

The effectiveness of the evangelizing approach to cultural change needs to be evaluated. As Luis Ugalde, a Jesuit who is the rector of the Catholic University of Caracas, has observed, if children learn a progressive ethic in school and find it irrelevant to their lives outside of school, the impact may be scant. That is why Ugalde, who is convinced that values and attitudes matter, is promoting anti-corruption, pro-merit campaigns in government, business and the professions.

Corruption is in significant part a cultural phenomenon, linked to factors like limited radius of identification and trust that translate into a limited sense of community and an elastic ethical code. Corruption has become a high-profile issue in Latin America. In 1998 the Organization of American States adopted the Inter-American Convention against Corruption. Few expect that the Convention itself is going to dramatically reduce the incidence of corruption—five Latin American countries (Paraguay, Honduras, Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador) appear among Transparency International's ten most corrupt countries. But it is clear that corruption is today receiving far more attention than it once did, by, among others, the World Bank.

The gender issue has also come to the fore, challenging the traditional *machismo* culture. Latin American women are increasingly aware of the gender democratization that has occurred, particularly in First World countries, in recent decades, and they are increasingly organizing and taking initiatives to rectify the sexism that has traditionally kept them in second-class status. In several countries, laws concerning parental and property rights and divorce have been liberalized in favor of women, and nine countries have

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established obligatory quotas for women candidates in elections. While these electoral laws are not uniformly effective, they are a reminder that the gender revolution, and all that it implies with respect to transformation of traditional values, is reaching Latin America.

Integrating Values and Attitudes into Development

WITH the notable exceptions of East Asia and Iberia, human progress during the half century since World War II has been disheartening. The principal reason for this has been the failure to take into account the power of culture to thwart or facilitate progress. It is, for example, the cultural contrast between Western Europe and Latin America that chiefly explains the success of the Marshall Plan and the failure of the Alliance for Progress.

This is not to say that addressing culture will solve all problems. Culture is one of several factors—others being geography and climate, ideology, policies, globalization, leadership, the vagaries of history—that influence progress. The limits of cultural explanations are obvious when one considers the striking contrasts in progress between North and South Korea, and between East and West Germany. But particularly as we view the longer run, culture's power becomes more apparent.

At a 1999 Harvard symposium entitled "Cultural Values and Human Progress", Nathan Glazer observed that people are made uncomfortable or are offended by cultural explanations of why some countries and some ethnic groups do better than others. But the alternative—to view oneself or one's group as a victim—is worse. As Bernard Lewis recently observed in a *Foreign Affairs* article about the Islamic countries,

> When people realize that things are going wrong, there are two questions they can ask. One is, 'What did we do wrong?' and the other is 'Who did this to us?' The latter leads to conspiracy theories and paranoia. The first question leads to another line of thinking: 'How do we put it right?'

A consensus emerged at the Harvard symposium that we need to understand a good deal more about the intricate relationship between culture and progress and what can be done to promote progressive values. A research agenda has been developed, the end product of which would be guidelines for governments and development institutions. The agenda would 1) define, analyze and weight the values that most influence development; 2) enhance understanding of the complex relationships among values, policies, institutions and development; and 3) enhance understanding of the role of agents of cultural transmission, e.g., parents, peers, schools, television. The research agenda would also extend the World Values Survey, which now covers sixty-five countries, further into the poor countries and tailor it to the results of the research on values. Finally, an evaluation would be undertaken of activities already under way that promote progressive values and attitudes, particularly through education, more effective parenting, promotion of entrepreneurship, promotion of civic responsibility, reduction of corruption and expansion of philanthropy.

Culture is not the only force that shapes the destinies of nations, particularly in the short run. Moreover, culture changes. An observation by Daniel Patrick Moynihan is apt: "The central conservative truth is that it is culture, not politics, that determines the success of a society. The central liberal truth is that politics can change a culture and save it from itself."

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But I believe that David Landes is right in concluding in his recent book, *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations*, "If we learn anything from the history of economic development, it is that culture makes all the difference." I believe that the same is true of political and social development. Yet the role of cultural values and attitudes as obstacles to or facilitators of progress has been largely ignored by governments and aid agencies. Integrating value and attitude change into policies and programs will assure that, in the next fifty years, the world does not relive the poverty and injustice in which most poor countries have been mired during the past half century's "decades of development." □

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

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Nyerere: A Flawed Hero

R.W. Johnson

WHEN JULIUS Nyerere, former president of Tanzania, died last October, there ensued an outpouring of grief and tribute in Africa and beyond that left others puzzled and even indignant. They demanded to know what was so special about a man who had "single-handedly destroyed the economy of Tanzania",[1] who had "showed little regard for individual rights and liberties",[2] and who was to blame for "forced removals on a scale about which apartheid bureaucrats could only fantasise."[3] But not even his harshest critics denied that he had possessed a certain charisma. For many, Nyerere still remained "Baba la Taifa", which means "Father of the Nation", or even broader, "Father of the African Struggle" or "Father of Africa"; and, of course, "Mwalimu"—"the Teacher."

Sadly, this difference of view often proceeded along racial lines. Nyerere had ruled Tanzania from 1960 to 1985, when he stepped down after five terms as president. No one could deny that mistakes had been made during his quarter-century tenure, and, to some extent, the division of views at the time of his death rested merely on whether one could excuse, or even justify, these mistakes. But it was also noticeable that his critics and supporters talked about different things: the former spoke of horror, of economic failure and restraints on individual liberty; the latter in glowing terms about national liberation, nation-building and the assertion of ideological principles.

Sometimes such differences in emphasis led to almost self-contradictory assessments. One commentator on an Internet newsgroup accused Nyerere of having "created" his successor in power, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, whom Nyerere himself pronounced to be corrupt. The commentator then added that despite this failing, his

> respect for Mwalimu will never wane mainly because of his convictions and actions. He never used office for selfish reasons and he tried what was humanly possible to liberate and empower the masses. He is thus a source of inspiration.[4]

Others made similarly passionate declarations, arguing that whatever criticisms might be leveled at him, Nyerere should be seen as a patriarch of the world's African family, second only to Nelson

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[1] *The Citizen* (Johannesburg), October 20, 1999.
[2] *The Times* (London), October 15, 1999.
[3] *The Star* (Johannesburg), November 1, 1999.
[4] ES051356@Orion.YorkU.CA, March 21, 1995.

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Mandela. This is a remarkable judgment to make of a man who led one of the world's poorest and least successful countries, which became even poorer and less successful under his rule.

To understand this phenomenon one must start with the fact that Nyerere was part of the generation of African nationalists who led their countries to independence in the late 1950s and early 1960s. For Africans—and the wider black diaspora—names such as Kwame Nkrumah, Patrice Lumumba, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Léopold Sédar Senghor, Sékou Touré, Jomo Kenyatta, Milton Obote and Seretse Khama will never wholly lose their glamour and allure. Although some of these men have been rightly scorned for their many failures and even their crimes, they remain founding fathers. Nyerere not only belonged to this group, he was a survivor, far outlasting his famous contemporaries. He stayed in power longer than any of them and managed to avert the military coups and major political crises that befell so many others. He thus became a living symbol of the golden era of African nationalism, the era of struggle and victory, of suffering and glory.

In fact, Nyerere had to do less than most to earn the reputation of a fighter. True, from 1954, when he founded the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), until 1960, when he became chief minister in Tanganyika's first Council of Ministers (a year before the country's independence), he went through a volatile period of political skirmishes with an unwilling and slow-moving British administration. But he did not have to resort to armed struggle, he was never imprisoned, and there was no need for violent clashes with the police or army. Nyerere's path to independence was much smoother than that of most African leaders simply because Tanganyika was a United Nations trust territory and, despite its limitations, this status was far more favorable to a national liberation movement than any other in the colonial world at the time. A national liberation movement of a trust territory had the right to address the United Nations Organization's Trust Council directly and even to appeal to the General Assembly—a right of which Nyerere made full use.

No doubt it took a certain courage and foresight to challenge the order of the day from the privileged position in which Nyerere found himself after graduating from Makerere college in Uganda and from Edinburgh University, but he was simply lucky in facing relatively weak resistance. As he himself put it, the British officials were "travelling in the same direction" as TANU "but at a different speed."

WHATEVER Nyerere did for the liberation of his country, he scored far more points in African and world opinion for his ardent support of the cause of Africa's liberation in general and of the armed struggles in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa in particular. All the African liberation movements—the MPLA, FRELIMO, ZANU, ZAPU, SWAPO, ANC and PAC—in their time had their offices and military camps in Tanzania. As a result, it has become common to attribute independence and majority rule in these countries not only to the struggle of their own guerrilla armies and mass movements, but also to Tanzania's vigorous assistance and solidarity: "All these countries are now free", wrote one South African journalist, "with their liberation sprung from Dar-es-Salaam."[5] "From Dr. Nyerere's commitment flowed the liberation first of Mozambique, Angola,

[5] *Sunday Times* (Johannesburg), October 3, 1999.

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Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde in the early '70s, followed by Zimbabwe in 1980, Namibia in 1990 and eventually South Africa", wrote another.[6]

Their point is clear. Tanzania was and is a very poor country, situated closer to the then racist and aggressive South Africa than some of the other backers of the national liberation movements. Nyerere took risks, and subjected his country to them, in the name of the common cause. He became a leading member of the Organization of Frontline States, was involved in promoting Africa's liberation at the UN, and pushed the Commonwealth, the Organization of African Unity and the Non-Aligned Movement to adopt a more radical line on all issues concerning the liberation struggle. So it is fair to say that Nyerere did more than many other African leaders found safe—let alone comfortable—to do for the cause of Africa's liberation.



AP Photo/Sayyid Azim

But was this really enough? So many people and forces can claim to be the fathers of African liberation, after all. Without the Portuguese revolution of 1974, for example, the colonies of Guiné, Cape Verde, Angola and Mozambique might not have achieved independence in the 1970s or even the 1980s. Would black majority rule in South Africa have come when it did without the collapse of the Soviet Union? And what about all the foreign donors to the liberation movements? The Scandinavian governments, for example, poured hundreds of thousands of dollars into South Africa's African National Congress (ANC) and other liberation movements in southern Africa. Funds and support also came from India and some Muslim countries. The Soviet Union supplied arms, services, training and funds, as did East Germany and various other Warsaw Pact countries. The Cubans supplied military expertise and cannon fodder. Funds also came from some circles in Western Europe and the United States, and it is arguable that the sanctions and other economic pressures exerted by these countries on Rhodesia and South Africa were the most powerful force of all. Even the British secret service, we are told, was "on the left of the British government", for it shared some information with the ANC.

Nor was Tanzania at major risk as a result of Nyerere's support of liberation movements. The country suffered none of the reprisal attacks from the South Africans and Rhodesians that many states further south did. In the Cold War era there was, moreover, a whole range of international political arrangements that would safeguard, if not guarantee, Nyerere's security—and take over where he failed. Thus when he faced an army mutiny in 1964, he was able to call on British military intervention, which speedily snuffed the threat out. None of this detracts from the principled positions

[6] *The Mercury* (Durban), October 5, 1999.

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he took, but it was the era of decolonization that made Nyerere, not Nyerere who made the era of decolonization.

It is ironic to reflect that both Angola and Mozambique took far greater risks and made far greater sacrifices than Tanzania in their assistance to South Africa's and Namibia's armed struggles, both from the raids and the subversion they suffered from the South African army and from their own endless civil wars. Mozambique's Samora Machel won some recognition for this sacrifice—though much less than Nyerere—but Angola's role seems to have faded entirely from public memory. Perhaps one day José Eduardo dos Santos will also be hailed as the "father of Africa", but it doesn't seem likely. No one seems willing to say that South Africa's liberation sprang from Luanda, although this would be at least as appropriate as saying that it sprang from Dar es Salaam.

The Nation-Builder

ONE OF Nyerere's greatest achievements, it is argued, was the welding together of the Tanzanian nation. The *Wall Street Journal* declared: "Dr. Nyerere may have been a poor economist but he was a skillful nation builder. He fused Tanzania's 120 tribes into a cohesive state, preventing tribal conflicts plaguing so much of Africa." "Above all", writes the earlier quoted newsgroup commentator, "he proved that it is possible to forge a nation whereby vicissitudes of ethnic affiliation are banished from social and political life. He created and promoted a powerful African lingua franca, Swahili, which united and educated people." South African journalist Mathatha Tsedu had even greater praise for Nyerere's achievements in nation-building and in developing a national language:

> Dr. Nyerere and his government decreed that Kiswahili would be the official language of the country, with English running a poor second. The result has been a nation that speaks one language, and people who see themselves as Tanzanians and not members of tribal entities. In a region where tribalism has been so entrenched that when people speak they want to first identify one's tribal affiliation as in Kenya and Uganda and even as far as Nigeria, Tanzania stands as a different entity. And the penetration of this nationalism is wide: media organizations publish in Swahili, and most of the newspapers are in this language.[7]

Again, this praise seems extravagant. Nyerere did well as a nation-builder mainly because he did not spoil what was already there—for he was able to build on very favorable foundations. While Tanzania's population was (and still is) extremely fragmented ethnically, there was not much disparity in size or economic situation between the various population groups: they were all small, and thus none felt too threatened by another. The fact that Nyerere himself came from one of the smallest of Tanzania's peoples, the Zanaki, proved helpful in this respect to his cause and his country.

The facts are that the process of ethno-cultural consolidation in Tanzania began long before independence, and Swahili became a lingua franca in what was to become Tanganyika as early as the nineteenth century. Swahili was not a twentieth-century creation but the language of the city-states of the East African coast, with a written literature dating back to the fifteenth century. In the nineteenth century Swahili-speaking slave traders from the coast spread the language into the interior, and in the twentieth century it became the language of the colonial administration, with

[7]Ibid.

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English already "running a poor second" well before Nyerere came on the scene. Nyerere's contribution was to build respect for the language (he translated Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar*) and promote its modernization by founding the Institute of Swahili. But he did not "create" Swahili and would not have been able to decree it an official language if the conditions for such a development had not already existed.

In other words, although nation-building in Tanzania was not as straightforward as in ethnically homogenous states like Botswana or Lesotho, it was certainly not as difficult as in Kenya or Uganda, and cannot be compared at all to the really tough cases such as Nigeria. Oddly, those who are quickest to praise Nyerere rarely mention his indubitable success in managing the relationship between Tanzania's Christians and its ever growing Muslim population. Zanzibar—the main center of Islam in East Africa and the center of the nineteenth-century Muslim state that included the whole of the East African coast—became independent in December 1963, two years after Tanganyika. A month later an uprising brought to power the radical Afro-Shirazi Party, whose views were much closer to TANU's than those of the previous government, headed by a representative of the nineteenth-century sultan's dynasty. To maintain stability after the two countries merged required a lot of tact and restraint from Nyerere, who enjoyed authority but no real power in Zanzibar.

To his credit, Nyerere, a devoted Christian, invariably preached racial and religious tolerance. In some ways the Afro-Shirazi Party was even given precedence over TANU. A common party document stated: "TANU has not yet resolved one of the main questions—the question of the elimination of feudal administration. This question was fully resolved by the Afro-Shirazi. This is why TANU took the decision about the socialist development of Tanzania."

Which brings one to the nub of the matter: *History will always remember Nyerere as one of the major proponents of African socialism—and African socialism was as thunderous a failure in Tanzania as it was everywhere else.* The problem is that neither Nyerere nor his admirers have ever accepted that it was a failure at all.

In its 1961 statutes, TANU proclaimed that its main goal was "the creation and strengthening of the socialist democratic state." The program of building the Tanzanian version of African socialism—*ujamaa*—was introduced in February 1967 at Arusha, in what became known as the Arusha Declaration. Nyerere, who originated the term, explained that this "African word" was specially selected to stress the African roots of the policy. According to him, the original meaning of the word—an extended family—implied that the building of socialism was based on the communalist African past and was to be implemented according to Africa's own blueprint. In fact, Nyerere's socialism was not very different from the standard East European pattern, except that he placed far greater emphasis on exhorting his people about the need for self-reliance and hard work than on socialist economics. He believed that socialism was equality, and as a first step he froze the salaries of senior civil servants for thirteen years, while regularly increasing the salaries of the lower ranked officials.

Nyerere did not nationalize land, but he did initiate "*ujamaa* villages"—i.e., collective farms—for he thought that bigger agricultural units assisted by the state would be more productive than small, poor households. A whole system of incentives and disincentives was used to make people move into these villages. Nevertheless, many had to be pressured, and in some cases virtually forced, to join.

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There were, finally, about seven and a half thousand such "villages" by the end of the 1970s—but no matter what assistance and incentives the government provided, the majority of them were not productive. The idea of collective farming, far from being universally rooted in the African past, was alien to the majority of Tanzanian peasants, and the very fact that people had to be moved *en masse* wrought great damage to the fabric of a rural life that was still recovering from the depredations of the colonial era.



The second pillar of Nyerere's socialism was self-reliance, *kujitegemea* in Swahili. He never trusted either the East or the West. While he liked some patterns of development more than others (he was deeply impressed by Chinese achievements, for example), what he wanted was a state that would be totally self-reliant and independent of any outside influence. He thought that nationalization was the key to self-reliance. Accordingly, immediately after issuing the Arusha Declaration Nyerere decreed the nationalization of all foreign banks, insurance companies, big firms, sisal plantations, tobacco companies, breweries, and cement and other factories. This was so unexpected that it startled even some of his friends abroad. The idea was, of course, that nationalized enterprises would create a powerful and economically independent state. Nyerere did not take into consideration the simple fact that he did not have enough qualified personnel, let alone managers, to run this sector. Even at the end of his rule these state industries were working at only 30–50 percent of their capacity, and only 190 of the 415 large state corporations were profitable. The effect on the economy and on personal income was devastating.

Nyerere's pursuit of a predictably disastrous economic strategy was not simply a matter of economic ignorance—at least he had studied economics at Edinburgh. True, socialism was very much the fashion in Africa at the time, but it should be noted that by the end of the 1970s neither China nor the Soviet bloc was trying to pressure African countries into "socialist" reforms. Such states generally ran into difficulty—and expected aid from the socialist camp—but both China and the Soviet Union had more than enough on their hands already.

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The damage wrought by these policies was enormous. Before Nyerere started "ujamaaization" there were several large and productive cooperatives in Tanzania, the best known example being the highly profitable Coffee Marketing Association in the Kilimanjaro area. These cooperatives were all destroyed in the cause of promoting "*ujamaa* villages." But Nyerere seemed almost oblivious to the economic harm caused by his policies. At one point, annoyed by British inaction over Rhodesia, he broke off diplomatic relations with Britain, Tanzania's main aid donor, and then with various other Western countries, causing a virtual cessation of foreign aid into the country, with damaging effects. Those losses were compounded when, as a result of ideological disagreements with its neighbors and partners in the East African Community, Tanzania closed the border with Kenya, terminating the essential common transport and communications service. The results were, again, disastrous.

Then there was Tanzara, one of the biggest railway projects on the African continent, linking Tanzania and Zambia. Tanzara was a joint Chinese-Tanzanian-Zambian project designed to reduce Zambia's economic dependence on Rhodesia and South Africa and thus make it more independent politically. An ideological project based on good intentions, Tanzara too was an economic disaster. Hugely expensive and inefficient, it never fulfilled its goal.

As one surveys the immense wreckage, one is forced to the realization that for Nyerere—and perhaps for other leaders of his generation in Africa as well—economic realities hardly seemed to exist. It was as if the lesson learned from the independence struggle was that reality could be changed by mere rhetoric, the assertion of will, and "mass mobilization." Over and over again one finds a belief that the future could be constructed from mere words—by motions passed, declarations made and plans drawn up. The systematic introduction of highly unrealistic economic plans that were never achieved continued even after Nyerere stepped down from power.

An Unrepentant Teacher

NYERERE IS often praised for resigning in 1985, first, because he complied with the constitution, becoming the first African leader to step down voluntarily, and, second, because he purportedly realized that his socialist theories and practices were mistaken. In fact, he only admitted to three mistakes: the abolition of local government in the name of speeding up Tanzania's transformation; the abolition of the "cooperative movement"—meaning cooperatives that existed before the *ujamaa* era; and the introduction of the one-party system. And even these admissions were heavily qualified.

To be fair, it was a pretty gentle process that made Tanzania a one-party state. During the days of anti-colonialism TANU did not have any opposition of which to speak, and rivals who emerged on the way were quickly outmaneuvered from any positions of leadership or significance. Between 1964 and 1977 there were two parties—TANU and Afro-Shirazi—working closely and comfortably together. In February 1977, however, the two decided to merge in order to form a "vanguard" party—Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), the Revolutionary Party. There is no doubt that this evolution protracted Tanzania's economic disasters, for, with no political competition, the CCM was able to continue quite blithely with unworkable socialist policies. In 1981, when the disastrous economic results of "ujamaaization" were already quite clear, the party came up with a new document, "The General

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Line of the CCM", which stipulated that "the main task of Chama Cha Mapinduzi now is to unite all socialist and progressive forces of the country and direct them to the struggle for the building of ujamaa in Tanzania." Even in 1987 the party continued to develop "the theory of *ujamaa*" and passed a program for its implementation from 1987 to 2002. Needless to say this remained yet another meaningless document, but one cannot but be struck by Nyerere's determination to press ahead with policies proven to be disastrous.

Even so, Nyerere never came to believe that a single-party system was wrong in itself. "I really think that I ran the most successful single-party system on the continent", he said many years later. He continued:

> You might not even call it a party. It was a single, huge nationalist movement. . . . I don't believe that our country would be where it is now if we had a multiplicity of parties, which would have become tribal and caused us a lot of problems. But when you govern for such a long time, unless you are gods, you become corrupt and bureaucratic. . . . So I started calling for a multiparty system.[8]

A strong current favorite in the West, Yoweri Museveni, president of Uganda, says almost exactly the same thing. He does not want any political parties in his country at all, until such time as "the people" will want them—but at least he allows competition between personalities standing on very different platforms, whereas Nyerere wanted just a "single, huge nationalist movement." By the end of his life Nyerere readily recognized that more and more people throughout the African continent were demanding a multiparty system—but even then he remained convinced that during his time in power the single-party principle had been exactly what the country needed.

As far as socialism was concerned, Nyerere left not the slightest doubt that in his eyes both the principle and the implementation of it in Tanzania had been irreproachable. "Where did you get the idea that I thought *ujamaa* was a miserable failure?", he asked a journalist who interviewed him at the end of 1996. "A bunch of countries were in economic shambles at the end of the 1970s. They are not socialist." According to Nyerere, Tanzania's problem was not socialism but poverty. In any case, his references to socialism now made no mention of nationalism or *ujamaa* villages. It turned out that for Nyerere socialism was now really all about values such as "justice, a respect for human beings, a development which is people-centered, development where you care about people. . . . The market has no heart at all since capitalism is completely ruthless, [so] who is going to help the poor?"[9]

Until the end Nyerere was proud about how well he had served Tanzanians. As he told the World Bank:

> We took over a country with 85% of its adults illiterate. The British ruled us for 43 years. When they left, there were two trained engineers and 12 doctors. When I stepped down there was 91% literacy and nearly every child was at school. We trained thousands of engineers, doctors and teachers.

Then he added bitterly, "In 1988 Tanzania's per capita income was $280. Now, in 1998, it is $140. . . . Enrolment in school has plummeted to 63%."[10] For, following Nyerere's departure from power, Tanzania had collapsed into the arms of the IMF and the World Bank, and

[8] *Sunday Independent* (Johannesburg), October 17, 1999.

[9] Online News Hour, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/africa/december96/nyerere_12-27.html, December 27, 1996.

[10] *Sunday Times*, October 3, 1999.

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Nyerere blamed these agencies for his country's impoverishment, disregarding the fact that such outcomes merely constituted the day of reckoning caused by his own unsustainable policies.

In retirement, Nyerere remained faithful to the ideals of self-reliance and unity that he promoted while in office. "We have to depend on ourselves", he told the South African parliament during his visit to the country in October 1997. Sub-Saharan Africa was on its own, he argued, because it lay outside the orbit of the world's major power blocs, none of which had "an internal urge" to help it. As for the World Bank and the IMF, Nyerere anticipated much of the current criticism of those institutions, seeing them as intrinsically hostile, and even responsible for Mobutu's crimes against his people and for the fact that he stayed in power so long.[11]

The Interventionist

REMARKABLY for someone whose philosophy was that African states should be proudly self-reliant and not tolerate intervention in their affairs, Nyerere had a not inconsiderable history of intervening in other countries militarily. In the last years of his life he mediated the crisis in Burundi. One must have courage and determination, let alone moral authority, to attempt such an undertaking. Nyerere's mediation was unusual, for he did not even try to appear neutral. He wanted Burundi's military government out and was once quoted as saying that he would be prepared to intervene in the country with military force. Unfortunately, the opposition forces were fragmented and fought one another—a problem that Mr. Mandela is now trying to disentangle.

The most widely known of these interventions was his 1979 intervention in Uganda. The general perception was—and still is—that this was well justified. Not only was Tanzania provoked by the intrusion of Uganda's forces onto its territory, but Idi Amin, Uganda's leader at the time, was universally recognized as a tyrant and a savage butcher of his own people. Thus, when Nyerere's victorious army pressed on from the border and helped the Ugandans evict Amin, Nyerere was widely seen as a liberator.

Of graver concern, Nyerere used his army to re-instate Uganda's former president (and his own personal friend), Milton Obote, although there was scant evidence that Obote had overcome the deep unpopularity that had led Kampala's crowds to cheer the news of his eviction from power in 1971. The army then supervised the elections. Opposition parties claimed a foul, and a bloody civil war followed in which thousands were killed before Obote was once again ousted from power, and Yoweri Museveni was left to pick up the pieces in a completely shattered country.

Similarly, Nyerere sent Tanzanian troops to help topple regimes that he disliked in two other neighboring countries—in the Comoros in 1975 and in the Seychelles in 1977—though in neither case could he claim (as he had been able to in the case of Idi Amin) that these states were aggressors against Tanzania. One cannot but be struck by the utter certainty Nyerere felt about his own opinions and his willingness to force them on other people.

Given this willingness to impose his will both on his own people and even on his neighbors, the question arose as to how Nyerere would react when such initiatives failed to work out. In fact, he never accepted an ounce of blame for any of his mistakes. Invariably somebody else had to take the responsibility, be it the

[11] *Business Day* (Johannesburg), October 17, 1999.

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colonial powers, the IMF, the World Bank, the bad rulers of neighboring countries or even his own people. In the 1977 document, "The Arusha Declaration Ten Years After", he attributed the failures of *ujamaa* to his compatriots' inability to work hard and sacrifice. Having selected his own successor, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, and having stayed on as chairman of the CCM for many years after resigning from the presidency, in 1995 he suddenly accused both his party and his government—and, indeed, the whole nation—of corruption. Naturally, he never accepted any responsibility for Uganda's travails after he had re-imposed Obote.

THERE ARE many things for which Nyerere is respected. He was one of those rare politicians who managed to earn a reputation for sincerity and integrity while in power. He was often brutally honest, and he was incorruptible—indeed, his lifestyle was modest to the point of austerity. In politics he was well meaning, accessible and non-divisive. His sins were simply that he was idealistic, impractical and willful. Compared to such leaders as Mobutu, Amin, Bokassa, Macias Nguema, Mengistu Haile Mariam and even to many other less monstrous, but equally corrupt, African leaders, Nyerere was a bright light on the African horizon. Stanley Meisler, a long-time Tanzanian observer, wrote: "I do not want to belittle Nyerere. His Tanzania is warm, calm, gentle and united."

The question is whether this is a sufficient reason to turn a politician into a saint. For in the eyes of many African commentators Nyerere could do no wrong. Nationalization? "Resources had to be centrally controlled by the government in order to ensure that distribution for internal and external purposes was guaranteed." The failure of *ujamaa* villages? That was due to the increase of the number of families in a village and the "invasion of rich families who wanted to make a quick buck from being a client of government." Re-instating Obote? "That [the regime] later crumbled, leading to guerrilla war, cannot be blamed on Dr. Nyerere." The disintegration of the East African Community? It would be wrong to blame Nyerere for the fact that Tanzania was the main sufferer as a result. And so on.

Where does this myopic vision come from? First, Africa badly needs its own heroes. Too many leaders have turned out to be grave disappointments, and some have been monsters. It needs not just heroes but saints and martyrs if it is to restore its belief in itself. And there are not too many candidates for sainthood apart from Nyerere.

Second, African independence and resistance to white minority rule has involved an enormous act of assertion by peoples and individuals, many of whom have been deeply damaged by what they have endured. The miseries and mistakes of the independence era lie heavily upon the continent—and on the black diaspora—and they threaten to squash that collective self-assertion. Celebrating Nyerere is a short-term way of keeping that self-assertion alive, though its long-term dangers are obvious. For what Africa needs above all is honesty about itself, its mistakes, its history—and even about its great men. □

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Lessons Unlearned

A Comparison of Three American Wars

Thomas Donnelly

OPERATION Just Cause, code name for the invasion of Panama in December 1989, was the first serious exercise of military power by the United States during the post-Cold War era. It would prove to be everything that subsequent U.S. military operations were not: a rapid, decisive application of overwhelming might that removed a petty tyrant from power, left a lasting imprint on local and regional politics, and brought democracy to an oppressed people. Given the peculiar pattern of U.S. military operations since 1989—whereby military power has been employed in an increasingly halting and feckless manner, producing less and less of enduring political value—one cannot help but wonder why the campaign has not been enshrined as a paradigm for the American way of war.

Just Cause proved to be a minor masterpiece in the art of high command. This is remarkable for two reasons: first, because American strategy and policy in Panama and, more broadly, in Central America have historically been reactive and short-sighted; and, second, because the architects of American military operations have moved cautiously, even timidly ever since. Even those in the Bush administration who oversaw the storming of Panama later lost their taste for boldness. As well as this, in the strictly military sense, Just Cause provided a revealing glimpse of the operational, tactical and technological prowess of the U.S. military. It was in Panama, after all, that the highly competent force, resurrected from the ashes of Vietnam, and trained and equipped through the Reagan build-up of the 1980s, first revealed itself.

Just Cause was fought during the small hours of December 20, 1989, and the combat portion of the operation was essentially completed by noon, though it took until January 3, 1990 to seize Manuel Noriega, who had gone into hiding when the invasion began. The operation was a classic *coup de main*, an attempt to "take down" not only the Panamanian military but its political base in one swift blow. Success came at a comparatively low cost—26 American deaths (including 23 soldiers) and 500 to 600 Panamanian fatalities—especially given the fact that a substantial portion of the fighting took place in the crowded slums of Panama City. Yet the combat phase of the operation was but one part of the story. The majority of dead Panamanians were civilians, not soldiers, many lost to the indiscriminate fire of the Panamanian Defense Forces. Though the war lasted less than a day, it triggered widespread looting and

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arson in Panama City, leaving an estimated 10,000 Panamanians homeless, according to the U.S. Agency for International Development. The complete pacification of the country took several additional weeks.

The campaign began with nearly simultaneous assaults on twenty-seven targets throughout Panama. Though many of these sites were clustered in and around Panama City and the canal zone, they included a substantial effort at Rio Hato, a Panamanian airfield and military base about seventy miles west of Panama City on the Pacific Coast. While the United States had substantial forces stationed in Panama prior to the invasion, many of these were performing various desk assignments at U.S. Southern Command. A sizeable portion of the combat forces were dispatched directly from the United States, including parachute assault teams from the army's 75th Ranger Regiment and 82nd Airborne Division. The bulk of the force was comprised of army light and mechanized infantry supported with helicopters. As well, Marines, Navy SEALs and a variety of other special operations forces played key supporting roles—along with the F-117 "Stealth" fighter, a large fleet of air force airlifters and tanker aircraft. In all, about 27,000 U.S. troops participated directly in Operation Just Cause, while thousands more supported it.

The Art of Bureaucratic Warfare

STUDYING the events that led up to the invasion of Panama, it is surprising that it all came out so well. In 1989 American policy toward that country was a shambles, the result of years of incompetent and neglectful stewardship. During the later years of the Reagan administration, American policymakers seemed unsure what to make of Noriega. At the same time, Noriega's grip on Panamanian society was weakening, as was the status of the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF). Corruption within the PDF, along with a growing desire among Panamanians for more open, accountable and democratic government, had created an increasingly inhospitable environment for Americans living in the country. As his position worsened, Noriega turned to anti-Americanism. To supplement his power base within the PDF, he created paramilitary "Dignity Battalions", which were little more than well-armed mobs. As threats against the American community in Panama escalated, the Bush administration and the Pentagon arrived at the conclusion that their former ally could no longer be left in place.

What most distinguished the design and planning for Just Cause from more recent U.S. military operations was a desire to create decisive political change. Interestingly—and perhaps disturbingly—the primary push in that direction came from the military, and in particular from the late General Maxwell Thurman and then Lieutenant-General Carl Stiner. In late 1989 Thurman was named to take over U.S. Southern Command (which covered the Caribbean and Latin America), replacing General Frederick Woerner. Thurman and his predecessor could not have been more different: Woerner was a "soldier-diplomat" with considerable experience in the region and a fluent command of Spanish, and who relied heavily upon his contacts with the PDF leadership. Thurman was a career staff officer who achieved a measure of fame overseeing the revival of army recruiting during the 1980s (he was the father of the "Be All You Can Be" advertising campaign). For his part, Stiner, then commander of the army's XVIII Airborne Corps, had spent much of his career in special operations and in the 82nd Airborne Division, which prided itself on its ability to execute quick-paced strikes.

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Thurman and Stiner had studied carefully the position of the PDF in Panamanian society. The PDF controlled and was controlled by Noriega; it was hardly an army in the professional sense. In contrast to the majority of senior Reagan and Bush diplomats, Thurman and Stiner believed that to achieve stability in Panama, not only Noriega but the entire PDF hierarchy had to go.

The distance between Stiner and Thurman on one hand and the Bush team on the other became apparent during a coup attempt in October 1989 by a mid-ranking PDF officer, Major Moses Giroldi. Although he bungled the attempt badly—after trapping Noriega in his office, Giroldi allowed him to talk his way out the door—many in the Bush administration were tempted to offer Giroldi American support. Thurman objected, arguing that substituting Giroldi and his cronies for Noriega would do nothing to resolve the fundamental problem. Thurman's position carried substantial risks: not only would a chance to eliminate Noriega be lost, but it was quite likely that Noriega, now uncertain of his backing within the PDF, would incite the masses with anti-American rhetoric and set loose his Dignity Battalions. In the end, the Bush administration withheld its support.

Bettmann/CORBIS

Stiner and Thurman enjoyed remarkable success in the art of Washington bureaucratic advocacy, success that proved as essential as their military prowess to an enduring victory in Panama. Under basic guidance from Thurman, Stiner devised the Just Cause assault plan, essentially a special operation writ large. As the theater commander in chief, Thurman enjoyed a variety of new powers conferred under the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols defense reforms. His career had established him as a well-known commodity with credibility in Washington. This, in turn, helped to convince newly installed Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Colin Powell, and eventually President Bush, that a bold plan not only could work but offered the best course of action. (Despite his rapid rise in the Reagan and Bush administrations, Powell in the fall of 1989 was still very much a creature of the army and, indeed, had spent his career as a subordinate to Thurman.)

More important, the planning for Just Cause extended beyond the sphere of combat operations in ways that subsequent operations have not. Although the extent of looting frankly surprised Stiner and Thurman, and they overlooked the importance of some issues such as the

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protection of the media and the wave of reporters and television crews that would flood the country to cover the war, the two commanders did prepare for stability operations after combat. In Stiner's phrase, he wanted to "take Panama down one day, and offer it a helping hand back up the next." Even as they withdrew elite units such as the Rangers and the 82nd Airborne, Stiner and Thurman inserted regular infantry units to conduct patrols and stability operations, and summoned civil affairs experts to reconstruct the Panamanian government, police force and other civil institutions.

A final factor that distinguished combat operations in Just Cause was the daring of its architects. Stiner and Thurman embraced risks, not recklessly but in order to conclude the fighting rapidly and decisively. Yes, the enemy was dramatically outgunned, but Just Cause was truly an inspired plan. When first briefed on the operation, Colin Powell responded that it "had a lot of moving parts", and so it did. But for Stiner and Thurman the tactical and technological abilities of their forces—which, in 1989, had yet to be widely recognized—invited boldness and decisiveness, not caution or excessive concern with casualties.

A Lesson Forgotten

THE CONTRAST with the subsequent employment of American military power is extraordinary. Since Just Cause, American forces have been used fitfully, cautiously and with only mixed results to show. In the two major military campaigns conducted since Panama—in the Persian Gulf and in southeastern Europe—the United States has pursued half-solutions and achieved incomplete victories. It has wielded just enough military force to prevent Saddam Hussein from controlling the majority of the world's oil supplies or Slobodan Milosevic from undermining stability in Europe, but no more.

Just eight months after eliminating what he termed his "Noriega problem", President Bush faced a much bigger "Saddam problem." Though conventional wisdom has it that the months leading up to Desert Storm amounted to a triumph of diplomacy and strategic planning, the record suggests otherwise. For one, the military received inconsistent and confusing guidance from senior administration officials. Indeed, at the final high-level conference prior to the launching of Desert Storm, Lieutenant-General Frederick Franks, commander of the U.S. VII Corps, which was to execute the campaign's main attack, plaintively asked Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, "How do I know what victory looks like?" This sort of confusion is even more remarkable when one considers that—except for Thurman and Stiner—most of the senior Bush administration team during Desert Storm was the same as during Just Cause. Yet the contrast between the two campaigns could not have been more striking.

To begin with, the Bush administration was unable to make a principled case for the Gulf War. The president's efforts to portray Saddam as a modern Hitler, for example, were hardly in tune with Secretary of State James Baker's claim that the war was about "jobs, jobs, jobs." The Bush team regularly protested that its problem was not with "the Iraqi people", merely with Saddam and his henchmen. Yet a declared aim of the war was to restore the Kuwaiti monarchy, hardly a representative government and one whose leaders seemed content to fight for their country from London's finest hotels. Even Bush's initial reaction to the invasion appeared muddled: before famously declaring that the invasion "would not stand", he had to be admonished by

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British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher not to "go all wobbly."

Confusion over principles was compounded by murky political goals. Many Saudi and Kuwaiti leaders and diplomats continue to express wonder that a greater effort was not made to "go to Baghdad", and maintain that they would have supported such a move. Even as the war developed, with Iraq's Scud attacks on Saudi Arabia and Israel, the Bush administration made no effort to modify its stated war aims. Nevertheless, a week after the war had been halted, army planners were warned by General Norman Schwarzkopf to prepare options for an assault on Baghdad.

Fought for more limited goals than those of Operation Just Cause, Operation Desert Storm was also fought in a more limited fashion. The most profound difference was the substitution of a sequential campaign for the simultaneity that characterized operations in Panama. Whereas Just Cause attempted to "take down" an entire country within the space of about eight hours, the Gulf War was divided into distinct air and ground campaigns, leaving open the possibility of diplomatic negotiations at almost any point. Even during the hundred-hour land war, the coordination between air and ground forces was sharply limited, and air campaign planners still lament the decision to subordinate what they viewed as the strategic air campaign—focusing on leadership and other targets in Baghdad, for example—to tactical concerns.

Even the ground war proceeded in a disjointed and sequential fashion, with the Marines and army conducting attacks that were not particularly well coordinated or synchronized. There were several separate ground wars just as there were separate air campaigns: the Marines' job was to liberate Kuwait, while the army's was to destroy Iraqi forces in the field. Oddly, the campaign that would have had the greatest lasting effect on Saddam's hold on power—the destruction of the Iraqi army, its leaders and its equipment—was the campaign that received the least attention and lowest priority. And, of course, that campaign was halted before it achieved its aim.

Likewise, the contrast between command arrangements for Just Cause and Desert Storm bears noting. Whereas Stiner enjoyed remarkable latitude and a strong advocate in the person of General Thurman, General Schwarzkopf faced a very different challenge. During the run-up to Desert Storm, the structure of tactical and operational planning was disjointed. The U.S. Central Command staff proved inadequate to the demands of such a large war, and an alphabet soup of elite service planning organizations played overlapping roles in crafting the poorly coordinated air and ground campaigns. The gruff and abrasive Schwarzkopf had no talent for Washington insider maneuvering and loathed his assignment on the army staff. Moreover, he was often employed in the unlikely task of soothing Saudi and other Arab sensibilities. In Washington, General Powell not only had to protect Schwarzkopf; he was at the same time advocating a more restrained strategy while involving himself with the details of the main ground attack.

The parallel wars of Desert Storm resulted in a victory, to be sure, but an incomplete one whose outcome continues to bedevil policymakers. Little effort went into post-combat planning, with disastrous effects for the Kurds in the north of Iraq and the Shiite in the south. Saddam Hussein has yet to comply with the UN mandates that ended the war, as ongoing "no-fly zone" operations over northern and southern Iraq—and the seasonal cruise missile strikes—attest. Indeed, these operations have continued for so long that a larger number of U.S. air sor-

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ties have been flown since the Gulf War than during it.

Reductio ad Absurdum

IT IS Desert Storm, not Just Cause, that has provided the template for recent U.S. military operations. Nowhere has this been more evident than in the conduct of last year's war against Serbia. While the full history of Operation Allied Force is still to be written, press accounts during the war and a remarkable series of articles by Dana Priest in the *Washington Post* last year revealed that the planning and conduct of the Kosovo campaign was very far removed from the Panama paradigm. Allied Force was conceived as an "air only" war, replete with Vietnam-like pauses for negotiation or strategy reassessment. Indeed, President Clinton pledged at the outset that he did "not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war."

As during Desert Storm, the air war over Kosovo was a meticulously "phased", sequential campaign that first would neutralize Serb air defenses, then strike at sites south of Belgrade, and finally culminate in attacks on the capital itself, including "leadership" targets such as ministry buildings and communications towers. But unlike Desert Storm, Allied Force would begin with strikes on a mere fifty-three targets, mostly air defenses, and be sharply limited by concerns over civilian casualties and possible pilot losses. Initially, no attacks would be directed at industries that might support Serbia's military.

NATO Commander General Wesley Clark faced opposition from his own senior advisers and in particular from General Michael Short, head of the U.S. Air Force in Europe. Short, realizing that attacking Serb ground units in Kosovo would prove a difficult and frustrating task, chafed at Clark's orders to strike Serb forces in the field, deriding them as "tank-plinking", air force slang for attacking mechanized forces one by one. In a postwar interview in *Air Force* magazine, Short complained that "the massive and laborious tank-plinking effort in Kosovo was in many ways a waste of airpower since it did little to achieve NATO's stated goals." According to the *Washington Post*, these differences eventually prompted this exchange, when in a video conference Short expressed satisfaction that his aircraft would be allowed to strike Serb police headquarters in downtown Belgrade:

> 'This is the jewel in the crown', said Short.
>
> 'To me, the jewel in the crown is when the B-52s rumble across Kosovo', answered Clark.
>
> 'You and I have known for weeks that we have different jewelers', said Short.
>
> 'My jeweler outranks yours', concluded Clark.

It is difficult to imagine Stiner or Thurman engaging in a similar set-to with one of their subordinates. And it is ironic that Clark, widely reviled in the military as a "political" general thought to be too cozy with President Clinton and senior administration officials, had to fight his war under restrictions with which the Just Cause commanders never had to contend. These limitations help to explain the unsatisfying nature of the "victory" in Kosovo, if indeed one can call it that. They persisted through the end of the war and to this very day—from the Russian race to the Pristina airport to the compromised role of French troops in Mitrovica, Clark has fared no better in stability operations than he did in waging the war itself. Uncertainty of purpose still handicaps NATO and U.S. operations in Kosovo and the Balkans. In fact, the "post-combat" phase of operations in Kosovo appears far more daunting than the bombing campaign itself.

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WHEN confronted with the Just Cause to Allied Force evolution of U.S. military operations, it is tempting to conclude that each conflict is *sui generis* and that drawing general lessons from specific campaigns is folly. Delivering the keynote address at a conference marking the tenth anniversary of the Panama invasion, no less an authority than Bush administration National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft warned against drawing overly broad conclusions from the 1989 campaign. Still, the current paradigm—waging limited war with limited force in a halting fashion—has yet to produce lasting results.

Pursuing a "Panama paradigm" is not beyond the capacity of American armed forces. While "taking down" an entire country in eight hours may be a difficult standard to meet, in hindsight it is clear that both Desert Storm and Allied Force could have been concluded more rapidly and more decisively, as there were no tactical or operational reasons that precluded a bolder approach. The failure to pursue one proved to be penny-wise and pound-foolish. Both in the Persian Gulf and in the Balkans, U.S. and NATO forces currently face open-ended commitments with no satisfactory "end state" in sight.

Yet the Pentagon continues to move farther away from the Panama template. Defense Secretary William Cohen has produced a preliminary review of the Kosovo campaign to coincide with his new budget request. The air force is trumpeting Kosovo (as it did the Gulf War) as the first war won by air power alone. The army has plans to acquire lighter combat vehicles, allegedly to improve its strategic mobility. Enthusiasts for the "revolution in military affairs" speak glowingly of America's increasing ability to conduct long-range precision strikes. At the same time, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Hugh Shelton argues for a reduction of U.S. forces stationed in the Balkans. The Defense Department is more than willing to punish opponents from a distance, but unwilling to do much more.

But for a global superpower—animated by universal political principles, favored with rich and powerful allies, and fielding dominant military forces—there ought to be a strong disposition to act decisively in war. This is not to argue that the United States should not be prudent in deciding whether to go to war in the first place, but rather to argue that when America does go to war it should do so in a certain manner. It should act in accordance with American political principles. It should seek, whenever possible, a lasting political outcome and fashion its military strategy accordingly. It should seek to achieve victory rapidly, to employ ample force for that purpose, striving for simultaneous rather than sequential operations. And it should recognize that, having taken such a fateful step, it bears a certain responsibility to clean up the mess it leaves behind. □

For Export Only

The French intelligentsia have largely abandoned the old theorists: These days Jacques Derrida is France's answer to Jerry Lewis, a hero to Americans but the butt of jokes in his own country.

—James Hynes, *Washington Post*, May 7, 2000

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Keeping the Coast Guard Afloat

Colin S. Gray

EVERYONE loves the U.S. Coast Guard. Its cutters, with their white-painted hulls and orange stripes, offer the world a kinder and gentler image of American military power. It rescues seafarers in distress, protects marine life, oversees safety in ports and coastal waters, and combats illegal immigration and drug trafficking, making for an exceedingly lengthy list of duties. The Coast Guard, which legally is an armed service, is the sole federal law enforcement agency at sea. It is at once humanitarian, policeman and fighting sailor.

But the U.S. Coast Guard, which is the envy of other coast guards (indeed of many navies) and which enjoys a hugely positive reputation with the public, has a problem. The difficulty lies both in its diverse portfolio and in a service culture that traditionally has emphasized a modest, quiet professionalism rather than noisy self-assertiveness. One might expect the Coast Guard to be generously endowed with politically powerful constituencies, but it is not. The service is tiny, with only 34,000 active personnel (uniformed and civilian), and is underfunded at $4 billion a year—slightly less than the cost of a single aircraft carrier.

A warm and fuzzy glow of public approval has not yielded reliable support for the Coast Guard when and where it matters most: among budgeteers in the executive branch—including the Department of Transportation, wherein the service is housed somewhat uneasily—and in the Congress. The Coast Guard may be the country's fifth armed service, performing vital work for national security, but in Transportation it competes with—and routinely loses out to—big ticket projects with enormous domestic constituencies.

As is generally recognized, the Coast Guard matters critically when things go wrong. But to a large extent the service's real value lies concealed in the things that go right—the ships that move safely, the criminal operations that are deterred. Nonetheless, the service is rarely out of the local news around America's 300 ports, 95,000 miles of coastline and 25,000 miles of coastal waterways, and is not long out of the national media spotlight. The trouble politically is that people do not see the Coast Guard as a fifth armed service, but rather as a fisheries protector here, an enemy of criminals there, and a lifeguard somewhere else. The Coast Guard's dilemma has led to a condition that is simple to explain: the

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service is currently required to do too much with too little.

A Crisis at Sea

AS THE strength of the Coast Guard withers—between 1995 and 1999 the Clinton administration cut the size of the service by 12 percent and slashed $400 million off its annual budget—a crisis approaches for U.S. national maritime security. America's economy is critically dependent on the use of the high seas and its own coastal and internal waterways. Everywhere one looks one finds an increase in pressure on marine resources and, as a result, on those charged with their protection.

The types of pressure range from a huge increase—probably a tripling—in the volume of legitimate maritime trade by 2020 (95 percent of U.S. exports and imports move by sea), a boom in illegal migration, an increase in maritime drug smuggling (at least 70 percent of the total drug flow into the United States travels part of the way by sea), and greater demands on ocean resources such as fisheries and mineral deposits, to a growing list of defense concerns. Additionally, the Coast Guard responds each year to approximately 50,000 distress calls, saves perhaps 5,000 lives, and provides emergency help to 100,000 others. Each year the service conducts safety inspections of 34,000 U.S. vessels and barges, 19,000 foreign vessels, and 7,000 fixed marine facilities on and offshore. Today, each of the three segments of the Coast Guard's duties—justice, transportation and defense—is registering significant growth.

All this activity has severely constrained the Coast Guard's ability to maintain its equipment. The service's high and medium-endurance cutters, patrol aircraft and communications systems are generally old and are becoming obsolete, if they are not so already. In the apposite words of Coast Guard Commandant Admiral James M. Loy, "Our ships and aircraft that operate offshore are among the oldest of all the world's fleets of similar platforms. The personnel and maintenance costs of keeping these ancient craft running grow increasingly prohibitive." The point is not only that obsolete equipment cannot do as good a job as more modern equipment; rather, increasingly it will be unable to do the job at all. Smugglers, for example, already outrun or otherwise evade relatively slow Coast Guard vessels and routinely deceive their obsolete search radars.

The maintenance problems of severely aging ships and aircraft also affect their endurance for patrols, especially for "deep water" duties far from shore, as well as their ability to operate effectively with the other armed services. The Coast Guard's assistant commandant for operations, Rear Admiral Ray Riutta, says that, "The biggest challenge I have . . . is to make sure that I do not field assets that are so slow, defenseless, and technologically outdated as to be albatrosses around the necks of the Navy's forces with which we sail." From a service traditionally averse to complaining in public, and which has always made a virtue of getting the job done, this should be taken as a serious warning.

Fortunately, these problems lend themselves to an elementary and inexpensive solution. To quote Admiral Loy again, "Many of our readiness issues are the sort of problems that really can be solved by throwing money at them. Twelve or thirteen million dollars to restore our parts inventories to where they were a few years ago would be a nice place to start." The point is further illustrated by the fact that when the Clinton administration's 1998 emergency request for supplemental readiness funds arrived on Capitol Hill, it did "not include a nickel for the Coast Guard"—uniquely among the five armed services—even though the

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service had both participated in all the meetings bearing on the request, and suffered from the same readiness problems as the other services.

It would be a serious mistake to assume that this crisis translates merely into lackluster performance. The stakes are far larger: an aging, persistently underresourced Coast Guard means more lives lost at sea, more pollution, more drugs and depleted fish stocks; it could also mean another Exxon *Valdez* disaster, a super cruise ship aided too late, or a nuclear device transported undetected by sea into the United States.

Arming the Coast Guard

AS AN ARMED service, the Coast Guard constitutes a crucial element of the "national fleet" of the United States, along with the navy and the Marine Corps. Many of the enemies of the United States unable to field regular armed forces are opposed principally by the Coast Guard. These enemies typically are armed, but they seek profit rather than political advantage. More and more often in recent years, defense against such threats has been prosecuted on the coasts and in the ports of friends and allies far away from North America.

The Coast Guard is legally required to be ready to serve in the navy in time of war. Thus it has been since the Revenue Cutter Service (created in 1790 and otherwise known as "the Treasury Fleet") served with distinction in the quasi-war with France in 1798 (the Continental Navy was disbanded in 1785; the U.S. Navy was created only in 1798). *U.S.* Coast Guard it may be, but it served in Europe in World War I, all over the globe in World War II, in the South China Sea during the Vietnam War, and in the Persian Gulf and the Adriatic more recently. True, it is not the mission of the service to win and protect control of the seas in conditions of high-intensity combat; that is the job of the navy. But the Coast Guard does have to be able to operate seamlessly with the other armed services.

What is, and should be, the relationship between the Coast Guard and the navy, and to what degree is the seafaring equipment of the two interchangeable? Much as a particular model of automobile can range in capability and price from an austere entry-level version all the way to a twin-turbo variant with a global positioning system, a Coast Guard "cutter" can be variably equipped. In its basic dimensions a cutter is sized to suit its seagoing roles and duties. The ships of most interest here are designed for high or medium periods of endurance, which is to say for deployments lasting up to several months, possibly far from resupply and ready assistance, and in some of the roughest waters on earth. Prolonged periods at sea in wintertime off the Newfoundland Grand Banks or in the Gulf of Alaska is a task for neither the faint of heart nor the frail. The Coast Guard's presence is required urgently when physical conditions are at their least benign.

The issue of most importance for American national security is how "cutter-like", or "warship-like", a new class of Coast Guard cutters should be. A Coast Guard cutter, like a navy frigate, inherently has no particular technical character. Both are defined by their purposes, and those purposes can be many and demanding. Both types of vessel are relatively small, general purpose warships. At one extreme, the U.S. Navy *could* choose to design and deploy frigates that in size, sophistication and cost would begin to approximate destroyers. At the other extreme, Coast Guard cutters could be purchased that carry only the crew and equipment necessary for muscular law enforcement activity.

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By 2020, however, the navy will have no frigates left, and all its destroyers will be relatively large and probably exceedingly expensive. In short, there will be a yawning void of small, general purpose warships, between the navy's fourteen 344-ton PC1 *Cyclone* class patrol boats on the one hand, and its fifty-seven 8,315-ton DDG-51 *Arleigh Burkes* (guided missile destroyers) and new DD-21's (land-attack destroyers) on the other. By 2020 U.S. Navy surface warships could number no more than ninety units. This portends a serious crisis for U.S. policy and strategy.



AP Photo/Paul Connors

The U.S. Coast Guard cutter, *Monomoy*.

By a fortunate accident, the interconnecting parts of the compounding crises described here suggest a synergistic solution. The predictable shortage of frigate-like warships in the navy of the future points to closer integration between it and the Coast Guard. Lest the point remain obscure, no break in law or tradition is contemplated. The Coast Guard is legally an armed service, and its cutters have always been more or less well-armed warships. The question, rather, is just how much "war" equipment Coast Guard warships should carry. The sensible scope for disagreement about the duties and equipment of the service is real, but not truly extensive. Everyone agrees: large Coast Guard cutters have to serve as warships; the navy needs assistance from frigate-like cutters; national defense traffic on and from the sea is very much on the rise; and old equipment needs to be improved or, where necessary and possible, replaced.

However, these pressing security needs will not necessarily translate into political clout. Because of its hybrid nature as armed service and law enforcement agency, warrior and quasi-civilian, marine traffic cop and protector of the marine environment, the Coast Guard does not fit neatly into an obvious bureaucratic niche. With a modest annual budget, it would be dwarfed were it "owned" by the Department of Defense (DOD). Furthermore, the wholly military ethos of the DOD is inappropriate for a service whose most distinctive functions are still related to law enforcement. As an agency keyed to the safety and policing of marine traffic, its fit within the Department of Transportation is logical; yet in Washington that carries the price of reduced political heft.

This disadvantage is made worse by the Coast Guard's character: the service is purposefully economical, and it performs an extensive array of duties. Probably nothing can or should be done about this. It is desirable that the Coast Guard remain lean and efficient, even though these traits all but guarantee a low political impact and a continued uneasy place within the bureaucracy.

Other sources of difficulty, however, are eminently surmountable, for they derive merely from a lack of public understanding of the scope of Coast Guard activities. For the most part, in times of peace the other branches of the armed forces have an impact on national security only through their deterrent capability. Although they do engage in preventive

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diplomacy, in an obvious sense the armed forces are merely waiting for war. The Coast Guard, by contrast, performs myriad national security duties on a daily basis. It is true that oil spills, drug running, living marine resources depleted, and cruise ships in trouble cannot compare in significance with the outbreak of a major war. But on the other hand, U.S. taxpayers spend $280 billion annually for the Defense Department and only $4 billion for the Coast Guard.

A bargain-basement Coast Guard can act as an extension of the navy at the low end of combat power. For a great navy like America's requires a full range of assets, from carrier task forces capable of coercing regional powers, down to a flotilla of relatively small, shallow-draft vessels that can provide coastal, port and other anchorage security. Small is not sexy in matters of maritime security, but it is necessary. Along the shorelines of the United States, the Coast Guard proves itself every day. A service that can function safely enough with the navy and air force in time of hostilities, and that can detect and run down law-breakers at sea in time of peace, is a Coast Guard that deserves adequate funding and attention. Today it has neither. □

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Germany's Illiberal Fictions

Jacob Heilbrunn

WHEN THE Nobel committee awarded Günter Grass its literature prize earlier this year, it recognized his stature not only as a novelist but as Germany's leading polemicist. Whether it was hitting the campaign trail for socialist Chancellor Willy Brandt in the late 1960s or condemning German reunification, the gloomy, walrus-moustached Grass has made a career of battling the German conservatives he refers to as "skinheads in neckties." Today, the newly minted Nobel laureate appears on talk shows to celebrate the meltdown of the Christian Democratic Union.

Like Heinrich Böll, the first German postwar novelist to win the Nobel, Grass exemplifies the decisive influence the Left has had in shaping contemporary German political culture. Germany's intelligentsia spent much of the Cold War banging its tin drums against consumer capitalism, American imperialism and an imminent resurgence of fascism. Its poets, novelists and critics viewed themselves as the first line of defense against a return to the Third Reich and insisted that it was their fundamental duty to marry literature with politics. To an extent inconceivable in the United States, the German literary class has functioned as the nation's self-appointed moral and political conscience.

But to the dismay of Grass & Co., with reunification an intellectual advance guard composed of former leftists such as the novelist Martin Walser has emerged to champion German national pride. Among other things, this new literary Right maintains that the Holocaust has been wielded as a "moral cudgel" by foreign powers to shame Germany. Dismissing as guilt-ridden humbug the summons of the influential political philosopher Jürgen Habermas for a "constitutional patriotism", it decries the literary Left and its long-held taboos. For much of the history of the Federal Republic, leftist writers espoused an anti-American nationalism that argued for a German *Sonderweg*, or special path, which in practice meant neutrality in the superpower conflict. Now the literary Right, emboldened by reunification, is arguing for its own version of a special path.

Politics of the Unpolitical

IN FACT, the anti-Western sentiments espoused by the German literati transcend political categories. For much of its history, Germany famously saw itself as a land of *Dichter und Denker*, of poets and thinkers who disdained politics as an insufferable intrusion into the artistic sphere. It was jolted out of this complacency by Napoleon's crushing

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defeat of Prussia in 1806. A cadre of writers and philosophers promptly emerged to defend German traditions against the degenerate Enlightenment values embodied by France and England, prompting Lord Palmerston to refer to Germany as "that damned land of professors."

No one was to epitomize this contempt for the West more faithfully than Thomas Mann. As Germany went down to defeat in World War I, Mann penned a defense of German values in his *Reflections of an Unpolitical Man*. He insisted that democratic politics was foreign, not just to German writers, but to the country as a whole. "German humanity", he wrote, "basically resists politicization." Mann elaborated:

> I don't want the trafficking of Parliament and parties that leads to the infection of the whole body of the nation with the virus of politics. . . . I want impartiality, order, and propriety. If that is philistine, then I want to be a philistine. If it is German, then I want in God's name to be called a German.

Mann's greatest novel, *The Magic Mountain* (1924), expressed these sentiments somewhat more cautiously in the form of debates between the hopelessly naive humanist Settembrini, who believes that rationalism and socialism will lead to the brotherhood of man, and the totalitarian Jesuit priest Naphta, who argues that true freedom can only be achieved through obedience and slavery.

If Mann's *Reflections* placed him squarely on the Right, his later denunciations of the Nazis made it appear as if he had subsequently moved leftward. His transition from foe of the West to fervent democrat was acclaimed as nothing less than a symbol of Germany's own postwar evolution. But as the historian Joachim Fest has argued, there is something more than a little facile about this view: the truth is that Mann, who described himself as "the master of contradictions", continued to harbor deep doubts about Western democracy long after the Second World War. These doubts, Fest maintains, provide the key to understanding Mann. They offer a clue as well to understanding the path that an entire generation of German writers would follow after World War II. For while the postwar generation of German scribes lacked the irony and sophistication of Mann's writings, it had faithfully imbibed his suspicions of the West.

During the postwar era, the Left borrowed extensively from Mann's *Reflections* to attack the Americanization of Germany. Its members argued that, in its zeal to confront the Soviet Union, the United States had installed in Bonn a puppet, Konrad Adenauer, who had relied on Nazi industrialists to finance the Cold War militarization of West Germany. Far from repudiating its Nazi past, West Germany was merely an extension and continuation of the Third Reich. By contrast, East Germany, which had enshrined anti-fascism as its state dogma, represented a conclusive break with that past.

The Group of 47

TWO ex-communist novelists, Hans Werner Richter and Alfred Andersch, helped to establish anti-Americanism and sympathy toward the Soviet Union as a staple of postwar German literature. In 1946, at the height of the American denazification campaign, Richter and Andersch obtained a license to publish a journal called *Der Ruf*, which espoused "socialist humanism." U.S. authorities shut it down a year later. Richter responded by inviting his contributors to a meeting at his home in Bavaria, where he founded the Group of 47, a semi-annual meeting of what would become a veritable who's who of postwar literature.

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Photofest

Its members included Heinrich Böll, Günter Grass, Martin Walser and Hans Magnus Enzensberger.

Nothing incensed these writers more than the *Wirtschaftswunder*, or economic miracle, which re-created a prosperous German middle class. Heinrich Böll fired the first blasts. His novels, while skillfully written, tended to rely heavily on caricatures of cynical, cigar-smoking industrialists who had profited during the Nazi era and who now formed the ruling class of the Federal Republic. By the 1970s, in his novel *Precautionary Siege*, Böll was depicting a Federal Republic led by a dictatorship in which every citizen was closely monitored by the government. The message was clear: little distinguished West Germany from its predecessor.

But it was Günter Grass who would become the most outspoken and influential member of the Group of 47. Born in Danzig, Grass personally witnessed the destruction of Germany's eastern provinces during the war and drew on this experience in his novels. His first major work was *The Tin Drum*, to which the Group of 47 awarded its prize for best new novel. It appeared in 1959 and its vigorous, caustic language was a far cry from the restrained prose of Böll. The protagonist, a child named Oskar Mazareth, refuses to grow up and remains a dwarf, the embodiment of Germany's own stunted development. His screams shatter windows, and, incapable of coping with the dreadful reality of postwar capitalism, he winds up in an insane asylum, itself a metaphor for West Germany. What is often overlooked in Grass' novel is the nostalgia for the East that suffuses it. In his depictions of Oskar's mother and the Polish grain fields, Grass lapses into sheer bathos; in evoking his childhood in Danzig, he crafts an elegy for German links to the East. This idealization of the East, the notion that it represented something purer than the West, is a leitmotif traceable to Mann's *The Magic Mountain*.

In the 1960s, with the construction of the Berlin Wall, Grass and other intellectuals repeatedly enthused about life on the other side. While they busily denounced the "postfascism" of West Germany, they virtually ignored the totalitarian character of the state next door. Instead, like Mann pining for the romantic world of "music, posthorns, homesickness", they indulged in fantasies that depicted East Germany as a niche society

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where the state treated writers properly and showered them with attention and special privileges—while the idealistic population, when not working to build socialism, eagerly consumed their latest novels. West Germany, by contrast, was a backslider, an immoral country filled with worshipers of the deutschemark (DM) who had buried their past in friendship with the United States.

By the 1980s, the anathemas pronounced by the German intelligentsia knew few bounds. Bernt Engelmann, the official spokesman of the Writers Association of the Federal Republic, declared, "We should finally separate ourselves from anything that has to do with the wish to restore a German nation-state." The novelist Friedrich Dürrenmatt announced that, henceforth, "Germany" would be a term "that will only exist in memory, in nostalgia, in sentimentality, and finally in the past." Together with Böll, Grass denounced the United States for preparing a new Holocaust in the middle of Europe.

The Kohl government's decision to support the stationing of Pershing cruise missiles on German soil especially enraged Grass. In an address in St. Paul's Church in Frankfurt on January 30, 1983—the fiftieth anniversary of Hitler's rise to power—he declaimed that "the present West German government is too mindless and powerless to defend Germany's special interests against the allied superpower and our neighbor France. In place of a firm policy it offers cowardly toadying." In 1986 Grass led a group of writers, artists and scientists to a supposed missile site, where he urged "resistance" to "democratically legalized lawlessness" and insisted that the United States was girding itself for an offensive war. "For me", Grass said, "the American president is no security guarantee, rather the opposite." Another Auschwitz, he declared, could be in the making.

The Past That Will Not Pass

WITH reunification Grass and his colleagues were caught flatfooted. He and his companions were revealed to have been living in a dream world, blind to the realities of both West and East Germany. The best response that Grass could muster was a fulmination about East Germans traveling to Berlin to eat fresh fruit, while Jürgen Habermas railed about a DM-nationalism taking over Eastern Europe. Meanwhile less extreme members of the literary Left had begun defecting to the Right, some, indeed, now conceding that communist totalitarianism was as pernicious as Nazism, and in many ways similar to it.

These themes, of course, had been percolating on the Right for some time, at least since the *Historikerstreit*, or historians' dispute, that rocked Germany in 1986. The debate raised, in the most fundamental and painful way, the question of German identity—whether, after Auschwitz, Germany could, or even should, aspire to be a "normal" nation. But for leftists such as Habermas, the mere consideration of these questions amounted to a dangerous plot to resurrect the old Adam of German nationalism.

The dispute began when historian Ernst Nolte published an essay in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* called "The Past That Will Not Pass Away." In it, Nolte argued that the Holocaust was not unique: Lenin's Red Terror, in fact, had been a dress rehearsal for the murder of the Jews, and Hitler, in any case, was merely responding to his fear of a Stalinist "Asiatic terror." Nolte was promptly denounced by Habermas and a host of historians, but his was merely the first shot fired in a battle that continues to this day, the most recent fusillade being the publication of *The Black Book of Communism.*

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Those making claims similar to Nolte's include historian Arnulf Baring of the Free University of Berlin, the influential playwright Botho Strauss and Willy Brandt's widow, Brigitta Seebacher-Brandt. These figures routinely inveigh against Germany's 1968 generation for enforcing a politically correct version of German history. Their target is usually the Bonn republic, whose national religion is said to have been self-effacement. Seebacher-Brandt declared, "The time has disappeared, the time from which sorrow, shame, and timorousness arose. It does not exist and never has existed—the 'Bonn republic.'" Frank Castorf, a leading German theater director, has called for a return to "fascist ideas." But it was Botho Strauss who captured the most attention with his 1993 essay in *Der Spiegel*, "The Swelling Song of the Billy Goat." Strauss assailed the consumerism and the "sinister aeries of the Enlightenment." He complained that the only ones with the courage to defend German values were the neo-Nazis attacking foreigners, writing, "That a people wishes to assert its legal customs against another and is prepared to sacrifice blood we no longer understand, and, in our liberal-libertarian self-delusion, view as false and damnable."

Perhaps the most important novelist on the Right today is Martin Walser. Walser, indeed, is the mirror-image of Grass. In the early 1960s, he hewed to the conventional wisdom about Germany espoused by its literary set. He argued that the division of the country had been a good thing: "Now we are probably protected forever against those idiotic dynasties or half-crazed fanatics of the 'Reich' who want to weld us together as a nation." By 1977, however, Walser was sounding a different theme. In an address at Bergen-Belsen, he said, "We cannot, and I say this trembling with audacity, recognize the Federal Republic anymore than we can East Germany. We must hold the wound named Germany open." And in a 1988 essay entitled "Handshake with Ghosts", Walser mused, "If we could master Auschwitz, we could again turn toward national tasks." Exactly what those tasks might be Walser did not say.

With reunification, Walser's views sharpened still further. In his lengthy autobiographical novel, *A Flowing Well*, which appeared in 1998, he tackled the question of personal memory and the Nazi era by devising an alter ego named Johann. In Johann's telling of that period there is only a fleeting reference to a Jewish character and the word Auschwitz never appears. The Americanization of Germany is portrayed as unnecessary and a mistake. By contrast, Walser depicts the Nazi era as a normal time for most Germans, or about as normal as life during wartime can be. He suggests that economic misery made it logical for Germans to join the Nazi party; Johann's mother becomes a party member merely to draw business away from a rival pub and rescue her establishment from likely financial ruin.

In recounting such episodes, Walser seeks not only to depict the Nazi era as largely benign, but also to distance himself and Germany from its barbarism. But what Walser also does is conflate the suffering of German Jews with the calamities that ordinary Germans experienced during the war—finding enough food to eat, losing a son, being bombed. In a lengthy interview with Rudolf Augstein in *Der Spiegel*, Walser expressed his incredulity at, and ridicule for, Augstein's childhood memories of his family's repugnance for the Nazis, maintaining that one could not have known at the time, particularly as a child, that Nazism was evil. In the same interview, Walser fondly recalled his own wartime youth and maintained that the Jews he knew were not stigmatized, let alone murdered:

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> I can truly say that in the village in which I grew up I first learned, after 1945, who was a Jew or Jewess. We had our coal trade and one of our customers was Frau Hensel, a pianist from Munich. Neither my mother nor father told me that she was Jewish. I believe they didn't know it. And Frau Hensel was there after 1945 just as she had been before.

Walser's novel was merely a prelude for worse to come. In 1998, before an audience in St. Paul's Church in Frankfurt that included German President Roman Herzog and Ignatz Bubis, the head of the German Jewish community, Walser delivered a speech entitled "Experiences While Drafting a Sunday Talk." At the end of the talk, Bubis was the only member of the audience to refrain from clapping, and he went on to call Walser "a spiritual arsonist." By the end of the month hundreds of articles had been written about the "Walser affair." To the surprise of much of the intelligentsia, Walser had managed to strike a responsive chord in the German population, tapping into latent (and not so latent) resentment over Jewish demands for German reparations.

In his speech Walser announced that he had "learned to look away" from terrible events. "I have many corners that I flee into", he continued. "I think my stance is reasonable. One does not have to endure the unendurable. I'm also practiced in forgetting about things." Walser maintained that he would not make it through a single day had he not become a practiced expert at suppressing unpleasant memories. There is not a moment, Walser declared, when Germany's historical burden is not waved in front of it, that a "moral club" is not wielded against it, that the past is not "instrumentalized" by foreign powers intent on exacting reparations from Germans. Responding to Walser in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, Bubis noted, "I have always said that when [neo-Nazi leaders] say something like this, then no person is interested. It has no effect. But when Martin Walser says it, then it has a totally different effect."

Bubis was correct. Soon enough, others began to question the taboos of the past. The philosopher Peter Sloterdijk diverted some of the attention from Walser when he delivered an address called "Rules for the Human Zoo: An Answer to the Letter on Humanism"—a lecture sponsored in part by Jerusalem's Hebrew University. His speech amounted to a declaration of war against Jürgen Habermas and the notion that constitutional patriotism could supplant the German anthem and flag. Sloterdijk announced to a horrified audience that it was time to return to the tough-minded thinking of Nietzsche and Heidegger, whose famous 1946 essay on humanism he was responding to. In an era of mass culture and barbarism—of, in short, "Americanism"—said Sloterdijk, the ideals of humanism were dead, and good riddance. He then mused whether it might be possible to combine education and genetic engineering to create a new master race.

The "master of dangerous thinking", as Sloterdijk described Nietzsche, showed in *Thus Spake Zarathustra* how man would become domesticated, through the melding of ethics and genetics, into a kind of pygmy—the last man. Sloterdijk approvingly observed that Nietzsche recognized that future conflict would be between the breeders of pygmies and the would-be breeders of a master race. For months, the pages of German newspapers were filled with tirades between Sloterdijk and his opponents; "Gene-Project Superman: Hitler, Nietzsche, Dolly and the new philosophers' battle", announced the cover of *Der Spiegel*. Sloterdijk's list of crimes was alleged to include everything from advocating fascist thought to the destruction of the German social welfare state. But Sloterdijk's ruminations were

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simply the latest in a series of challenges to the taboos established and maintained by the liberal-left mainstream during the Bonn republic.

A FEW YEARS ago, Josef Joffe, writing in *Foreign Affairs*, dismissed the notion that any serious changes had taken place in Germany since reunification: "Germany is boring." But as these debates indicate, nothing could be further from the truth. Chancellor Gerhard Schröder—who seeks to modernize not only the Social Democratic Party but Germany itself—and other politicians have begun to question sacred dogmas. During the Walser debate, Schröder declared that there are some things that a chancellor might like to say, but only a novelist can.

The idea of the writer as *praeceptor Germaniae*, as the all-knowing seer to whom the populace should defer, is a theme in German history that continues to bedevil the country. Thus, it is intellectuals who have picked up the cudgels for a return to national pride. And like the Left, the literary Right has become entangled in, and has shamelessly misused, the Nazi past. Indeed, the problem with Germany's novelists is not that they pay too little attention to their history, but too much. □

Identity Problem

Writing about the 1930s, Stürmer still finds it baffling that a vulgar mass movement, led by a ruthless preacher, could attract a middle-class that was educated in the humanities. Again, he seeks to explain this by pointing out the loss of tradition. In his words, 'disorientation, demoralization and fear of the abyss had undermined all tradition.' This fits in well with Stürmer's promotion of a healthy historical identity for Germany today. But the seduction of millions of Goethe-readers and Beethoven-worshipers is surely not all that mysterious. Intellectuals are easily seduced by collective, quasi-spiritual, idealistic movements that promise to redefine the identity of the nation. Defining the national identity is, after all, their natural occupation. Yet in the absence of active, political citizenship, intellectuals soon fall prey to feelings of uselessness and alienation. And there is no better cure for intellectual self-pity than to be received into the warm bosom of the *Volk*.

—Ian Buruma, *The New Republic*, January 31, 2000

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The Challenge to Certainty

Zach Shore

IN THE Winter 1999/2000 issue of *The National Interest*, Alan Charles Kors asked, "Did Western civilization survive the twentieth century?" He concludes, rather optimistically, that despite its many critics Western civilization has emerged resilient, as it had from so many previous, darker times. But Kors, engaged in a lengthy jeremiad against the multiculturalist Left, misses a critical feature of the past century: a far deeper, more pervasive attack from which the West has not yet recovered.

The twentieth century will ultimately be remembered for its challenges to certainty. All of the major themes historians have pointed to as markers of our age can be subsumed within this paradigm. More than any previous period, the twentieth century called into question many of the fundamental beliefs upon which Western civilization had been based. Notions of class privilege, racial hierarchies, gender roles and sexual identities all underwent dramatic rethinking and led to readjustments in political, social and economic relations. Beyond grand societal transformations, certainties upon which individuals had always counted—such as where to live, what occupation to enter, whom to marry, and even what would become of one after death—ceased to be sure. As political and social traditions were being questioned, so too were basic assumptions in the sciences and philosophy. The multiculturalists' assaults upon Western civilization, which Kors adroitly parries, scarcely equaled the mighty blows struck by those from within the very heart of the Western scientific tradition.

THE TWENTIETH century began with Einstein's sweeping away of several fundamental human, not simply scientific, assumptions. Einstein's theories gained worldwide attention for suggesting that two dimensions always assumed to be constants—time and space—were in fact curved and relative, dependent on that which interacts with them. Newtonian mechanics, the basis of Enlightenment advances, no longer functioned in the expanding universes of astrophysics and subatomic particles. If the very dimensions in which we exist were not absolute, what absolutes could we hold on to?

At least there was the certainty that one and one makes two. Or rather there had been, until Kurt Gödel came along. Gödel saw that mathematics was based upon assumptions, not indisputable truths. His infamous incompleteness theorem, published in 1931, argued that the

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system upon which mathematics is partly based is unprovable because in a logical system using symbols to construct axioms, any proof must come from outside that system. One plus one, therefore, equals two only because there is consensus that it is so. Just how far could relativity be taken?

Werner Heisenberg's uncertainty principle reached into the subatomic realm. Stating that we can never know both the position and the speed of any particle, Heisenberg's theories have influenced contemporary notions of probabilistic occurrences, in which we are now only able to speak of a particle's *probability* of existing in any given space or time. Praising Western civilization's resilience, Kors writes: "Greece fell, but its mathematics still measures, actually and metaphorically, the world." Its mathematics does still measure the world, but the twentieth century saw Western science's ability to measure with certainty undermined from within its finest ranks.

The notion that nature behaved with regularity and that humans could measure and predict its patterns with precision formed a salient aspect of Enlightenment thinking, but this notion crumbled in our age of uncertainty. Chaos theory, first formulated by the French mathematician Henri Poincaré in the latter half of the nineteenth century, but developed and tested in the 1960s by the American meteorologist Edward Lorenz, maintains that long-range prediction is impossible. Systems sensitive to their initial conditions can exhibit chaotic behavior where tiny errors at the start become gigantic ones later. Chaos theory, which extends to countless other systems, from weather patterns to water flow to leaky faucets, exposed the inability of science to predict with certainty.

When James Watson and Francis Crick unlocked the structure of DNA, genetic programming became virtually inevitable. Soon we would know the sex of an unborn child. By the century's final decade, human ears were being grown on the backs of mice, Dolly the sheep made cloning a living, tangible reality, and scientists spoke of the ability to create life. In 1999 the human genome project unraveled the first pair of human chromosomes and promises shortly to map the entire digital code that determines much of human identity. This undertaking represents far more than just an extraordinary advance in knowledge. If we discover that our genetic programming determines most of our personality, emotional make-up and spiritual inclinations, it may well present a challenge to the millennia-held notion of a soul.

PHILOSOPHY followed suit with science in the century's long march toward uncertainty. Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Camus popularized in existentialism the view that the world was a chaotic place, not divinely ordered, and this notion has enjoyed worldwide popularity. While Nietzsche's proclamation that God is dead represented an extreme, the open questioning of God's existence was a leitmotif of the twentieth century.

Not only did the truth of God's existence and his ordered universe fall prey to attack, but the very notion of truth itself fell into doubt as Michel Foucault argued, among other things, that the basic assumptions that societies take for granted as truths are wholly dependent upon power relations and are therefore fluid over time. Foucault's relativism struck at the heart of commonly accepted Western beliefs and challenged the idea that anything could be established with certainty.

Perhaps the most common feature attributed to the twentieth century is that it witnessed the greatest violence in human history. Yet the great tragedy of

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the century's carnage was not solely that it wrought death and suffering of a magnitude hitherto unknown, but that it challenged citizens' faith in the modern state. After Stalin's purges and Nazi terror it became clear that the full power of the modern state could be harnessed not only for civilizing and improving social conditions, but also for the destruction of whole peoples.

Even if the state were unlikely to inflict terror upon its own citizens, its ability to protect them against foreign attack seemed questionable. A profound change occurred in the way people conceptualize war. With the advent of thermonuclear weapons and delivery systems capable of projecting warheads around the globe, the nuclear age redefined the potential devastation of war, holding forth the prospect of the planet's total destruction. Post-Cold War triumphalism casts a dense fog upon our memories of bomb shelters and missile attack drills, but the uncertainty that surrounded a nuclear holocaust was once, and not so long ago, as palpable as today's jubilation over stock market booms.

In addition to scientific development and unparalleled violence, one other salient trend of the last century often cited is the magnitude and rapidity of social change. Groups traditionally marginalized by elites broke through rigid class, race and gender barriers to attain varying degrees of control over their own destinies. These social upheavals, too, can be seen as challenges to certainty, for they questioned the long-existing order on which societies were based.

As class certainties gave way to greater social mobility, so too did notions of racial supremacy. Even the one great certainty on which all men could rely—that a woman's place is in the home—crumbled in the last century. The growing acceptability of "coming out", the open assertion that women did not need men in their lives for sexual gratification, and the increasing openness of bisexuality—a behavior proclaiming that sexual identities are fluid—have all produced a kind of sexual *glasnost*, whereby a once taboo topic not only penetrated mass media, but threatened the most basic societal norms.

PROFESSOR Kors' question is a good one, and the answer is surely yes. The more interesting question is: What damage did the twentieth century inflict? The principal themes of that century—scientific advances, social change and barbarity—can all be seen as challenges to certainty, and it is this idea for which the past century will eventually be remembered. That the West will recover all or even most of its lost assumptions is unlikely. The West may, however, invest in new canons. Faith in the state may already be in the process of being supplanted by faith in markets. Faith in God may rise among some as an ultimate reaction to uncertainty. But will there again be faith in absolutes?

Lurking just below the surface of these reflections is yet another question: whether there is some link between the century's great themes—between unprecedented horrors, genocides and brutality on the one hand and the scientific, philosophical and social challenges to certainty on the other. Did Heisenberg and Foucault merely reflect the growing uncertainty of the century, or could its catastrophic man-made upheavals have been caused by the unmooring of previously unshakable beliefs? This is a question whose answer is as uncertain as the age itself. □

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Tainted Transactions

An Exchange

Jeffrey D. Sachs, director of the Center for International Development, Harvard University:

JANINE Wedel, for the umpteenth time, repeats her phony diatribes against me ("Tainted Transactions: Harvard, the Chubais Clan and Russia's Ruin", Spring 2000). Please permit me to correct the record.

Despite Dr. Wedel's weird insinuations that I had no advisory role with the Russian government, I was an official adviser to that government, but only for two years and two months, from December 1991 to January 1994. I worked closely with Anders Åslund during this period. President Yeltsin officially designated us as advisers during a meeting with us on December 13, 1991, and we received offices in the Council of Ministers during 1992 and in the Ministry of Finance during 1993. During the period until the end of 1992, Åslund and I mainly advised acting Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar, and in 1993 we led a unit within the Russian Finance Ministry advising Deputy Prime Minister Boris Fedorov. (The most bizarre and entertaining fiction is Dr. Wedel's additional suggestion that I somehow secretly worked with the IMF during 1992.)

During this entire period, there were notoriously heated divisions within the Russian government, and between the Russian government on one side and the Duma and Central Bank on the other. The reformers, led by Gaidar and Fedorov, did what they could to pursue needed reforms, but very often they were blocked. Unlike my experience in many other countries, such as Poland, little of what I recommended was actually enacted. It wasn't pleasant being blamed for high inflation and other ills that resulted from the very opposite of the advice that Åslund and I were giving (such as when the Central Bank ran a disastrous hyperinflationary monetary policy in 1992 and 1993), but it was still worth the effort of supporting the brave reformers fighting an uphill battle. Åslund and I publicly resigned in January 1994, days after Gaidar and Fedorov left the government. We were concerned about the takeover of the government by the "industrial lobby", with a foreshadowing of the mega-corruption that was to follow, especially in the disgraceful state giveaways of the lucrative natural resource enterprises, mainly during 1994–96. I was also particularly distressed by the lack of appropriate Western advice and assistance, a point that I made repeatedly in writings and speeches at that time and afterward.

Somehow in this maelstrom some people came to assume (or at least claimed to assume) that whatever happened was what I had recommended, even though I was publicly and privately critical of the lawlessness and lack of reform progress. For a few people this has continued despite the fact that I have not advised the Russian government for six years or even been to Russia for five years. Wedel writes in just

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this nonsensical vein. For many years I have publicly and repeatedly denounced the scandals of privatization such as the "shares for loans" deals, and published articles and books describing and criticizing the lawlessness and corruption in Russia (including *The Rule of Law and Economic Reform in Russia*, 1997).

Dr. Wedel deliberately and systematically mixes personal references to me, the Harvard Institute for International Development (HIID) and other Western advisers, so that she can rope me into her phony conspiracy theories. The HIID projects she refers to were directed by Professor Andrei Shleifer at Harvard, and I had no role in those projects. She seemingly can't understand that I had a completely separate project, and that I resigned from advising the Russian government as of January 1994. One and one half years later, I became director of HIID in July 1995, and Professor Shleifer's project was one of sixty or so ongoing HIID projects around the world. During the period in which I directed HIID (1995–99), I stayed completely away from any personal involvement in any Russian advisory work, consistent with my public resignation in 1994. Moreover, when dubious practices in Professor Shleifer's project came to the attention of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and myself in the spring of 1997, USAID and I worked together to close the project immediately.

Dr. Wedel writes darkly that "it is unclear who paid Sachs and his team." As I have explained repeatedly to her, and to anyone else that had the slightest interest, I received my academic salary for my work in Russia, with my leave time from Harvard University covered mainly by the United Nations University in Helsinki in early 1992, and thereafter by the advisory project supported by the Ford Foundation and the Swedish government during 1992–93. USAID supported a small amount of my summer academic salary, probably a total of a month or two. Of course, I never invested a penny in Russia, or in any other country in which I have served as an economic adviser. Nor did I engage in any consulting services for private businesses or investors involved with the Russian economy.

Dr. Wedel also accuses me of somehow improperly promoting myself to the Russians as a person "facilitating access to Western money." As any mildly interested observer of the Russian reforms would know from my writings and speeches, I strongly believed and publicly argued in 1992 that the West should provide large-scale assistance to Russia to support the early days of market reforms and stabilization, something the West manifestly declined to do. There was nothing sinister, surreptitious or secretive about any of this: I simply believed (and continue to believe) that timely Western help in 1992 and 1993 could have played an important role in helping real reforms and democratization to take hold, but of course it did not come. The Russian reformers and I knew that the chances for the needed large-scale support were not high, but we felt the effort was worth making anyway.

Wedel's twisting of facts and outright misrepresentations go on and on. What I find hard to understand is how *The National Interest* could publish this nonsense without even doing an iota of fact-checking.

*

Anders Åslund, senior associate, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace:

A decade after the collapse of the communist system, history has demonstrated that those post-communist countries that aggressively pursued market economic and democratic reforms are

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rapidly improving the lives of their citizens. In her article in *The National Interest*, Janine Wedel ignores this reality and seems more intent on denigrating those who have advocated and actively promoted such radical reform. She appears to lack an analytical framework, and her assertion of facts is inaccurate.

The stars among the post-communist countries are Poland and Estonia, which are generally acknowledged as the most radical market reformers. According to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, they also have the least corruption. Russia attempted a radical reform, but unfortunately it stumbled. Even so, Russian citizens are better off than Ukrainians, who saw a much later reform and less privatization, not to mention the poor Belarusians, who suffer under a frightful dictatorship in a Soviet theme park. Market reform and democracy go together in the post-communist world. Russia's problem is not too radical reform, but too little reform.

For the past decade, Janine Wedel has been going after leading advocates of radical market economic reform and privatization in former communist countries. Since the shortcomings of her gossip journalism are so obvious, nobody seems to have bothered to answer her as yet, but when a respectable magazine, such as *The National Interest*, publishes an article of hers, this mixture of lies, half-lies, sly allusions and sheer misunderstandings needs to be exposed.

In 1990 she started pursuing Jeffrey Sachs and David Lipton for having destroyed the Polish economy through their "ideology . . . of radical privatization and marketization", which soon turned Poland into a stunning success. Poland's President Alexander Kwasniewski recently bestowed a high Polish order on Sachs and on Lipton in gratitude for their services to Poland.

What is her alternative? In her book, *Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe 1989–1998* (1998), she revealed her ideological preferences by repeatedly citing the old-style Soviet communist Leonid Abalkin with sympathy in his criticism of liberal reformers. She seems to advocate U.S. assistance to such communists: "In short, donors, by equating Western-oriented Russians with reform agendas and traditionalist or communist Russians with anti-reform agendas, created stereotypes."

Wedel is patently contradictory. She criticizes Western consultants for their "[l]ack of the understanding of the Russian cultural context", but the particular persons she assails know Russia well. She attacks the major Western economic advisers in Russia for being both ineffective and too influential. You cannot have it both ways.

Similarly, she regrets large amounts of aid to consultants, but she has focused on one institution, namely, the Harvard Institute for International Development, which received less than 1 percent of total USAID assistance to Russia. She ignores the many other general contractors for USAID that received much more money.

The major problem, however, is Wedel's inability to evaluate the accuracy of her sources. She mainly relies on interviews, going around talking to admittedly many people, but she only records vicious and tendentious allegations often made by single individuals. She makes no attempt to check their truthfulness, ulterior motives or even whether her interviewees can know what they say. The Soviet Union was an empire of lies, and systematic lying remains common. Wedel seems unaware of this, revealing her limited understanding of the Russian cultural context.

Sometimes, though, Wedel seems aware of her absence of evidence, but

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instead of retracting she adds, for instance, ". . . as well as a number of additional reports and sources in Russia, Ukraine, Sweden and Washington."

In a review of *Collision and Collusion* in *Comparative Economic Studies*, Jozef van Brabant, an economist who has persistently opposed radical market reform, concluded: "The book is marred by all too many other inaccuracies some of which are attributable to the author's ignorance."

From a personal perspective, I can say that Wedel's portrayal of my work is simply wrong. She alleges: "Åslund seemed at once to represent and speak on behalf of American, Russian and Swedish governments and authorities." This statement is absurd. I left the Swedish foreign service in 1989. I served as economic adviser to the Russian government from November 1991 until January 1994. I have never been employed by the U.S. government. Although my employments have varied over time, they have never involved conflicts of interest, and I have always made clear what I am doing.

Wedel also complains that "he always presented himself [in op-ed articles] as an objective analyst, despite his many promotional roles." When working with the Russian government and later the Ukrainian government, I always mentioned that. Some may disagree with me, but I have hardly ever been accused of being unclear about what I stand for.

Wedel claims: "Åslund was also involved in business activities in Russia and Ukraine", and in her *Demokratizatsiya* article: "He had 'significant' business investments in Russia." The truth is that while advising any government, I have never been involved in business activities or invested in that country, though I have given lectures and briefings on the state of their economies.

She complains that two of my associates, who worked for Chubais, set up an investment bank *after* having finished their work for Chubais. So what? High U.S. Treasury officials often come from and go to investment banks.

In her *Demokratizatsiya* article, Wedel claimed: "Åslund helped to deliver Swedish government monies to the [Russian Privatization Center]." I would have been happy to do so, but I did not. Wedel writes that I attended a *dacha* in Arkhangelskoe when the Gaidar team prepared its government program there, but I have never visited that *dacha*. Nor is it true that my assignment in Ukraine "explicitly included public relations on behalf of that country."

In public appearances, Wedel has asserted that I have made a huge amount of money on USAID, but USAID has never financed any advisory work of mine. Nor have I worked for HIID, which she also has alleged. My work in Russia was financed by the Swedish government and the Ford Foundation through the Stockholm Institute of East European Economics.

This is a long list of allegations that I know to be wrong because they involve me personally. There is no reason to believe that she is more truthful about anything else, as Wedel's text abounds with inaccuracies. Aleksander Bevz has never headed the Gaidar Institute. Maxim Boycko replaced Alfred Kokh as chairman of the State Property Committee, not the other way around, as Wedel reports. Jeffrey Sachs and David Lipton were rarely in Moscow together, and so on.

Many of these facts can be easily checked. Most of Wedel's claims have been made three or four times in almost identical wording, as she is in the habit of republishing the same article many times, so it is not a matter of typographical errors.

In short, Wedel's main shortcoming is that she lacks the faculty to distinguish truth.

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Marek Dabrowski, former first deputy minister of finance of Poland, currently vice chairman of the Center for Social and Economic Research, Warsaw:

I found Janine Wedel's article deeply wrong in its description and interpretation of East European and Russian transition processes, and of the role of foreign aid to this region.

My impression is that the author intentionally and consciously manipulates facts and sources of information in order to support her conspiracy theory and address far-fetched and certainly unfair personal insinuations against key Russian reformers such as Yegor Gaidar and Anatoly Chubais, and leading Western experts trying to help Eastern Europe and Russia such as Jeffrey Sachs, David Lipton and Anders Åslund. Her style of writing and methods of work remind me of the worst instances of Communist Party propaganda, which I had occasion to experience not so long ago as an East European national.

The best example of such practices is footnote 33 of her article where she quotes me as the source of the opinion that ". . . Åslund was engaged in public relations activities. His assignment in Ukraine, where he was funded by George Soros, explicitly included public relations on behalf of that country, according to other Soros-funded consultants who worked with Åslund there."

It is true that I worked with Anders Åslund in Ukraine (and in Russia), but I did not formulate such an opinion, and, what is more important, I never gave Wedel permission to use any fragment of our two conversations as the source of quotation in her publications.

Wedel met me once in 1995 with the purported reason to ask me about a paper I had presented on foreign assistance to transition countries. It seemed a normal academic conversation. Then, she called me on the phone several months later. When she started to put her questions, I quickly realized that she was in the grip of some conspiracy theory, and she tried to provoke me to speak against Jeffrey Sachs and David Lipton. She was not ready to listen to my answers because she knew better what the "truth" was, and she wanted me only to confirm her crazy interpretation of events. At the beginning I tried to convince her that she was wrong, but when I realized that this was a hopeless task, I stopped the conversation. I asked her never to call me again, and not to use any part of our conversation in her work, a request she has not respected.

*

Peter Reddaway, professor of political science, George Washington University:

Janine Wedel's powerful article focuses mainly on the negative effects of "transactorship" on Russian-Western relations. These contributed to other problems that, taken together, mean that the West has helped to create in Russia a much bigger long-term problem for our foreign policy than most observers have yet grasped.

In my view, the attempted imposition of shock therapy (or "the Washington consensus") on Russia by Boris Yeltsin and the West has been a textbook example of doctrinaire social engineering. It has been based on a mixture of ignorance and arrogance. As I have argued since before the process began in 1991, such an approach was bound—given the legacy of Russian and Soviet history—to be, at the least, premature and dangerous. Russia is not Poland or Estonia. No matter what tricks Yeltsin and his foreign backers used, it was *politically impossible* to fully apply shock therapy in the Russia of the early 1990s. Any government that might have tried to do so would have provoked chaos and fierce opposition—and been thrown out. Governments do not deliberately

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commit suicide. The repeated complaints of people like Jeffrey Sachs and Anders Åslund that Yeltsin and Yegor Gaidar "lacked the political will to go the whole way" demonstrate, at best, political naivety. At worst, the complaints look like an attempt to divert attention from the incompetence of the advice given by these individuals to the Kremlin, the IMF and Western governments.

The second part of the tragedy is that when, by 1994, it was crystal clear that the "reforms" were not working, the IMF, the G-7, Sachs, Åslund and others continued—for four more long years—to pressure Yeltsin into largely futile efforts to push ahead with them. This compounded failure. For most Russians, such doctrinaire obstinacy put an end to the hopes of better living conditions that had been aroused by the fall of communism.

The pattern was this: the West kept offering loans in return for Kremlin promises to reduce inflation and the budget deficit, privatize industry, appoint Anatoly Chubais to run the economy, circumvent the parliament through presidential decrees, and so on. However, as Dmitri Glinski and I will show in our forthcoming book, *The Tragedy of Russia's Reforms: Market Bolshevism Against Democracy* (2000), not only did these Western recipes fail to stabilize the ruble, halt the steep plunge in investment, and get workers paid on time; they also created a humiliating dependency on the West's aid and foreign policy, promoted crony capitalism, fostered massive crime, corruption and capital flight, eroded state capacity all around, and destroyed what basis remained for achieving a modicum of social justice.

The devastating effect of all this in terms of values is that the majority of Russians, who a decade ago saw democracy and free markets as beacons of hope, now see before their eyes ugly perversions of these institutions, and wonder if they just won't work in Russia. Opinion polls repeatedly show profound doubt and even despair about Russia's future. They also show that anti-Americanism has permeated the whole society and is probably now deeper than at any time in Russia's history. A substantial majority believe that the United States and the West have weakened Russia deliberately, in order to exploit and humiliate it.

Encouragingly, a few of Dr. Wedel's "transactors"—for example, Pyotr Aven, Konstantin Kagalovsky and David Lipton—have in varying degrees rethought and recanted the neo-Bolshevik social engineering that is the main cause of this tragic outcome. Others—notably Sachs and Åslund—have not. Åslund, indeed, tries to publicly ridicule people like the former chief economist of the World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz, who dare to criticize either him or the now exploded "Washington consensus." Also silent as regards rethinking and self-criticism are the main architects and implementers of U.S. policy toward Russia: Strobe Talbott, Lawrence Summers and Al Gore. Their successors will, tragically, be left with a major, nuclear, long-term "Russia problem."

*

Igor Aristov, head of the Department for Competition Protection of the Financial Markets, Ministry for Antimonopoly Policy and Entrepreneurship Support, Russia:

It was very useful to learn the details about the Chubais Clan and its illicit activities from Janine Wedel's article.

It is not possible to overestimate the significance of such an article. For me personally this information is also very important because Russian tycoons have used illegal financial inflows for private purposes and against the national interest of Russia. To foresee their future inten-

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tions we need to understand the structure of their informal relations. Recent scandals have revealed the importance of monitoring closely their transactions, property, money and debts to international organizations. Thank you very much for the article.

*

Wayne Merry, director of the Program on European Societies in Transition, the Atlantic Council of the United States:

Janine Wedel makes a major contribution to the "Who lost Russia?" debate by pulling back some of the protective covering on how the U.S. government sought to impose its economic ideology on post-Soviet Russia. During my years in the political section of the U.S. embassy in Moscow (1991–94), I also saw close up the basic flaws of our Russia policy. First came ignorance, as purveyors of "the Washington consensus" unleashed their dogma on a country they did not understand and, worse, did not wish to understand. Then came arrogance on many levels: the belief that "the Washington consensus" embodied ultimate economic truth (its manifest failures notwithstanding); responding to any doubts about the dogma with accusations of heresy and disloyalty; the view of Russia as an economic wasteland (how it had managed to build all those missiles conveniently ignored) and as a laboratory to refine economic theory (heedless of the banners carried on the streets of Moscow by some of the laboratory animals demanding "No More Experiments").

Next came authoritarianism, as Washington encouraged a willing group of Russian "reformers" to implement our policies by presidential decree rather than face the compromises of the legislative process, and to create extra-constitutional and clandestine structures of administration to avoid parliamentary oversight or media exposure.

Lastly came hypocrisy, as Washington officials claimed to be "shocked, shocked" when the government-sanctioned corruption and theft of public property in Russia could no longer be hidden. They then piously demanded that Russian governance be all the things the Treasury and IMF had insured it would not be: honest, accountable, transparent, law-based, public-spirited.

Thanks are due to Dr. Wedel for her efforts to document this failed policy process but, sadly, she has so far seen only the tip of the iceberg—what remains "classified" is much worse.

*

Michael Hudson, president of the Institute for the Study of Long-term Economic Trends:

I would like to give a perspective on Dr. Wedel's theory of transactors as an economist who has worked most of my life for U.S. international banks and money managers, addressed the Duma on numerous occasions, and consulted for U.S. government agencies on U.S.-Russia relations.

I have observed transactorship, and the insider dealings it entails, first-hand. "Average" U.S. investors were not in a good position to profit from the corruption that underlay Russia's stock market boom. One of the leading fund managers (for whom I worked in 1989–90 to help organize the first global sovereign-debt fund) refrained from the outset from riding this roller coaster. The firm's managers didn't trust the visibly corrupt investment climate and, not being insiders, they saw that "arms-length" speculation probably would end in disaster.

Institutional investors from firms that did enter the market explained to me that the safest money to be made was by those

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who had inside contacts. Money managers who didn't want to invest directly in the risky Russian stock market consigned funds to companies such as Brunswick, which put on promotional shows around the country, in which Anders Åslund and others tried to convince institutional investors that they had an inside track. It was no secret that Russia's market had no legal overseer like our SEC, but that was the very point of investing in Russia!

Based on discussions I had with U.S. global investors during the 1990s, I think I am in a good position to point out why many of them preferred to see major Russian companies pass into just a few corrupt hands. If a few Russian insiders could buy out Russian oil fields and other firms at only 1 or 2 cents on the dollar, they probably would be willing to sell their takings to U.S. and other international investors for 2 to 4 cents. This would enable them to double their money, while providing foreigners with what they wanted: inexpensive ownership of Russia's potentially lucrative mineral wealth and public utilities, as well as its real estate (or, more specifically, its land).

Thus, one reason the U.S. government welcomed the Chubais-HIID mode of "reform" was because of pressure from large investors. If Wall Street investment bankers wanted to take an investment position in Russia, they could do so most easily—and at a much lower price—if only a few "oligarchs" gained ownership of Russia's prize assets. However, if the Russian government or other parties retained control over these assets, they would not be sold as rapidly, and probably would be sold at a higher price.

And so a symbiosis developed between the largest U.S. investors and Russian oligarchs. The largest U.S. investors realized that the kleptocrats for their part wanted to transfer their fortunes abroad. This is what all thieves want to do, for a simple reason: if they keep their money at home, it can be seized by true market reformers. Hence, Russian appropriators sought to move their money to Cyprus, Switzerland and other offshore banking centers, topped by the United States.

To do this, they needed security from Western prosecution. The traditional way to achieve this is to go into partnership with well-placed Westerners. Partnership agreements accordingly were sealed by selling part of their stock ownership to Western investors. Such sales in fact were the only way in which the privatizers were able to realize financial value for their control, for there was no purchasing power within Russia itself to buy their shares. To raise money off the shares they had obtained, Russians needed to sell abroad.

This was well recognized by international investors. It explains why they turned a blind eye to the abuses by Chubais and other insiders, for they knew that they themselves would be the beneficiaries.

Was the subsequent economic devastation directly intended, as a means of "hurting Russia" and thereby disabling it from posing a future threat to the United States and other countries? I believe not. Rather, it was the consequence of the game plan by Western investors (mainly in the United States) to get rich quickly off Russia. The shrinkage of the Russian economy in consequence was a form of "collateral damage", not the intention of the programs themselves. It is the same sort of damage caused by IMF austerity programs imposed on hapless Third World debtors.

My conclusion is that the U.S. government is guilty of gross negligence as to the consequences of the reformers' privatization plans it backed. It didn't mean to kill Russia. It just wanted to take its money and property. Russia's economy got killed in the process. I suppose you might call this second or third-degree murder, not first-degree murder. But that is all that Wedel's article claimed, in my reading.

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What is ironic is that the "free-market" strategy that has been followed excludes from the market precisely the arms-length investors that U.S. policy has claimed to attempt to attract as the mainspring in allocating Western capital funds.

*

David Ellerman, economic adviser to the chief economist, the World Bank:

...My only "problem" with Professor Wedel's article is that it attempts to tell the story in such detail that it will allow those who intellectually sponsored what is, in my personal opinion, one of the biggest debacles of the last half of the twentieth century to continue to avoid analyzing the forest by bickering over the details of the bark on the trees.

*

Steven Rosefielde, professor of economics, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill:

Janine Wedel's "Tainted Transactions" makes an important contribution to the "Who lost Russia?" saga by investigating the nexus between "radical" economic transition theory and Western foreign assistance. . . . A few facts and comments might prove illuminating.

First and foremost, it needs to be stated bluntly that there is no scientific theory of how to transform a command economy efficiently into a well-functioning competitive market system. Theorists cannot even demonstrate the necessity of general equilibrium with a production sector under perfect competition, so there certainly isn't a shred of justification for suggesting that Yegor Gaidar's and Anatoly Chubais' radical reforms should have produced good results. The policies they adopted, often called "shock therapy", were analogous to removing the control rods from a nuclear reactor, and insisting that the ensuing chain reaction would create a better power system.

The Soviet/Russian basis for this strategy dates to the late eighties when Stanislav Shatalin, Gregory Yavlinsky and others developed their infamous 500 Days program, which promised *perekhod*—transition to competitive free enterprise by the end of 1993. They weren't sincere. Shatalin disclosed his real agenda at Duke University in 1991 when he declared that, "It didn't matter if the transition took 500 days, or 500 hundred years, as long as it destroyed Communism!" The debate between the "shockers" and the "gradualists" was never really about economic "optimality"; it was a rhetorical struggle between a generation of young Turks egged on by Gorbachev, who saw radicalism as a highway to political power, and the old reformist economic guard like academicians Oleg Bogomolov and Yuri Yaremenko, who—like Western Nobel laureates Kenneth Arrow, Paul Samuelson and James Buchanan—understood the necessity of building legal and market structures before leaping into the abyss. The failed putsch in August 1991, and Gorbachev's refusal to allow the military to arrest and execute Yeltsin later that fall when Russia, Belarus and Ukraine seceded from the Soviet Union, enabled the radicals to triumph, as their predecessors had during War Communism and the Stalin era. Their Luddite politics not only instantaneously brought about an economic implosion that has caused 5.4 million premature adult deaths through 1997, but opened the Pandora's box of vicious criminality, just as anyone conversant with the history of Gulag and Soviet mafias would have predicted.

The Western transactors Wedel discusses in her article—the IMF, World Bank, U.S. Treasury, USAID, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, OECD, EU and the Western private sector—could not have prevented this deba-

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cle, even if they hadn't misbehaved in the ways Joseph Stiglitz describes in the April 17 & 24, 2000 issue of the *New Republic*. Only Chubais, Maxim Boycko and Alfred Kokh—successive chairmen of the Russian State Property Committee and members of the "transactors circle"—could have mitigated the plunder and disorder, had they not been so thoroughly corrupt. From this perspective, it makes little difference whether some Western economic theories were partially or wholly congruent with those of Russia's homegrown radicals. Had Jeffrey Sachs, widely considered an arch advocate of "shock therapy", been a closet conservative, as Joseph Stiglitz now suggests, Yeltsin's vendetta against the Communist Party still would have driven him to recklessly destroy the remnants of central planning and the ministerial system without first preparing the way for a smooth market transition.

The damage caused by Western proponents of "shock therapy" and others who misunderstood the conditions required for empowering Adam Smith's invisible hand was less than that caused by Yeltsin's rash decrees. It is the sum of the tens of billions of dollars that "transitionists" of all stripes coaxed Western leaders into diverting from America's, Europe's and Japan's deserving poor to Kremlin thieves, plus the negative global welfare costs of consolidating Yeltsin's system of anti-productive elite privilege. The new economic model that has emerged is similar to the regime contrived by Hjalmar Schacht for Hitler: a marketized variant of a command economy that allows leaders to utilize a broad array of regulatory instruments, including direct arms procurement contracting, to enrich a narrow clique and rearm, in whatever mix Putin desires. It is precisely in this sense that Russia has been lost, and that those found guilty by the verdict of history of abetting the process through economic myth-making, politicking and moral turpitude should feel profoundly ashamed.

* * *

Wedel replies:

JEFFREY SACHS' and Anders Åslund's letters contain a series of unsupported counter-assertions. Both deal in significant part with issues that are not addressed in, or material to, my *National Interest* article. The article presents the theory of transactorship, a mode of organizing relations among nations. Both Sachs and Åslund are stunningly silent on this central issue: neither attempt to refute either the theory or the critical body of facts supporting it. The principal point of the article is that a group of self-interested actors and advocates from both the United States and Russia, supported by Western aid and promoted by high U.S. officials to whom they were closely linked, managed to co-opt U.S.-Russian economic relations and helped to bring about the fiasco that followed. It is not at all "contradictory" to conclude that Western economic advisers in Russia were both "influential" and "ineffective." The Harvard-Chubais transactors, including Sachs and Åslund, were most influential precisely in recommending and implementing policies that turned out to be highly counterproductive. The outcomes of their activities ran directly counter to the stated aims of the U.S. aid program in Russia.

Sachs seems not to understand that the issue is the *multiple* and *conflicting* roles that the transactors assumed (with ambiguous loyalties, ambitions and income sources), not the specific official title they held at any given time. Sachs restates that he advised Yegor Gaidar, which I do not dispute, and does not deny his other roles: his transfer of loyalty from Gaidar to Gaidar's nemesis, Ruslan Khasbulatov, who was seen in the

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West as a retrograde communist; and his offer of access to Western aid to Khasbulatov, while urging, in his role as an American economist, that vast amounts of such aid be sent to Russia. Sachs seems to deny that he was in correspondence with the IMF while at the same time advising Gaidar. However, one memorandum that I have in my possession was written by Sachs and David Lipton (who became a Treasury undersecretary), dated May 11, 1992, and directed to key Russian decisionmakers at the IMF. It shows that Sachs and Lipton were privy to internal discussion within the Fund and were proffering advice within that context without any mention of their role advising the Russian side.

Åslund and Sachs portray me as a conspiracy theorist "going after leading advocates of radical market reform." On the contrary, I have been trying, as an anthropologist, to understand the roles being played by key actors involved in the aid process and in guiding economic transition. If those studies have resulted in uncovering unseemly activities, that is a consequence of what the actors have done, not of any analytical bias. I have no personal antagonism toward any of the key figures involved, nor did I approach the analysis with any ideological agenda.

As a researcher, I have pieced together the story based on hundreds of documents, U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) reports and interviews. I have been studying Eastern Europe as the centerpiece of my professional work for more than twenty years. As an anthropologist, I am especially aware that people I interview don't always tell the truth—and not only Eastern Europeans. I always cross check critical information and confirm key points with multiple sources.

Åslund and Sachs make a number of specific allegations. The facts are as follows:

• Regardless of the percentage of U.S. assistance to Russia flowing directly to the Harvard Institute for International Development, the U.S. government delegated virtually its entire Russian economic aid portfolio—more than $350 million—for management by HIID. Part of this was used to design, implement and promote the disastrous voucher privatization program. In a 1996 report, the GAO found that HIID had "substantial control of the U.S. assistance program." The advisers were also influential under other guises. Project documents submitted by Jeffrey D. Sachs and Associates, Inc. to the Finnish government state: "The [Sachs] team has had an extensive interaction with the [Russian] State Committee on Privatization and has helped in the design of the mass privatization program legislation recently enacted by Parliament."

• Åslund, as I state in the article, *has* been involved in business activities in countries while consulting with their governments. He says he was an adviser to the Russian government beginning in the early 1990s. He continued to advocate on behalf of that government throughout the decade, during which he was also linked to Brunswick. Brunswick began as a Moscow-based brokerage firm and evolved into an investment bank, the Brunswick Group. While Åslund claims that he only gives "lectures and briefings", he attended an April 1997 banking conference in New York sponsored by Brunswick Securities Ltd. *as a representative of Brunswick.* He promoted the Russian stock market to institutional investors and money managers, according to Michael Hudson, who also participated in the conference. Hudson adds that the minimum acceptable investment was between $400,000 and $500,000. As to the significance of Åslund's business ventures in Russia, it was the head of the Interior Ministry's Department of Organized Crime that characterized Åslund's investments in Russia as "significant."

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• Åslund appears not to understand that the problem of conflict of interest is no less real where an expert works in serial for conflicting interests rather than at the same time. The American investment bankers he refers to could well end up in jail if they were to use their Treasury Department contacts in violation of conflict-of-interest and revolving door laws and rules that limit the free use of connections. Thus, Åslund sees no problem that the two close associates whom he introduced to privatization minister Chubais, and who helped to design and implement voucher privatization, then started Brunswick Brokerage to help sell vouchers and other assets to Western investors. But there is a problem.

• Nowhere in my article do I say that Sachs has investment activities in Russia.

• Sachs makes much of the distance between his project and that of his Harvard colleague, Andrei Shleifer, who continues to be under investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice. However, Sachs, Lipton *and Shleifer* are listed as the "three senior members" of the Russia advisory project conducted by Jeffrey D. Sachs and Associates, Inc. As I state in the article: "In time, Sachs and Shleifer emerged as rivals and ran largely separate operations in Moscow." However, "they shared the transactorship mode of operating and many contacts in the Chubais Clan", as well as many Western contacts.

• I have never written that Åslund worked for HIID directly. In my book, *Collision and Collusion*, I did point out that Åslund collaborated with Sachs on HIID's unsolicited proposal to advise Ukraine, the details of which are specified in the 1996 GAO report mentioned earlier. I have never said that he has made a huge amount of money on USAID. However, the grants that Sachs and Åslund received from several sources were substantial. Åslund's advisory project was awarded $642,857 in 1991–92 from the Swedish government. Sachs received $322,728 in salary and fees (not including expenses) for a WIDER Institute-sponsored project billed to Jeffrey D. Sachs and Associates, Inc. The project, the total cost of which was $2,036,122, was funded by the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Sasakawa Foundation.

• Not only do I *not* claim that Åslund was officially on the payroll of the U.S., Swedish and Russian governments simultaneously, but I wrote that he was a "private" citizen who nevertheless "participated in high-level meetings at the U.S. Treasury and State Departments about U.S. and IMF policies." In addition, he "played a leading role in Swedish policy and aid toward Russia" and "was understood by some Russian officials in Washington to be Chubais' personal envoy." (For example, Åslund was highly influential with Sweden's Prime Minister Carl Bildt, who promoted him in Washington and included him in a high-level official delegation to the White House.) I report that Åslund *seemed to speak on behalf of* these governments.

• Åslund suggests that there is nothing wrong with serving as an adviser to a country while presenting himself as a disinterested observer. He denies that his role in Ukraine included public relations. Åslund's team member, Marek Dabrowski, is not my only source on the matter. In my interview with Dabrowski of November 27, 1997, he stated that Åslund's "kind of advertising" and "campaigning" creates a "conflict of interest." Contrary to what Dabrowski now alleges, my conversations with him were friendly and, indeed, *on the record*. I have cited Dabrowski as a source before in print on this subject, and he has never previously disputed its accuracy. I do not know why he has responded now with such a personal attack, but it is a fact that Dabrowski's center has received substantial funding from USAID (and much USAID

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economic assistance passed through HIID). Both Sachs and Åslund are also listed as members of the advisory council of Dabrowski's center.

• Åslund claims that in writing articles he "always mentioned" his work for the Russian or Ukrainian government. That is simply not the case. For example, in his article "Russia's Success Story" in *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 1994), Åslund presents himself as a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment and makes no mention of any relationship with the Russian government.

• Åslund characterizes my work as "repeatedly citing the old-style Soviet communist Leonid Abalkin." But I did not cite Abalkin at all in my article and he is cited but *twice* in my book, *Collision and Collusion*, among some 1,750 interviews.

• Finally, Åslund raises a series of irrelevant and diversionary points. He denies being somewhere—Arkhangelskoe—where I never said he had gone. If he is implying that he was not involved when the Gaidar team prepared its program, then that is contradicted by his own writing (see, for example, his book *How Russia Became a Market Economy*, p. 2). In a similar vein, the order in which Kokh and Boycko chaired the Russian Privatization Center is wholly irrelevant to the issue of their corruption. It was the deputy head of the Gaidar Institute, Dr. Alexei V. Ulyukaev, who said, in a taped interview with Anne Williamson, that "Sachs was never an *official* adviser to the government, that's his own illusion" [my emphasis]. Sachs and David Lipton had a close working relationship, as evidenced in numerous joint publications and in Lipton's position as vice president of Sachs' consulting firm. However, it was a Russian representative at the IMF who said that "Jeff and David always came [to Russia] together", a point that others have made as well.

As to Sachs/Åslund's more general comments, former World Bank Chief Economist Joseph Stiglitz is among a growing number of economists who believe that the policies that Sachs and Åslund advocated were misconceived and harmful to Russia and to most of the other post-communist countries. Russia didn't "stumble", as Åslund characterizes it; it was inundated with counterproductive advice from people like himself.

With regard to Poland, although its economy has grown, this success was achieved not by following a radical transition program, but, as Harvard Professor Marshall Goldman has shown, by rejecting key parts of it. Further, high-level corruption has become so institutionalized that the World Bank has urged Poland to begin fighting it. I have not accused Sachs, as Åslund writes, of "having destroyed the Polish economy." On the contrary, I have pointed out that Sachs' role in the Polish transition was largely promotional, a point confirmed by the Polish government in the *Financial Times* (June 15–16, 1991).

Finally, Åslund manages to cite the only negative review (that I know of) to try to discredit my work. In fact, *Collision and Collusion* has been widely reviewed in places such as the *Wall Street Journal*, the *Washington Post* and *Foreign Affairs*, and the reviews have been overwhelmingly positive. Former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote of the book: "Very critical and troubling analysis of the shortcomings of Western aid policy, particularly to Russia. The implications of Wedel's critical assessment need to be seriously taken into account." The other letters printed above share that view, and I thank their authors for their support. □

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Books

Attraction and Chastisement

Max Boot

Brian McAllister Linn, *The Philippine War, 1899-1902* (Lawrence, KA: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 427 pp., $39.95.

PRESIDENT Bush famously claimed to have buried the "Vietnam Syndrome" in the sands of Arabia. But, for a corpse, it is still showing plenty of signs of life. When Congress was debating an aid package for Colombia earlier this year, the specter of another you-know-what was once again invoked. Vietnam came up, too, when the NATO commander in Kosovo requested American reinforcements to help police Mitrovica and other trouble spots; the Pentagon blocked the request, in part because the generals apparently wished to avoid another "quagmire."

It is far from clear exactly what the "lessons" of Vietnam are supposed to be, but the general view (and, more important, the generals' view) seems to be that the United States should stay out of conflicts where it does not intend to use overwhelming force and where it lacks a clearly defined "exit strategy." This view, which was formally promulgated in the Weinberger/Powell Doctrine, implies that the United States should not become entangled in peacekeeping missions of uncertain duration. Such operations, after all, might involve combat against *guerrillas*, a term that has assumed an almost mystical connotation in the wake of America's withdrawal from Vietnam.

In countering this impression, it helps, but does not suffice, to point out that Saigon fell not to the pajama-clad Viet Cong (most of whom had been wiped out in the Tet Offensive), but to the tanks of the regular North Vietnamese army. The U.S. defeat can still be ascribed in some degree to the efforts of the Viet Cong because they kept the conflict going long enough to break the American will to win—the most that any guerrilla force could hope to accomplish. Still, Vietnam raises more questions than it answers. Was the war in Indochina an anomaly? Was it a conventional war or a guerrilla war? And if it was the latter, are American soldiers really incapable of defeating guerrillas in the field?

To answer these questions, we would do well to cast a glance backward, before a place called Vietnam even existed. We might be tempted to begin with

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the Indian Wars, the U.S. Army's most prolonged combat against irregulars. But as General William Tecumseh Sherman acknowledged in 1883, his army's victory over the Indians derived less from martial prowess than from "immigration and the occupation by industrious farmers and miners of lands vacated by the aborigines." A more reliable test case is to be found in the Philippine War, which formally lasted from 1899 to 1902 but in reality dragged on for several more years as a series of police actions.

Though the Korean War is called the "forgotten war", it is well remembered in comparison to what was once known as the Philippine Uprising. Oddly enough, even the Spanish-American War, which begot the conflict in the Philippines, is much better remembered, in spite of the fact that it involved fewer combatants, fewer casualties and considerably less time. No doubt this is because the Spanish-American War is widely thought to have heralded America's rise to world power, whereas, in the view of most historians, the Philippine War was a blind alley—a short-lived U.S. foray into colonialism.

When the Philippine War *is* remembered, it is typically for the purpose of denouncing the United States as an imperialist power. Here, after all, was another U.S. war fought in the jungles of Asia that generated considerable opposition at home and charges of atrocities committed by U.S. troops. (By their own count, U.S. forces claimed to have killed 16,000 Filipinos in battle, four times the U.S. casualties.) New Left histories, such as Stuart Miller's *Benevolent Assimilation* and Leon Wolff's *Little Brown Brother*, depict the U.S. war effort in the Philippines in a distinctly grim light. In their telling, the war is reduced to a simple tale of racist U.S. soldiers torturing, killing and raping Filipinos. Such works aim to prove that My Lai was no aberration—that this is how U.S. soldiers usually behave, or at least how they usually behave when fighting non-Westerners.

BRIAN McAllister Linn, a history professor at Texas A&M University who has been studying the Philippine War for two decades, offers a welcome alternative to this tendentious catalogue. Whereas the New Left writers focus almost exclusively on alleged U.S. atrocities and public opinion in America, Linn recounts what actually happened on the battlefield. What he reveals is one of the most successful counterinsurgency campaigns of modern times (rivaled among Western powers only by the British in post-World War II Malaya).

True, the U.S. victory can be credited in some measure to mistakes by the enemy. Emilio Aguinaldo, the first president of the Philippine Republic, was no Ho Chi Minh—and Antonio Luna, his top general, was no Vo Nguyen Giap. Aguinaldo committed the fatal error of trying to engage the U.S. Army in a conventional war. His forces were mauled during a series of battles in 1899 that began just outside Manila in February and finished in northern Luzon ten months later. Thereafter, Aguinaldo resorted to guerrilla warfare, but his government, dominated as it was by *ilustrados* (wealthy landowners), never succeeded in rallying the Filipino people to its cause.

Still, the eventual U.S. triumph was hardly foreordained. There were never more than 70,000 U.S. troops in the islands, and an average of only 24,000 men in the field, facing at least 80,000 insurgents. (By way of comparison, in the first Chechen war of 1994–95, the Russians had a 3 to 1 manpower advantage and still managed to lose.) The American technological advantage was not great—in the beginning of the war, most U.S. troops were armed with Civil War-vintage Springfield rifles that were

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inferior to the rebels' Mausers (eventually, all U.S. regiments received more modern Krag-Jorgenson rifles). The United States could bring to bear superior firepower from artillery and navy gunboats, but even in the war's early days these advantages were to some extent obviated by the difficult jungle and mountain terrain; later on, heavy weaponry proved almost entirely irrelevant to combating the elusive guerrillas. Moreover, while the *insurrectos* were acclimated to local conditions, foul weather and disease ravaged U.S. ranks. Finally, the rebels, with informers in every *barrio*, possessed better intelligence about the U.S. Army than the army had about them.

Ultimately the army pacified the islands using a two-pronged approach—what has been dubbed "attraction" and "chastisement." The policy of attraction—renamed "hearts and minds" in Vietnam—has been slighted by New Left historians, but it contributed significantly to the U.S. victory. The army ran schools, hospitals, sanitation programs and other charitable works. The colonial administration also granted generous terms to rebels who surrendered, and held out the promise of eventual independence for the islands. Eventually, more and more Filipinos tired of the war and concluded that American rule was in fact preferable to the "dons" who had come before, and perhaps even to Aguinaldo's oligarchy.

It is the policy of chastisement that has drawn unwelcome attention to the U.S. war effort, both in the early 1900s and in the years since. The American press avidly reported tales—some confirmed, some not—of U.S. soldiers shooting prisoners, burning down towns, gathering up natives in "reconcentration" camps and administering the "water cure" (restraining a suspect and forcing water down his throat) to gain information. This led to Mark Twain's mordant suggestion (not mentioned by Linn) that Old Glory be redesigned, with "the white

Baldwin H. Ward/CORBIS-Bettmann

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stripes painted black and the stars replaced by the skull and crossbones."

Many of these abuses did occur, but Linn puts them into proper perspective. He notes that isolated garrisons in the *boondocks* (a Tagalog word) had to operate against an unseen enemy who would kill or mutilate their buddies one day and be smiling "amigos" the next. It is hardly surprising that in such trying circumstances soldiers did not always heed Marquess of Queensbury rules. Then, too, it is not entirely fair to judge the actions of turn-of-the-century soldiers through a lens of contemporary norms. This was a more brutal time, when police departments in America routinely used the "third degree" to elicit confessions and U.S. soldiers themselves were subject to harsh hazing and physical punishment that would not be tolerated today. Indeed, by the standards of the day, the conduct of U.S. soldiers was probably better than average for colonial wars—certainly nothing the Americans did rivaled the depredations of the Belgians in the Congo. What Linn does not point out, but could have, is that U.S. forces probably killed more civilians in one night of bombing Dresden than in all of the Philippine War.

This is easy to overlook because most histories of the war concentrate on only a few of its more brutal episodes; for instance, General J. Franklin Bell herding thousands of residents of Batangas province into "reconcentration" zones where many died of disease. Linn widens this focus to look at what was happening outside the main island of Luzon, the heartland of the Tagalogs and hence of resistance to the occupation. He notes that in half the archipelago's provinces there was no fighting at all. Many of the minority ethnic groups were resentful of Aguinaldo's Tagalog-dominated government and were more than ready to cooperate with the occupiers. Thousands of local men even signed up to fight alongside the Americans in battalions such as the Macabebe Scouts, a unit renowned for its courage and ferocity (and which is today denounced as collaborationist by patriotic Filipino historians).

IN THE END, the success of the U.S. counterinsurgency effort owed not to atrocities committed but to the attention paid to the rudiments of counterinsurgency strategy. Unlike in Vietnam, the army did not squander its resources on fruitless search and destroy missions; rather, it concentrated on cutting off the guerrillas from civilian assistance by garrisoning the countryside. Even more important, U.S. forces interdicted the guerrillas' lines of supply. Linn credits the navy with an often overlooked role in blockading the Philippines, which "not only prevented foreign arms shipments but also effectively ended inter-island trade", making it difficult for Aguinaldo to raise money and move reinforcements. Geography also played a key role: in the Philippine Islands, there were no sanctuaries and no Ho Chi Minh trails to keep the guerrillas in business.

Even with the *insurrectos* cut off from outside support, it nevertheless took a long time to bring the insurgency to an end. Optimistic estimates that the archipelago would be pacified in 1899 were not borne out; neither were similar predictions in 1900 and 1901. Just when the army thought it had the situation under control, some fresh setback would occur to remind Americans that victory was not around the corner—the most notable disaster being the massacre of forty-six men from Company C, Ninth Infantry, at Balangiga on the island of Samar on September 28, 1901. Even after President Roosevelt declared the war over on July 4, 1902, resistance continued for years on outlying islands among the Muslim Moros. (In fact, Moro resistance to rule from Manila has never really ended; even

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today, Moros battle the Philippine Army.)

Presumably, if the War Department had been in the grip of the Weinberger/Powell Doctrine in the early 1900s, it would have thrown up its hands in despair. But the generals of that day had a more realistic, or at any rate more resigned, attitude. They realized that only police work could ultimately produce lasting victory. That is true not only in the Philippines but in most wars. When American forces withdraw immediately after winning a battle, as they did in the Gulf War, very little is left decided. As Michael Howard has argued, only long-term occupation can transform battlefield victory into more than a temporary armistice. The U.S. Army applied this insight in the post-1865 South and post-1945 Germany and Japan, but seems loath to apply it today in places like Kosovo. To be sure, the stakes are considerably smaller there, but so is the U.S. commitment.

The Philippine experience is worth recalling because in the post-Cold War era the United States is once again undertaking imperial policing. It is doubtful that any conflict we fight will be as prolonged or bloody as the Philippine War, but the experience of 1899–1902 ought to teach us that guerrillas should not be feared unduly. They can be defeated by a regular army—so long as it abjures a conventional military mindset.

Counterinsurgency requires a police department, not a war department, mentality. This in turn means demonstrating greater patience than is typical of our instant gratification culture. No one expects the New York Police Department to declare victory tomorrow in the war against crime and go home. Likewise, we should not expect that our mission in the Balkans will be completed anytime soon. In real life, few military commitments offer easy "exit strategies." But that does not mean we will find ourselves trapped in a "quagmire" or headed for "another Vietnam." It simply means that for military professionals there remains a hard, wearying, inglorious job ahead. □

Max Boot, op-ed editor of the *Wall Street Journal*, is writing a history of America's small wars.

The View From the Margins

Peter Hitchens

Norman Davies, *The Isles* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 1200 pp., $45.

FUTURE historians of Europe will marvel at the speed of Britain's disintegration in the sixty years that followed its finest hour in 1940. They may well conclude that this disintegration was the price paid for that brief, astonishing moment when one country, bankrupt and all but beaten, still held the pass against the combined powers of tyranny. Today, few, especially in the United States, realize that a great nation has already ceased to exist, and that its fragments are about to be rearranged in an utterly different form. However, in England, Wales, Scotland and Ireland the first shock of dissolution has already passed, and the writing of epitaphs, obituaries and eulogies of the

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departed nation has become a flourishing industry.

Norman Davies, author of a powerful account of Poland's past and of an original, energetic and encyclopedic history of Europe, has produced a timely and cunning reworking of what British people rather sentimentally used to call Our Island Story. The key to his approach is found in the title itself, which flatly refuses to use the standard term for the group of damp, green, cramped islands off the French coast. Davies accurately points out that large parts of this archipelago are not now British at all, that they were only united under one crown for a brief 120 years, and that the process of disintegration is likely to accelerate in the near future. Correct as it may be, this attitude is calculated and probably mischievously intended to annoy traditionalists and even many who did not think of themselves as traditionalists, who will say that he is quibbling and pedantic—while wondering whether he is right.

MOST OF US do not learn history as we do mathematics or foreign languages, dispassionately and logically. The knowledge comes to us at a tender time of life when we are not very willing to see both sides of a question or to find fault with our own culture. It is the lore of our tribe, a series of stories that are sometimes uplifting, sometimes filled with warnings, but which combine to give us a picture of the culture from which we believe we have emerged and which we expect to serve in our own lives and continue for our children. Without some sort of grasp of national history—which includes a certain amount of pride, a fair number of honorable victories or even more honorable defeats, the regular triumph of good and the recovery of lost domains and fortunes—it would be difficult to accomplish Edmund Burke's idea of civilization being based on a permanent, self-renewing pact between the dead, the living and the unborn. We need to revere our ancestors. We treasure our national myths while we are children, and even as adults we do not like to see them dissected or exposed to the hard, cold light of scientific research. This is why the discoveries of researchers—who tell us that Parson Weems made up the story of Washington and the Cherry Tree or that Joan of Arc did not save France—are so often greeted with groans of annoyance and disbelief.

Davies willfully sets out to produce such groans. He pointedly gives supposedly English kings their French names, on the reasonable grounds that this is what they would have called themselves, since they were French and could not speak English. He undermines favorite stories about King Richard the Lionheart, Magna Carta, and Shakespeare's hugely unfair portrait of the Scottish King Macbeth.

He begins British history at an imagined point where the national territory did not even exist, and was not yet separated by water from the European continent. He delves, for many pages, in the great unknown times before the Romans and the many other invaders arrived on what many readers will still defiantly call British soil. He repeatedly challenges the conventional understanding of events, correctly pointing out that the Roman occupation left very little trace of itself, that Scotland can prove a longer and more continuous royal line than England, and suggesting, rather less convincingly, that Ireland had a historical existence as a united nation of sorts long before England came to be. This is a frustrating period for a historian because the few known facts are surrounded by a fog of myth, reinforced or further confused by sagas, interminable songs of war and loss, and picturesque legends.

When Davies reaches the edges of the known world, his history, while generally

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conventional, differs from its forerunners partly in suggesting that the English Parliament is not as unique as it likes to think, partly in stressing the continental links that bound England to Europe until the Reformation, but mainly by giving far greater attention and prominence to the three minor nations that occupy the British Isles. As in Davies' *Europe*, the different approach is productive and refreshing. Old and seemingly well-known stories, seen from his new perspective, are enriched and enlivened. It is important to understand that England's story would sound very different had it been written by the defeated factions and parties of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, who were so very nearly the winners. But is his emphasis justified?

THE PARADOX of the lesser British nations is that they owe their importance and influence in the world to their English neighbors, oppressors, sometime conquerors and overlords. To call them minor or lesser is to state a fact, rather than to belittle or denigrate them. England has always been by far the largest and richest of the British nations, a position that was emphasized and strengthened by the agricultural and industrial revolutions and the population growth that followed them. The relationship between the four nations has not, however, been a simple one of conqueror and conquered as it might have been elsewhere in Europe. Britain's island security allowed a rather different, more complicated relationship to develop.

Ireland's position is the strangest of all. Her greatest writers and poets have obtained global fame for works written in English, supposedly the language of the colonial oppressor, though in fact much enriched and strengthened by Irish influence. Ireland's vast diaspora, with its giant political impact on North America and Australasia, is a sort of dark reflection of the British Empire. Irish exiles would eventually help to bring down that Empire through their political power in the United States, and even now their influence is felt. Irish America contributed greatly to the events that led to that recent and astonishing British surrender to Irish Republican terrorism known as the "Northern Ireland Peace Process."

Scotland was never permanently defeated by English arms, and it changed English history by providing Scottish kings to sit on England's throne. Its own failed attempt to become a colonial power in Central America finally destroyed its independence from England. Davies gives an excellent account of the Scottish expedition to Darien, on the Isthmus of Panama, in 1698. This ambitious enterprise might have been the beginnings of a Scottish empire, dominating trade between Europe and Asia through its strategic position. Mishaps, disease, downpours and the objections of the armed Spanish neighbors quickly reduced the scheme to bloody farce, before extinguishing it altogether. England, already comfortably established in the Caribbean, stood by and, to put it kindly, did nothing to help the doomed colonists.

The bitter failure greatly influenced the decision of Scotland's elite to agree to union with England eight years later. Scotland thus became England's enthusiastic and successful partner in the spreading and exploitation of the Pax Britannica. Poor Wales, conquered and absorbed long before the others, has played a quieter role, but Welsh influence over the English language, culture, politics and religion has been lasting and powerful, and has gone everywhere that Britain has gone.

Yet these truths do not comfort Scottish, Welsh or Irish nationalists. In a way, they double the humiliation they feel they have suffered. It is a wicked thing to be deprived of nationhood, and a worse

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one when outsiders often cannot distinguish you from your oppressors. How infuriating it must be for Gerry Adams of Sinn Fein to acknowledge that the English language, which he speaks much better than he speaks Irish, is one of his most powerful weapons against England. Sometimes this resentment is trivial, like the annoyance of Canadians mistaken for U.S. citizens. Sometimes it is bitter and hard, more like the impotent fury of Poles, Lithuanians or Ukrainians confused with their Russian masters in the days of the czarist or Soviet empires.

For much of the past two centuries, most British people and historians have taken such resentment as trivial, and with good reason. The modern relationship between England and its island neighbors has been remarkably civilized by European or world standards. England never tried—perhaps mistakenly—to abolish or absorb Scotland's separate legal system, so that it became one of the few existing bodies of law without a parliament to revise it. The United Kingdom also came to value Scotland's military skills, its culture and its advanced education system. Without much of a stretch Scotland could even be said to have made a reverse takeover of England. Scots are heavily over-represented in the armed forces, the medical profession and many other fields, and are especially dominant in politics—most of the highest offices in the current British government, for example, are held by Scotsmen. The excesses and stupidities of English rule in Ireland, though sometimes exaggerated by propagandists, are now a matter of regret for civilized English people, and far too little credit is given to Britain for the successful, neighborly relations achieved after Irish independence. Irish citizens are free to live and vote in Britain, and can travel unhindered in and out of British territory without passports, an almost unique arrangement.

Northern Ireland, for decades a political slum in which one ethnic group was allowed to dominate another, has been transformed during thirty years of direct rule from London, so that discrimination in employment, housing and other fields has been largely abolished, though this truth seems to be almost completely unknown in the United States. It is quite bizarre that the "Peace Process" mentioned above now intends to throw this success away, quite possibly replacing it with the eventual absorption of a resentful Protestant, British-oriented minority into an all-Ireland republic, a recipe for further discontent and violence.

A FEW years ago, this would have been conventional wisdom, and Davies' view from the edges would have been dismissed as eccentric. However, a quite unexpected development has transformed the British peoples' views of themselves. British unity was preserved, like a mummified Pharaoh in an airless tomb, by the Cold War. The British-American alliance, Britain's position in Europe, and its standing as a great power were artificially prolonged by the struggle with the USSR. Yet while the external appearance remained unchanged, the internal realities were in turmoil. During the forty years between the Berlin airlift and the fall of the Berlin Wall, Britain changed within in a thousand ways. Religion, morality, class distinction, education, geography, broadcasting, the shape of the economy and the nature of employment—all were utterly transformed. Deference and patriotism disappeared among younger citizens. Yet the outward appearance of things remained roughly the same, as did the institutions.

Then the seals of the chamber were broken, the cold air rushed in, and the perfectly preserved, forty year-old attitudes and institutions crumbled to dust. Mikhail Gorbachev's spokesman, Gennady

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Gerasimov, spoke truer than he knew when he said in the early 1990s that, "We have done a terrible thing to you. We have deprived you of an enemy." This was much truer for Britain than for any other country, and the UK's almost frantic involvements in the Gulf War and the Balkans are best understood as attempts to rebuild the old NATO relationship with Washington on a new, more global footing. It hasn't really worked.

More important for Britain and for Margaret Thatcher, much of whose prestige rested on her close American links and her revival of moribund patriotism, the year 1989 completely changed the European balance of power. Germany, more rapidly than anyone could have imagined, became one nation again, not quite "from the Maas to the Memel", as the now banned verses of its national anthem claim, but still sprawling mightily across the Continent, with its economic power spreading well beyond its borders. A worried France, still hag-ridden by Sedan, Verdun and Vichy, sought to contain and control this reborn monster by binding it into a multinational system intended to remove the source of Franco-German conflict forever. Out of this came the Franco-German desire for a rapid integration of the European Union, an integration that Margaret Thatcher mistrusted on the old British grounds that no one power should dominate the Continent, but which many in her party supported because they had lost confidence in the British nation-state.

European integration was seen in France as a profoundly anti-American project, whose aims included the reduction of U.S. power and influence in Europe, and a challenge to the pre-eminence of the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency. The effects on Britain were an unintentional by-product of something much larger, but no less earthshaking for that. England's weakness or danger has always been Ireland's opportunity, and the shift in relations with both Europe and the United States has led to the largely unacknowledged defeat of English power in Ireland after eight hundred years, not by military force but by the ingenious diplomacy of Dublin and of Sinn Fein, the political mouthpiece of the "Irish Republican Army."

The disappearance of an external enemy has, especially in Scotland, obliterated Britishness and the belief in a united Britain, already threatened by a sweeping cultural revolution in all areas of life. Nationalists in Scotland, and even in Wales, have recognized the opportunity that European federalism gives them, to break the bonds with London and pay allegiance directly to the new Euro-capitals of Brussels and Frankfurt. Tony Blair's creation of devolved assemblies, which he claimed was meant to strengthen the United Kingdom, has actually hurried the departure of Scotland and Wales from the UK. They already exist as administrative "regions" of the new Europe—while England, far too large to be fed into the Euro-blender in one piece, has been divided into several such regions, whose inhabitants mostly do not yet know that they exist or what they are called.

Davies seemed a little shy when British supporters of the European Union adopted his book as one of their texts, which several of them hurried to do. It is certainly nothing like as hostile to the current British state as Linda Colley's deconstruction of Britain in her 1992 volume, *Britons*, nor is Davies much of an enthusiast for the wobbly euro, which many otherwise keen federalists see as far less urgent than the eastward expansion and reform of the EU. Yet this book does give powerful support to the idea that Britain was a temporary country, formed by empire and fatally undermined by the end of that empire. It also hints at a belief that Britain *ought* not to continue to exist.

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It is, for instance, harshly dismissive of the embattled Protestants of Northern Ireland, the most self-consciously British people in the Isles. It is disappointingly modish on the subject of the British House of Lords, speaking of the "running sore of continuing hereditary privilege", as if there were no respectable arguments in favor of a revising chamber that was independent of the executive, and which embodied the principle of inheritance that is central to private property and therefore to liberty. It predicts, with a certain amount of Jacobin relish, the approaching abolition and humiliation of the monarchy—again without any consideration for the dangers involved in such a step for a finely balanced constitution.

But it is in its attitude toward the relationship with Federal Europe that *The Isles* justifies its long and unsettling rearrangement of the national past. Davies, in an open statement of his own views, writes, "Perhaps the main source of optimism lies in the existence of the European Union. . . . Under the umbrella of the European Union, a 'Scotland-in-Europe', a 'Wales-in-Europe' and an 'England-in-Europe' have every chance of doing as well as an 'Ireland-in-Europe.'" This is doubtful, not least because the huge EU subsidies given to Ireland are unlikely to be extended to anyone else, and also because the EU's plans for a "Europe of the Regions" do not acknowledge the continued existence of England as an entity.

Davies also insists that there is some sort of balancing act, in which Britain has to choose between fealty to the EU or to the United States. But why? As the fourth-largest economy in the world, a significant military and diplomatic power with a tried and successful system of government, and astonishing global economic connections, Britain could maintain good relations with other powers and blocs without having to make some sort of ideological choice—though it would certainly be wise to reject the EU's centralized, overtaxed and over-regulated economic model if it wishes to maintain its prosperity. But the supposed "choice" is a false equivalence of opposites. The United States does not demand political sovereignty as the price of trade, nor does it dream of merging the pound sterling with the dollar, or of "harmonizing" British and American taxes, or of imposing its legal system on the UK. The EU requires all these things as the price of continued membership, and makes no secret of its desire to develop political and legal institutions that would obliterate the serious sovereign differences between nations for good. Two successful European nations—Switzerland and Norway—remain happily outside the EU, while trading and maintaining good diplomatic relations with it. Britain could easily do the same, if it so chose.

Yet under the Blair government, anxious for its own obscure reasons to intensify engagement with the EU, the break-up and gradual obliteration of Britain are well advanced. So much so that a European Atlas of the not-too-distant future may well fulfill Mr. Davies' predictions, and show these once famous islands, balkanized into provinces and regions, as nothing more than nameless offshore possessions of a new and dreary empire. □

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An Ambiguous Legacy

Gabriel Schoenfeld

Leon Aron, *Yeltsin: A Revolutionary Life* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 934 pp., $35.

HAS ANY peacetime political leader ever brought his country as low as Boris Yeltsin brought Russia, a former superpower turned into a mendicant? The old Soviet economy may have been creaking noticeably, but it hardly compares to the shambles that is the Russian marketplace today. Whereas the militia and the KGB formerly kept order in the streets (and everywhere else), there is now soaring crime and ubiquitous corruption. The army, once feared around the world, can no longer even put down minor insurrections within Russia's reduced frontiers. The communist leaders of the old USSR had their grave flaws, but at least they behaved with a measure of decorum. They did not appear in public intoxicated, as Yeltsin did during a state visit to Germany in 1994, snatching the baton from the conductor of the Berlin Police Orchestra and attempting to lead the musicians, embarrassing himself and his country before the world.

From the public record of his deeds, it is easy enough to frame a searing indictment of Boris Yeltsin. Indeed, by the time he stepped down this past December, the Russian president was widely despised in his own land and, in the sharpest possible contrast to the last leader of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, had few if any admirers abroad. Yet, while the critics have ample ammunition to fire at Boris Yeltsin, there is, as we see from Leon Aron's richly researched and highly readable biography, another side to their target. The story of the Russian leader's "revolutionary life" is far more complicated, and his achievements far more significant, than his critics both within Russia and abroad acknowledge.

Boris Yeltsin was born into typical Russian misery in the village of Butka in the Ural Mountains in 1931. From an early age he emerges in Aron's pages as a frequent risk-taker, intermittent troublemaker and somewhat erratic leader. While still a schoolboy, he guided a gang of friends into an arms depot to steal some hand grenades that he then attempted to disassemble with a hammer. To this day, he conceals his injury—two fingers are missing—by means of strategic placement of his left hand.

As he entered adulthood, Yeltsin's most distinctive trait was an extraordinary dedication to his work in his chosen field, construction. In a universe of sloth, thievery and alcoholism, he stood out as a relentlessly hard-driving manager who gave neither his subordinates nor himself a respite. His Stakhanovite devotion insured a quick rise up the rungs of the only serious career ladder around, the Communist Party. Unusual for anyone in those hard-pressed years, he shunned the advantages afforded the privileged class from the start. In Aron's portrait, he comes across as an example of a rare but not entirely unknown species: an honest communist, a man of integrity like Gorbachev, but, unlike Gorbachev, far more earthy and practical and not so deeply in the grip of communism's ideological inanities.

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This is not to suggest that Yeltsin in his early years was in any way a heretic. After he became head of the Sverdlovsk party apparatus in 1976, his speeches were as fawning toward the "deep and profound" Leonid Brezhnev as those of any other communist apparatchik. What was distinctive about him beyond his zeal for toil was a proclivity for what Aron calls "bain de foule"—bathing in the crowd. Unlike a good many of the officials running the workers' state, he was simply not afraid of the working class, and he would make his way around Sverdlovsk on overcrowded city buses, visit ordinary bare-shelved stores, and hold meetings with rank-and-file citizens in which he would give startlingly candid answers to questions from the floor. His reputation for conjoining efficiency with the popular touch was instrumental in securing him the successive promotions that took him from construction foreman to regional party chairman, and then, in 1985, to Moscow and membership in the ruling Politburo.

Gorbachev's decision to place Yeltsin in charge of the largest and most visible local Communist Party machine in the USSR was, in Aron's words, a "bold and shrewd gamble." In some ways it paid off—but not for Gorbachev himself, for whom it ended in humiliation and disaster. Arriving in Moscow just when things in the USSR were looking as if they could not get worse—three Soviet gerontocrats, Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko, had just died *seriatim* and the stresses on the system were mounting as never before—Yeltsin was to set in motion forces that were hardly expected or welcomed by the man who had brought him to the center of power.

Operating under Gorbachev's slogans of *perestroika* and *glasnost*, Yeltsin used his Moscow perch to declare war on the hidebound and highly recalcitrant local party apparatus. His vigorous attacks on the establishment's privileges gained him an appeal across the strata of the nominally classless Soviet society that rapidly outstripped Gorbachev's. In short order, the two men were locked in combat, with Yeltsin publicly chastising Gorbachev for launching an incipient "cult of personality", and Gorbachev lambasting Yeltsin for aberrant behavior and disloyalty. Whatever the merits of these competing charges, the emergence of a genuinely popular politician from within the Communist Party's ranks was an unprecedented development for the USSR. But Yeltsin's rise as an authentic leader coincided with so many other tectonic shifts that it was little appreciated in the West, particularly a West that was in the grip of a Gorbomania that the Russian populace never shared or grasped.

Indifference to Yeltsin's significance was certainly a pronounced feature of the Bush administration's hyper-cautious diplomacy in this period of revolutionary change. Its primary consequence was to leave the United States more or less on the sidelines in the midst of great events. As Aron recounts, on the occasion of Yeltsin's 1988 visit to the United States, Bush's national security team invited the Russian politician to the White House only to deliver a series of petty snubs, ushering him through a rear door away from the attention of the press, insisting that he wear a visitor tag ("I am Yeltsin", Yeltsin angrily declared as he thrust it aside), and refusing to arrange an official meeting with President Bush (who dropped in on Yeltsin's discussion with National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft only as a carefully prearranged "afterthought"). This rudeness was dictated in part by Scowcroft's assessment that Yeltsin was a "flake", and in even larger part by the administration's unbending drive to maintain strong ties with Gorbachev, to whom it clung uncomprehendingly even after his power had evanesced.

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Even if the main bet had to be on the man who was still in charge, Yeltsin was a horse on whom the Bush administration should have been placing money. When he began his assault on the party establishment in 1985, his outlook was radical for its time and place, but hardly as radical as it was to become. Like Gorbachev, he appears initially to have been convinced that the Soviet system could be repaired by shining a spotlight on corruption, malingering and privilege. But unlike Gorbachev, as he ran into a brick wall of resistance from conservative elements above and desperate bureaucratic infighters below, his essentially pragmatic disposition led him to jettison cherished dogmas with relative ease.

By 1988 he was no longer characterizing the Soviet system as "socialist" but rather as "state authoritarian" and "state bureaucratic", and he began openly to discuss the virtues of private ownership of capital and land. He also was unafraid to challenge the holy of Leninist holies: one-party rule. "To have free debates, and to avoid the cult of personality", Yeltsin told a student newspaper, "we must have two parties." By 1990 he had resigned from the Communist Party and won a free and democratic election to become chairman of the new Russian parliament.

Yeltsin's increasing radicalism coincided with Gorbachev's increasing conservatism, manifested in the latter's appointment to high office of the men who launched the abortive coup d'état against their own patron in the summer of 1991. This tragicomic episode, recounted by Aron in exceptionally vivid and gripping detail, discredited Gorbachev for good and sent the USSR into its death rattle. Yeltsin's courage in this crisis, and the resonance of his appeal to Russian soldiers not to follow the illegal orders of the coup plotters—"One can build a throne of bayonets but one cannot sit in it for long"—turned him into an immensely popular national hero. By the close of 1991, the Soviet system dissolved, Gorbachev was pushed aside, and power fell into the hands of Russia's first-ever democratically elected president.

IF YELTSIN gained glory on the way up to this mountaintop, he would encounter tragedy and disgrace on the way down. There was, of course, no roadmap for transforming a chaotic planned economy into a market one, and the transition had to be carried out in the midst of a staggering downward economic spiral. The remnants of the Communist Party, making use of freedoms they had themselves denied to others and increasingly showing a radically nationalist and anti-Semitic face, took every opportunity to paralyze the newly founded democratic state. The Russian republic, composed of peoples who had greatly suffered under the Soviet boot, itself began to splinter along ethnic lines. As Aron has little trouble demonstrating, Russia's problems in every sphere were so acute that no leader, no matter how wise and no matter how stalwart, could have successfully grappled with all of them at once. And Yeltsin, as Aron readily concedes in his generally admiring portrait, was not always wise or stalwart.

Certainly, his personal shortcomings, particularly visible in his last years of ill health but traceable throughout Aron's account, must be weighed in the balance. Drinking was one such shortcoming, but this was by no means the worst, both because it was greatly exaggerated by a hostile press and because Yeltsin had another far more consequential character defect. This was a tendency to lapse into melancholy and inactivity when not engaged in a fight. "In an urgent situation", as Yeltsin himself once explained, "I am, as a rule, strong. In ordinary ones, I can be lackadaisical."

But even this self-critical appraisal, along with all of Yeltsin's other real and

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imputed character flaws, must be placed in a context, and this is where Aron's biography truly excels. He shows that in condemning him as harshly as they have, Yeltsin's critics are suffering from amnesia with respect to the USSR's recent and not-so-recent past. If one considers the morass that was Russian society only a decade and a half ago under communist rule, not to mention the rivers of blood that were flowing there another five or so decades earlier, the Yeltsin era appears in a rather favorable light.

For one thing, Russia has held more than a half-dozen democratic elections since 1991, imperfections in the way they were conducted notwithstanding, and this year has witnessed the peaceful transfer of power to a newly elected official; this is no small accomplishment for what was not long ago a totalitarian regime. For another thing, Russia has a press that is freer and more vigorous (again, allowing for imperfections) than anything throughout its long history of dictatorship and oppression. Though an ugly and brutal war has been waged in Chechnya, the forecasts issued by more than a few observers a decade ago of widespread civil war and total disintegration have not come to pass. The cutting-edge army that once drained the coffers of the government has been pared and pared again; Russia, it can be said, is no longer a military-industrial state. Millions, it is unquestionably true, have been thrust into poverty by the transition to a market economy, and thousands upon thousands have been unduly enriched, but it is too easily forgotten that virtually the entire citizenry lived in poverty under the old regime, while a privileged elite governed every last detail of their life and squeezed every last breath out of society. Today Russians live in freedom, and their country, far behind but rich in resources and talent, has a chance.

In the end, Aron is quite persuasive when he argues that Yeltsin would have had to work "miracles" in order to transform Russia in the way that his foreign critics, and much of the Russian populace, seem to assume was possible. Russia under Yeltsin may not have done all that well, but in comparison to what it was and to the disasters that could have happened but did not, it has done well enough. That is Boris Yeltsin's ambiguous but by no means trivial legacy. □

Gabriel Schoenfeld is senior editor of *Commentary*.

Anthony Hartley

1925-2000

A good friend and a greatly valued colleague,
Tony was a contributing editor of this
magazine from 1992 until his death.

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Two Sides of the Same Coin

Joshua Muravchik

A. James Gregor, *The Faces of Janus: Marxism and Fascism in the Twentieth Century* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 240 pp., $30.

WHEN, in her famous article "Dictatorships and Double Standards", Jeane Kirkpatrick emphasized the distinction between totalitarianism and authoritarianism, she was accused of seeking to excuse the misdeeds of right-wing regimes. In fact, she was only invoking a taxonomy that had been widely employed in academia as recently as the 1950s and 1960s but had since fallen into disfavor. More precisely, it had been driven from general academic discourse on the grounds that it was too polemical. The concept "totalitarian", which grouped communist and fascist regimes in a single category, was said to be a Cold War throwback, gratuitously smearing the far Left with the discredit belonging to the far Right.

A. James Gregor, professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley, has now taken Kirkpatrick's point a step further. Not only can communism and fascism be twinned, he argues, but they are, for all intents and purposes, the same thing. In 1979 Gregor published *Young Mussolini and the Intellectual Origins of Fascism*. This masterful reconstruction of Mussolini's evolution from Marxist leader of Italian socialism to avatar of fascism evoked a response quite similar to the one that greeted Kirkpatrick's writing. "Gregor's admiration for Mussolini's coherent convictions and intellectual integrity" is "complete", raged Dennis Mack Smith in the *New York Review of Books*.

In truth, Gregor was no more an apologist for Mussolini than Kirkpatrick was for right-wing dictators. What Gregor had done was merely to show that Mussolini's fascist doctrine had evolved in a series of logical steps from his earlier Marxist convictions. To those for whom the term "Marxism" holds happy connotations, this may sound like praise of Mussolini, but that was scarcely what Gregor intended.

In his new book, Gregor approaches the same topic from the opposite direction, proposing to use "Mussolini's Fascism as a paradigmatic instance of what revolution in our time might be taken to mean." Why not, he asks the reader, look upon communism as a form of fascism?

To sustain this proposition, Gregor marshals a variety of evidence and argument. To begin with, he defines fascism as a creed possessing the following characteristics: a leadership principle; a hegemonic party; large-scale state intervention in the economy; extensive control over education, communication and social life; nationalism, chauvinism and aggressiveness; militarization of the economy; invocation of an ethic of obedience and sacrifice; the service of a national mission; and the restoration of lost territory as part of a comprehensive policy of return to national grandeur. Apply these hallmarks to the former USSR, the People's Republic of China, Vietnam, North Korea or Cuba, and the fit is almost perfect, except perhaps not all of these regimes invoked a glorious national past.

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WHERE did Gregor's definition come from? A bit wickedly, he reveals that he derived it from standard *Soviet* sources on fascism. Nor does his mischief end there. As a second buttress for his thesis, Gregor presents a lengthy exhumation of the diatribes exchanged when communists fell out among themselves. He shows that time and again they claimed that their erstwhile comrades had become "fascists." When the Sino-Soviet split occurred, "Soviet Marxists discerned elements of fascism in the political system that took shape under the ministrations of Mao Zedong, and Chinese Marxists saw fascism in the developments of the post-Stalinist Soviet Union." The Soviet publicist Fedor Burlatsky decried "Mao's cruelty . . . the cruelty of *fuehrerism*", while in the *Beijing Review*, Chang Chien described the USSR as a "fascist dictatorship" under the "signboard of socialism."

In still a third line of argument, Gregor returns to his earlier work on Mussolini, recalling that the theoretical emendation at the heart of *Il Duce*'s transition was the substitution of nation for class. "Like you", said Mussolini to the Bolsheviks, "we consider necessary a centralized and unitary state which imposes iron discipline on all persons, with this difference, that you reach this conclusion by way of the concept of class, and we by way of the concept of nation." Gregor points out that this substitution was neither unique nor original. An early exemplar, he says, was Moses Hess. Hess was a member of the young Marx's circle of Hegelians, who may have been the first to tutor Marx in the idea of socialism. Hess, though, eventually forsook socialism for Jewish nationalism, and became one of the earliest exponents of modern Zionism.

Subsequently, many other socialists came to appreciate the salience of national identity. Often the result was an admixture of patriotism in their ideology, despite Marx and Engels' insistence that "the working man has no country." Gregor shows that such "national socialist" thinkers plowed the ground for emerging fascist movements in countries such as Italy and France well before Hitler left his indelible imprimatur on the term.

While the distinction between class and nation as organizing principles was supposedly what rendered communism unlike fascism, Gregor says the distinction eroded within the communist world itself. He invokes, for example, the crumbling Soviet Union in the days of Gorbachev:

> With the increasing irrelevance of Marxism and Marxism-Leninism, 'Eurasianism', 'Russophilism', statism, elitism, irredentism, empire, and authoritarianism all became ideologically relevant again in the Soviet Union. Once again, as in the time before the Bolshevik revolution, intellectual journals were filled with discussions of authoritarianism, nationalism, and empire, of cosmic destiny, and of human will and human heroism. There were increasing appeals to the 'traditional Russian constants' of *narodnost*, *sobornost*, *dukhovnost*, and *derzhavnost*—conjuring up visions of the historic *Volk*, united in organic communion, undergoing transfiguration through conflict under the governance of a transformative 'magnificent State.'

This spirit found expression not merely in the voice of such fringe types as Vladimir Zhirinovsky, but in the view of the man who took over as chief of the Communist Party, Gennady Zyuganov. Gregor writes:

> Ziuganov has consistently argued that Stalin, at the close of the Second World War, was prepared to abandon traditional Marxism-Leninism and undertake a 'philosophical renewal' of the 'official ideology of the Soviet Union.' Stalin sought, according to Ziuganov, to 'create an effective "ideology of

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patriotism" . . . [as] a dependable philosophical basis for the . . . enormous Soviet State.' Love of the Motherland would substitute itself for 'class warfare', for all Russians would be fused in the fire of patriotism.

For the capstone to the argument about national socialism, Gregor turns his attention to communist China. Mussolini's fascist Marxism rested on the claim that Italy, undeveloped and downtrodden, was in some sense the "proletariat" of nations. Likewise, says Gregor, the Chinese communist revolution has been much more about national redemption than class struggle. Despite all the Marxist lingo, Chinese communist doctrine insists that the definition of a proletarian is anyone who adheres to "Mao Zedong thought." And with the advent of Deng Xiaoping's reforms, private enterprise now accounts for the bulk of the economy in communist China. With that change, says Gregor, "the distinctions between generic fascism and Chinese Marxism-Leninism have become increasingly threadbare."

ALL OF THIS is quite clever, but is it persuasive? Gregor's arguments are fresh and irreverent. His examples are widely drawn and ingeniously deployed. On many specific points he is telling, but on the overarching thesis, less so. The mutual denunciations among communists who call each other fascists are amusing to read, but they carry very little evidentiary weight since communists are often indifferent to the degree of truth of their own statements. To them, words are merely weapons: the term "fascist" is an epithet that can be directed at the villain of the moment, whoever he might be. Thus, in the Comintern's radical "third period" (the late 1920s and early 1930s), social democrats were branded "social fascists", but when Hitler's menace to the USSR called forth a moderate era of "united fronts", they became allies and their fascist traits miraculously disappeared.

Gregor's thesis also flies in the face of chronology. Mussolini took power five years after Lenin. Lenin's system, moreover, spawned many duplicates, some imposed by the long arm of the Kremlin, others the product of domestic forces. Mussolini's system, by contrast, had few, if any, successful imitators. The regimes of Hitler, Franco and even Peron are frequently classified as "fascist", but many serious students see more differences than similarities among them. Given that communism came earlier and possessed a more consistent character, why choose fascism as the paradigm?

As the 1937 *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* entry on fascism, written during the system's heyday, put it: "It is difficult to isolate by abstract analysis the distinctive feature of Fascism." Gregor offers a list of defining characteristics drawn from Soviet sources, and elsewhere in the book he provides other lists. But the features are invariably drawn broadly. Mussolini's system was mostly improvised, and it rested on theoretical foundations that were meager compared to those of Marxism-Leninism. Lenin may have been an opportunist in tactics, but he elaborated a fairly clear doctrine, entailing state ownership and a vanguard party ruling in the name of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Moreover, many other states labeled themselves communist, providing at least one compelling basis by which we can identify communist systems. No state other than Italy ever called itself fascist.

Yet even if his thesis is not ultimately persuasive, Gregor's polemical thrust deserves applause. Those who sought to banish the term "totalitarian" from academic discourse were right that the term was morally freighted. But it was also illuminating. The similarities of communist, Nazi and fascist regimes could be described clearly, and so could the fea-

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tures that distinguished all of them from less intrusive kinds of dictatorship. Was it unfair to associate communism with Nazism? Perhaps. But no more unfair than associating fascism with Nazism. In truth, the objections to the term "totalitarian" rested on the assumption that only the right-wing versions carried an inherent moral stain.

The hypocrisy of those who insist on treating communism with scrupulous detachment but who rarely express the same delicacy toward fascism is what has apparently motivated Gregor to devise a model that allows him to illustrate what the two systems have in common and how they are historically connected. One need not accept the paradigm to see the great empirical and moral truth in this. □

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Nature's Pitchfork

Eric Jones

Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, *Environment, Scarcity, and Violence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 270 pp., $27.05.

YOU MAY thrust nature out with a pitchfork, so the tag from Horace goes, but she will quickly return. No doubt this was meant to apply to garden weeds but it equally accords with the study of international relations. There is a subtext to the social sciences, in which every so often an attempt is made to show that human affairs are in the grip of powerful natural agencies, or at least that they are strongly influenced by them. Thomas Homer-Dixon's *Environment, Scarcity, and Violence* follows in this vein. Homer-Dixon sets out to re-establish what he calls "nature-social" explanations of possible threats to national and international security. Although his thesis proves more nuanced than bald environmental determinism, the purpose of the volume is to trace various paths by which the natural world may give rise to intra- or inter-state conflict.

There is an obvious argument for "bringing nature back in" to the interpretation of world politics. Just as the diversity of soils and climates means that production costs under any given technology are unlikely to be the same everywhere, so too will the costs of trading with others or fending off aggressors vary from place to place. Nevertheless, efforts to establish the role of nature in social phenomena have been episodic. Every so often, meteorologists try to account for historical events on the basis of climatic changes. The most resounding environmental explanation was probably Karl Wittfogel's "Oriental Despotism" thesis, which attributed underdevelopment in Asia to the flourishing of repressive empires that supposedly arose wherever farming depended on centralized irrigation and flood control in great river valleys. Wittfogel fell afoul of the Stalinists, who would accept no deviation from the Marxist orthodoxy that proper (i.e., communistic) social organization could over-

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come all natural obstacles. One might think capitalism also challenges Wittfogel's thesis, since modern economic growth in Asia patently shows that the continent has not in fact been the prisoner of natural constraints. Most modern commentators seem to take this line. They feel obliged to acknowledge that the environment is "a good thing" that should be preserved at almost any cost, while ignoring the effect the natural world may actually have on human affairs.

The uneven distribution of global poverty is nevertheless so intriguing that it still attracts the attention of the occasional non-geographer. Fundamentally, the issue is what it always has been: whether natural constraints hold back disfavored societies or whether the constraints are social, political or economic. Homer-Dixon belongs to the first school, believing that the world will tend increasingly to bifurcate into great patches of resource "haves" and "have-nots." Whether or not we believe this distressing prediction, it is only fair to consider the potential for environmental problems in lands very different from the developed countries.

Sixty to 70 percent of the world's population still lives in rural areas, and more than 40 percent depends on so-called "biomass fuels" like straw and cow dung, while 1.2 billion people lack access to potable water. A graphic illustration of the challenge to the imaginations of those of us who dwell in the rich, urban and wired world comes from the 1999 BBC television series on the "1900 house" experiment, in which a modern family finds itself utterly shaken when obliged to make do with the Western domestic equipment of a century ago—limited technology, admittedly, but not one that compares with cooking over dried cow dung.

According to Homer-Dixon, two processes describe how environmental scarcity leads to conflict. One is ecological marginalization, when groups are driven (often by their own population growth) onto infertile soils, unstable hillsides, the fringes of deserts or into the depths of forests. The other is resource capture, when elites seize the lion's share of some diminishing resource. Understanding one or both processes is necessary to interpret the strife in Chiapas, Haiti, South Africa, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines and elsewhere. The deeper questions, however, concern the extent to which these issues are genuinely environmental ones, and the circumstances under which they constitute threats to national or international order.

Homer-Dixon does not believe there will be wars *between* states over resources. Most of the under-endowed countries, he writes, are too poor for war, or at least for war with other states. This, though, is a sanguine position in view of the generally pessimistic tone of his book. The states intervening in the Congo, for example, would appear at first glance to be too poor for military adventures—which cannot all be paid for by misdirected IMF funds—yet that has not deterred them from dispatching armies across borders. Potential gains as well as costs have to be considered, and the enormous wealth of the mineral-rich Congo may tempt neighboring countries to engage in aggression that, strictly speaking, they cannot afford. Some have expressed the opinion that such conflicts may be merely peripheral to the security interests of the developed countries. But I doubt this, given that we are speaking here about a set of countries that includes Pakistan, India, Indonesia and China.

Homer-Dixon correctly notes that even sub-national violence can drive states to become authoritarian and thus pose potential dangers to their neighbors. He is also inclined, after the fashion of thematic writers, to suggest that scarcity-induced migrations may carry conflict into hitherto unaffected regions. But in

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general he does not anticipate inter-state resource wars, not even over water supplies, and he mostly portrays environmental issues within states as merely contributing to underdevelopment rather than determining it.

THEN THERE is the question: What exactly is the scarce resource in question? Is it cropland, fuel, wood or water? Or is it something quite distinct from physical resources—such as creativity, which develops the technologies that adapt available resources to modern rates of population growth? For most economists the answer lies in the response more than in the challenge. The weakness of a geographical approach is that it takes one factor of production—land—far too seriously. It makes no particular sense to think of land as a fixed resource; for instance, we can plant it with superior-yielding, genetically modified crops, which amounts to much the same thing as increasing its surface area. Indeed, the heart of the matter is less the dilemma of static resource endowment than its more general solution: the social, political and economic arrangements necessary to generate new technology and stable property rights capable of remedying resource scarcity.

Homer-Dixon would expect an economist to take such a cavalier view of human suffering. Thus, he devotes whole chapters to the debate between the optimistic view espoused by a majority of economists, who see the underlying issue as a failure in the supply of *ingenuity*, and the neo-Malthusians, who see the issue either as one of overpopulation or the maldistribution of wealth and power. In these sections he goes so far as to accuse economists, *tout court*, of believing that the price elasticity of ingenuity is nearly infinite. But of course if that were true the world would be drowning in fresh gadgets and wheezes.

Some economists have undoubtedly been too glib about the fluidity of the human response to environmental scarcity. Joseph Stiglitz of the World Bank has written as though institutions adjust automatically to changing economic incentives, while the late Julian Simon gave hostages to fortune by insisting that growing populations generate a proportionate supply of new ideas, as if every country's institutions are equally adept at stimulating creativity and bringing the results to fruition. In reality the situation in poor countries is even worse than it appears, since the precious few skilled workers often emigrate to richer pastures. India and South Africa, among others, have suffered particularly egregious brain drains.

The author argues well past the concept of simple resource scarcities to the question of coalitions that block ingenuity. Given a rising price for a resource (growing scarcity), elites do not necessarily feel inspired to invest in improving productivity; rather, they resort to securing as much of that resource as possible for themselves. To cite an example, genocide in Rwanda was, in Homer-Dixon's telling, the outcome of a "conventional struggle" among elites for control of the Rwandan state; land scarcity played only a minor role. But here, as elsewhere, the author's dose of *odium theologicum* with respect to economics lets him down. He claims that land scarcity "restricted the alternatives for elite enrichment outside of government." It would have been more in line with his concept of resource capture had the elites extended their control over the scarce natural resource: namely, land. Although he does not explain which response a given group will choose, it remains true that rising real prices for resources may play out in the political arena by tempting elites into uncreative responses. This only goes to show that, for practical purposes and policy ends, so-called environmental problems do lie in the response more than

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in an intrinsically constricted "geography." The economist William Baumol has developed an "Allocation of Talent" model to show how each society "chooses" whether to induce talented individuals to take up productive, unproductive or destructive activities. This expresses more exactly Homer-Dixon's observations on the choices facing the elites of poor countries. Needless to say, too often they respond to perverse incentives.

Homer-Dixon's thesis is repeatedly qualified and surrounded by many methodological doubts. If we cut to the bare bones, we do find an acknowledgement that the issue is not merely whether one is a geographer but whether one is an optimist or a pessimist. Will humanity be capable of expanding scarce resources? The solution partly depends on how long one is prepared to allow the processes to work themselves out. Instant solutions are certainly not in the cards. The remaining part of the answer is philosophical and depends on one's world-view. In that respect Homer-Dixon is a deep pessimist who does not think that enough ingenuity will, or indeed can, be forthcoming.

This is a faintly absurd position when we think of how many nations have grown rich despite the fact that each was once poor. Have we really crossed a threshold beyond which humanity can no longer help itself? One of the author's explanations for his pessimism is that the scientific response will be inadequate because there are limits to human cognition. But most of the technologies needed to raise resource productivity or reduce waste already exist; they are simple and cheap. The obstacles to their further spread are political, i.e., the perverse incentives to which Homer-Dixon usefully draws attention.

Whether there is an intellectual barrier preventing science from solving every problem is beside the point. There is no reason for giving up on the poorest countries in the name of an ultimate epistemological limit, for the world has come nowhere near universally diffusing the tool kit it already possesses. But this book does not make too strident a case for the global importance of environmental scarcities, and the author is to be congratulated for mostly, though not always, steering clear of exaggeration. In terms of its anti-market tone and depressing policy implications, however, *Environment, Scarcity, and Violence* is not an appealing volume. □

Eric Jones is professorial fellow at the Melbourne Business School, and professor of economics at the University of Reading, England.

Selling Out

The ice-cream maker Ben & Jerry's Homemade Inc., that utopian experiment in peace, love and capitalism, is selling itself to a multinational consumer-products behemoth whose name sounds like a machine tool—Unilever. Not since General Motors acquired Saab, the tree-hugging car company from Sweden, have investors from the Woodstock generation been so dismayed.

—David Brancaccio, *Wall Street Journal*, April 17, 2000

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
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Letters

The Present Danger:

I agree with Robert Kagan and William Kristol ("The Present Danger", Spring 2000) that the United States should stop frittering away the opportunity to establish a new foreign policy, one designed to strengthen the international order in ways favorable to U.S. interests. I agree, too, with their endorsement of "preserving and reinforcing America's benevolent global hegemony." Moreover, I agree that a principal way of manifesting that benevolence should be by "accepting the responsibilities of moral and political leadership." However, I strongly disagree with their heavy focus on military and other efforts to bring about favorable changes in other countries.

I believe that the military intervention into foreign disputes that they favor, with the United States "being more rather than less inclined to weigh in when crises erupt, and preferably before they erupt", would not only be too costly in American lives and resources, but would generally be fruitless even in the very long run. . . . I also believe that our efforts since 1991 to help some countries copy our economic and political institutions have consistently, and inevitably, failed because the peoples of the countries receiving that aid have not possessed the values that prevailed in the United States when our leaders established those institutions. Unless and until those values settle deeply into the hearts and minds of those peoples, the prospects for important economic, social and political gains in their countries will continue to be dim, no matter what else we do to help them. . . .

How can we instill these values? We should devise and implement a comprehensive program to help others understand the political system that was initiated by our Founding Fathers and that accounts for our economic, social and political preponderance. We need not, and must not, put any kind of pressure on anyone to follow us. But we can, and should, help those who want help in understanding the values that underlie our Declaration of Independence, the Constitution and our economy. . . .

HERBERT K. MAY
McLean, VA

Without exception I have found the articles in *The National Interest* to be informative, well reasoned, stimulating and intellectually honest. Until the Spring 2000 issue.

The article by Robert Kagan and William Kristol is informative, well reasoned and stimulating, but less than intellectually honest. The authors have a number of points to make, and they have useful facts and arguments with which to make them.

Yet when I read that the Clinton administration was "challenged by anti-American dictatorships in Baghdad and Belgrade", I seem to recall that in Belgrade, unlike in Baghdad, one finds a democratically elected parliamentary government. And I do not recall any Belgrade "challenge" to America—unless one counts as a challenge refusing to sign a treaty of surrender. When I read of the air war over Kosovo, I might imagine aerial dogfights *à la* the Red Baron, rather than the unopposed bombardment that actually took place.

When I read that "regimes . . . resort frequently to provocation . . . by regional conquest, as in the cases of Iraq and Serbia", I ask myself, "What

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part of Europe has Yugoslavia conquered lately?" It has not provoked or attacked or conquered any of its neighboring countries, and its territory has, rather unusually, been getting smaller.

The article had good points to make. It is a shame that sophistry damages the message.

BOB AYERS
Palo Alto, CA

Humanitarian War:

Congratulations to Elliott Abrams: working with thorny and complex material, he makes a number of very useful points in "To Fight the Good Fight" (Spring 2000). But there is a vital aspect of the "humanitarian intervention" problem that should be mentioned. This is the central factor of uncontrollable media exposure, which makes human rights abuses—especially those of the horribly bloody and spectacular sort—highly visible and provocative to large sections of democratic electorates, above all in what the French call the Anglo-Saxon part of the world. These visual images carry a power and immediacy and achieve a scope that the verbal reports of earlier times did not; they are almost invariably translated into political pressure to "do something." Where inaction may project an unpopular impression of callous indifference, such pressure is very hard to resist; an outraged electorate tends to have little truck with the legal arguments used to justify or oppose the consequent action.

No doubt in time "compassion fatigue" will reduce the impact of inflammatory media images; there are signs that this is happening already. But for the moment they remain a dominant or at least important factor.

HERB GREER
Manchester, UK

Abrams replies:

Mr. Greer is right to remind us of the media's role, which was mentioned but not highlighted in my article, yet we should not take the point too far. Sometimes there is intervention without much public clamor (e.g., the United States in Haiti). Other times popular pressure to "do something" is evanescent or is resisted by political leaders. There is no doubt that intense media coverage can stir popular revulsion and make intervention more likely. Still, the decision about intervention is most often based on a mixture of humanitarian and more traditional motives, and decisionmakers will look beyond the day's polls to calculations of their own longer term national—and electoral—interests.

The Law of Increasing Returns:

In "The Law of Increasing Returns" (Spring 2000), Ronald Bailey writes:

> In fact, the solution to the puzzle of life and of a growing economy is that the earth is *not* a closed system—the energy that drives it comes principally from the sun. . . . And new ideas and designs continue to be developed all the time, among them passive solar homes, solar cells, fuel cells and nuclear power plants. It seems safe to conclude that so long as the sun shines, the second law of thermodynamics is not terribly relevant.

But the sun's energy must pass through a highly developed ecosystem before we can enjoy its benefits. Unlike plants, we cannot feed ourselves directly through photosynthesis. . . . The sustainability of the oceans, the atmosphere, and plant and animal life is critical for breathable air, drinkable water and palatable food. . . .

Similarly, new technologies may have increased the efficiency with which we conduct our affairs, but they have also helped to increase our total consumption and levels of pollution. Moreover, the development of new technology requires a huge infrastructure. No matter how fuel-efficient they may be, automobiles are not virtual. Their assembly requires material to be mined, refined and transported. . . . Further, the argument that wealthier nations pollute and consume less is disingenuous. The

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wealthiest nations pollute and consume less per capita than they did twenty years ago, but the environment does not recognize efficiencies, only totals. North America and Europe have had some success solely in decreasing the *rate* at which pollution and consumption increase. . . . But North Americans and Europeans still consume and pollute more than they did twenty years ago.

The ecosystem that supports human life has been slowly developing for millions of years. It strikes me as arrogant to think that we can re-engineer it as we wish in the space of a few decades. . . . If we continue with the pace and nature of our technological activities, we will find ourselves inhabiting a planet we have rendered inhospitable to human life.

ADAM VAN SERTIMA
Montreal

Bailey replies:

Obviously, Mr. van Sertima completely missed the point of the article. He conflates "consumption" with "pollution"—the point is that consumption in the developed countries has gone up while pollution has gone down and the condition of the natural world is improving. As Vice President Albert Gore told the American Association for the Advancement of Science two years ago, "In the past 50 years the value of our economy has tripled, while the physical weight of our economy as a whole has barely increased at all." How? We produce more food on less land, forests are expanding, air and water pollution is declining, and much more. There remain problems, especially in developing countries, but constantly improving technology and markets will promote a virtuous circle of higher consumption and lower impacts on the natural world. In fact, if we do not continue the pace and nature of our technological activities, humanity could well end up in the inhospitable world Mr. van Sertima fears.

Look, Duck and Vanish:

Michael Howard's sensitive and excellent analysis of John Lukacs' *Five Days in London: May 1940* ("Turning Point", Spring 2000) contains one minor anachronism that your readers might find of interest.

He states that in May 1940 he was a student in British public school. He and his fellow students were "living our lives as normally as possible until we were called on to 'do our bit', whatever that might be. We were enrolled in the Home Guard. . . ."

In May 1940 there was no Home Guard. What was later to be called the Home Guard was then called the "Local Defence Volunteers."

As described in *Finest Hour*, volume 6 of Martin Gilbert's biography of Winston Churchill, the surprisingly quick surrender of France to Germany in June 1940 required Churchill, in only his second month as prime minister, to marshall hastily all the "material, . . . moral, . . . practical, [and] psychological" resources of Britain. Anthony Eden supported the continued use of "Local Defence Volunteers" for those who would defend England from an "easy invasion" by Germany. Churchill, in an example of the brilliant use of the English language to inspire his countrymen and the world against Hitler, suggested instead the "Home Guard", which was thereafter used to describe Britain's anti-invasion forces. □

DANIEL H. BORINSKY
Lake Ridge, VA

Letters to the Editor

We welcome brief comments (under 300 words) from our readers.
Due to space constraints, all letters are subject to editorial revision. Remarks should be addressed to:

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

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"NO 'European' is willing to die for 'Europe.'"

—Zbigniew Brzezinski

"VICTOR POWERS are prone to succumb to 'the victory disease'; they continue to pursue the strategies that brought them victory in utterly new and inappropriate circumstances that the victory has created."

—James Kurth

"TRIUMPHALISM, gloating, bullying, lecturing about our 'indispensability'—all these are counterproductive, and also avoidable."

—Peter W. Rodman

"FROM TOKYO there has been no silly rhetoric about a strategic partnership with China."

—Michael J. Green

"IS IT POSSIBLE to bring an end to Russian barbarism by using barbaric means?"

—Laurent Murawiec

"THE IDEA of the writer as the all-knowing seer to whom the populace should defer is a theme in German history that continues to bedevil the country."

—Jacob Heilbrunn

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